Concentrated Corporate OwnershipRandall K. Morck University of Chicago Press, 2007 M12 1 - 394 páginas Standard economic models assume that many small investors own firms. This is so in most large U.S. firms, but wealthy individuals or families generally hold controlling blocks in smaller U.S. firms and in all firms in most other countries. Given this, the lack of theoretical and empirical work on tightly held firms is surprising. What corporate governance problems arise in tightly held firms? How do these differ from corporate governance problems in widely held firms? How do control blocks arise and how are they maintained? How does concentrated ownership affect economic growth? How should we regulate tightly held firms? Drawing together leading scholars from law, economics, and finance, this volume examines the economic and legal issues of concentrated ownership and their impact on a shifting global economy. |
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Página vii
... Incentives, and Complementarities 17 Paul A. Gompers and Josh Lerner Comment: Michael S. Weisbach 2. Ownership Structures and the Decision to Go Public: Private versus Social Optimality 55 Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Luigi Zingales Comment ...
... Incentives, and Complementarities 17 Paul A. Gompers and Josh Lerner Comment: Michael S. Weisbach 2. Ownership Structures and the Decision to Go Public: Private versus Social Optimality 55 Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Luigi Zingales Comment ...
Página 8
... incentive to gather and hoard information so as to increase the value of the option. He also has an incentive to ... incentives for wealthy people to become controlling shareholders. The third set of papers in this volume — by Khanna ...
... incentive to gather and hoard information so as to increase the value of the option. He also has an incentive to ... incentives for wealthy people to become controlling shareholders. The third set of papers in this volume — by Khanna ...
Página 16
Randall K. Morck. This Page Intentionally Left Blank The Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Success Organizational Structure, Incentives,
Randall K. Morck. This Page Intentionally Left Blank The Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Success Organizational Structure, Incentives,
Página 17
Randall K. Morck. The Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Success Organizational Structure, Incentives, and ... incentive structures in corporate funds are very different: most are structured as corporate subsidiaries and have much ...
Randall K. Morck. The Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Success Organizational Structure, Incentives, and ... incentive structures in corporate funds are very different: most are structured as corporate subsidiaries and have much ...
Página 18
... incentives and management interference, would be unable to select or oversee firms effectively. If corporations can exploit complementarities with their existing lines of business while evaluating or assisting portfolio firms, however ...
... incentives and management interference, would be unable to select or oversee firms effectively. If corporations can exploit complementarities with their existing lines of business while evaluating or assisting portfolio firms, however ...
Contenido
1 | |
15 | |
II The Law and Concentrated Corporate Ownership | 137 |
III Economic Effects of Concentrated Corporate Ownership | 263 |
Contributors | 373 |
Name Index | 375 |
Subject Index | 381 |
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Términos y frases comunes
agency costs analysis assets banks benefits block Canada Canadian capital changes choice close corporation companies concentrated consider constraints contract controlling shareholder corporate costs countries courts directors distributions Economics effect efficient entrepreneur equal equity evidence example exit expected firms foreign freezeout funds gains governance greater heir held hold Holderness important incentives income increase independent industry initial institutional interest investment investors issue Journal less limited lower majority managers mean measures median minority shareholders monitoring Note offer opportunism owner ownership ownership structure parties percent performance positive possible potential problem protection pyramids reason receive reduce relation relative reported returns rule sample shares significant structure suggests tion traded transfer United University variables venture venture capital voting wealth
Pasajes populares
Página ix - RELATION OF NATIONAL BUREAU DIRECTORS TO PUBLICATIONS REPORTING CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS Since the present volume is a record of conference proceedings, it has been exempted from the rules governing submission of manuscripts to, and critical review by, the Board of Directors of the National Bureau.
Página 286 - Significant at the 5 percent level. * * * Significant at the 1 percent level.
Página 59 - Government service in 1970, he was professor of finance at the Graduate School of Business of the University of Chicago.
Página 160 - ... historic powers of the Chancellor to grant such other relief as the facts of a particular case may dictate. The appraisal remedy we approve may not be adequate in certain cases, particularly where fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, or gross and palpable overreaching are involved.
Página 216 - ... the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent...
Página 88 - While a complete discussion of the optimal choice of motor poles is beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it to say that...
Página 229 - To meet this test, if the stockholder whose shares were purchased was a member of the controlling group, the controlling stockholders must cause the corporation to offer each stockholder an equal opportunity to sell a ratable number of his shares to the corporation at an identical price.
Página 25 - ... (Venture capital can be defined as equity or equity-linked investments in young, privately held companies, where the investor is a financial intermediary who is typically...
Página 146 - Nasdaq and then moved to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the American Stock Exchange (Amex) between 1983 and 1992.