Concentrated Corporate OwnershipRandall K. Morck University of Chicago Press, 2007 M12 1 - 394 páginas Standard economic models assume that many small investors own firms. This is so in most large U.S. firms, but wealthy individuals or families generally hold controlling blocks in smaller U.S. firms and in all firms in most other countries. Given this, the lack of theoretical and empirical work on tightly held firms is surprising. What corporate governance problems arise in tightly held firms? How do these differ from corporate governance problems in widely held firms? How do control blocks arise and how are they maintained? How does concentrated ownership affect economic growth? How should we regulate tightly held firms? Drawing together leading scholars from law, economics, and finance, this volume examines the economic and legal issues of concentrated ownership and their impact on a shifting global economy. |
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... private optimality may give rise to ownership structures that are not socially optimal . Surprisingly , they show this to be true even when a value - maximizing entrepreneur makes the choice of ownership structures Introduction 3.
... private optimality may give rise to ownership structures that are not socially optimal . Surprisingly , they show this to be true even when a value - maximizing entrepreneur makes the choice of ownership structures Introduction 3.
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Randall K. Morck. value - maximizing entrepreneur makes the choice of ownership structures at the IPO stage . A key assumption is that the market for minority shares is perfectly competitive while that for controlling blocks is not ...
Randall K. Morck. value - maximizing entrepreneur makes the choice of ownership structures at the IPO stage . A key assumption is that the market for minority shares is perfectly competitive while that for controlling blocks is not ...
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... choice , scope of opera- tions , and control transfers . Bebchuk , Kraakman , and Triantis concede that wealthy families with a reputation for fair dealing may be able to extend their control via such ownership structures . This should ...
... choice , scope of opera- tions , and control transfers . Bebchuk , Kraakman , and Triantis concede that wealthy families with a reputation for fair dealing may be able to extend their control via such ownership structures . This should ...
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Contenido
1 | |
15 | |
II The Law and Concentrated Corporate Ownership | 137 |
III Economic Effects of Concentrated Corporate Ownership | 263 |
Contributors | 373 |
Name Index | 375 |
Subject Index | 381 |
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Términos y frases comunes
abnormal returns agency costs analysis Andrei Shleifer assets banks Bebchuk billionaire block investors buyout Canada Canadian Canadian firms capital gains capital markets cash flows cash-flow rights CCPCs close corporation CMS structures companies concentrated ownership constraints control block controlling shareholder corporate control corporate governance corporate venture countries courts directors dividends domestic institutional ownership effect a freezeout entrepreneur equity evidence exit Financial Economics firm's freezeout go public group firms heir heir-controlled firms Holderness and Sheehan incentive income independent venture industry initial public offering investment Journal of Financial majority owners managers market power market price median minority shareholders minority shares monitoring Morck ownership structure p-value paper parties partnership percent potential pre-money valuation private benefits problem pyramids rata distributions regressions rent seeking sample self-dealing Shleifer significant tion Tobin's q transactions United valuation variables venture capital VentureOne voting wealth widely held firms
Pasajes populares
Página ix - RELATION OF NATIONAL BUREAU DIRECTORS TO PUBLICATIONS REPORTING CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS Since the present volume is a record of conference proceedings, it has been exempted from the rules governing submission of manuscripts to, and critical review by, the Board of Directors of the National Bureau.
Página 286 - Significant at the 5 percent level. * * * Significant at the 1 percent level.
Página 59 - Government service in 1970, he was professor of finance at the Graduate School of Business of the University of Chicago.
Página 160 - ... historic powers of the Chancellor to grant such other relief as the facts of a particular case may dictate. The appraisal remedy we approve may not be adequate in certain cases, particularly where fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, or gross and palpable overreaching are involved.
Página 216 - ... the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent...
Página 88 - While a complete discussion of the optimal choice of motor poles is beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it to say that...
Página 229 - To meet this test, if the stockholder whose shares were purchased was a member of the controlling group, the controlling stockholders must cause the corporation to offer each stockholder an equal opportunity to sell a ratable number of his shares to the corporation at an identical price.
Página 25 - ... (Venture capital can be defined as equity or equity-linked investments in young, privately held companies, where the investor is a financial intermediary who is typically...
Página 146 - Nasdaq and then moved to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the American Stock Exchange (Amex) between 1983 and 1992.