Concentrated Corporate OwnershipRandall K. Morck University of Chicago Press, 2007 M12 1 - 394 páginas Standard economic models assume that many small investors own firms. This is so in most large U.S. firms, but wealthy individuals or families generally hold controlling blocks in smaller U.S. firms and in all firms in most other countries. Given this, the lack of theoretical and empirical work on tightly held firms is surprising. What corporate governance problems arise in tightly held firms? How do these differ from corporate governance problems in widely held firms? How do control blocks arise and how are they maintained? How does concentrated ownership affect economic growth? How should we regulate tightly held firms? Drawing together leading scholars from law, economics, and finance, this volume examines the economic and legal issues of concentrated ownership and their impact on a shifting global economy. |
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Página 6
... investors might commit to restraining their dominant shareholders. The authors find little evidence of this. Outside directors, staggered boards, cumulative voting, audit committees, and compensation committees are all rarer in ...
... investors might commit to restraining their dominant shareholders. The authors find little evidence of this. Outside directors, staggered boards, cumulative voting, audit committees, and compensation committees are all rarer in ...
Página 9
... investors in India. Since emerging economies such as India are increasingly courting foreign investors, these results are clearly important. The paper by Lucian Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman, and George Triantis distinguishes true majority ...
... investors in India. Since emerging economies such as India are increasingly courting foreign investors, these results are clearly important. The paper by Lucian Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman, and George Triantis distinguishes true majority ...
Página 12
... investors are highly diversified. Where concentrated ownership is prevalent, the most critical controlling shareholder in each firm may be quite undiversified. Since this investor has control rights that let him influence corporate ...
... investors are highly diversified. Where concentrated ownership is prevalent, the most critical controlling shareholder in each firm may be quite undiversified. Since this investor has control rights that let him influence corporate ...
Página 18
... investors.) Thus, the contrast between corporate and independent venture funds provides a natural test case for ... investors in these cases: it may be that the corporate investor will be willing to pay more than other investors owing 18 ...
... investors.) Thus, the contrast between corporate and independent venture funds provides a natural test case for ... investors in these cases: it may be that the corporate investor will be willing to pay more than other investors owing 18 ...
Página 19
... investors. The empirical evidence suggests that corporate programs are much less stable than those of independent funds. The programs frequently cease operations after only a few investments. We show that the instability is particularly ...
... investors. The empirical evidence suggests that corporate programs are much less stable than those of independent funds. The programs frequently cease operations after only a few investments. We show that the instability is particularly ...
Contenido
1 | |
15 | |
II The Law and Concentrated Corporate Ownership | 137 |
III Economic Effects of Concentrated Corporate Ownership | 263 |
Contributors | 373 |
Name Index | 375 |
Subject Index | 381 |
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Términos y frases comunes
agency costs analysis assets banks benefits block Canada Canadian capital changes choice close corporation companies concentrated consider constraints contract controlling shareholder corporate costs countries courts directors distributions Economics effect efficient entrepreneur equal equity evidence example exit expected firms foreign freezeout funds gains governance greater heir held hold Holderness important incentives income increase independent industry initial institutional interest investment investors issue Journal less limited lower majority managers mean measures median minority shareholders monitoring Note offer opportunism owner ownership ownership structure parties percent performance positive possible potential problem protection pyramids reason receive reduce relation relative reported returns rule sample shares significant structure suggests tion traded transfer United University variables venture venture capital voting wealth
Pasajes populares
Página ix - RELATION OF NATIONAL BUREAU DIRECTORS TO PUBLICATIONS REPORTING CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS Since the present volume is a record of conference proceedings, it has been exempted from the rules governing submission of manuscripts to, and critical review by, the Board of Directors of the National Bureau.
Página 286 - Significant at the 5 percent level. * * * Significant at the 1 percent level.
Página 59 - Government service in 1970, he was professor of finance at the Graduate School of Business of the University of Chicago.
Página 160 - ... historic powers of the Chancellor to grant such other relief as the facts of a particular case may dictate. The appraisal remedy we approve may not be adequate in certain cases, particularly where fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, or gross and palpable overreaching are involved.
Página 216 - ... the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent...
Página 88 - While a complete discussion of the optimal choice of motor poles is beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it to say that...
Página 229 - To meet this test, if the stockholder whose shares were purchased was a member of the controlling group, the controlling stockholders must cause the corporation to offer each stockholder an equal opportunity to sell a ratable number of his shares to the corporation at an identical price.
Página 25 - ... (Venture capital can be defined as equity or equity-linked investments in young, privately held companies, where the investor is a financial intermediary who is typically...
Página 146 - Nasdaq and then moved to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the American Stock Exchange (Amex) between 1983 and 1992.