Concentrated Corporate OwnershipRandall K. Morck University of Chicago Press, 2007 M12 1 - 394 páginas Standard economic models assume that many small investors own firms. This is so in most large U.S. firms, but wealthy individuals or families generally hold controlling blocks in smaller U.S. firms and in all firms in most other countries. Given this, the lack of theoretical and empirical work on tightly held firms is surprising. What corporate governance problems arise in tightly held firms? How do these differ from corporate governance problems in widely held firms? How do control blocks arise and how are they maintained? How does concentrated ownership affect economic growth? How should we regulate tightly held firms? Drawing together leading scholars from law, economics, and finance, this volume examines the economic and legal issues of concentrated ownership and their impact on a shifting global economy. |
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Página viii
... Wealth , Corporate Control , and Economic Growth : The Canadian Disease ? 319 Randall K. Morck , David A. Stangeland , and Bernard Yeung Comment : David M. Levy Contributors Name Index Subject Index 373 375 381 Foreword Over the past ...
... Wealth , Corporate Control , and Economic Growth : The Canadian Disease ? 319 Randall K. Morck , David A. Stangeland , and Bernard Yeung Comment : David M. Levy Contributors Name Index Subject Index 373 375 381 Foreword Over the past ...
Página ix
... wealth creation . Nevertheless , while the public debate over corporate governance reform has focused on the structure and performance of corporate boards of di- rectors , legal and economic scholars have taken a much broader view of ...
... wealth creation . Nevertheless , while the public debate over corporate governance reform has focused on the structure and performance of corporate boards of di- rectors , legal and economic scholars have taken a much broader view of ...
Página xi
... ownership by pension funds , corporate insiders , corporate raiders , foreign corporations , and wealthy individuals . I am indebted to the authors of the papers contained xi Concentrated Corporate Ownership: Acknowledgments.
... ownership by pension funds , corporate insiders , corporate raiders , foreign corporations , and wealthy individuals . I am indebted to the authors of the papers contained xi Concentrated Corporate Ownership: Acknowledgments.
Página 1
... wealth of minority public shareholders is then an externality . We expect utility - maximizing holders of controlling blocks to use corporate resources to benefit themselves in both pecuniary and nonpecuniary ways . Pecuniary benefits ...
... wealth of minority public shareholders is then an externality . We expect utility - maximizing holders of controlling blocks to use corporate resources to benefit themselves in both pecuniary and nonpecuniary ways . Pecuniary benefits ...
Página 4
... wealth , even though this is socially suboptimal . Since the transfer of ownership imposes different externalities ... wealthy families , often through multilayered holding companies . Daniels and Iacobucci go on to criticize Morck ...
... wealth , even though this is socially suboptimal . Since the transfer of ownership imposes different externalities ... wealthy families , often through multilayered holding companies . Daniels and Iacobucci go on to criticize Morck ...
Contenido
1 | |
15 | |
II The Law and Concentrated Corporate Ownership | 137 |
III Economic Effects of Concentrated Corporate Ownership | 263 |
Contributors | 373 |
Name Index | 375 |
Subject Index | 381 |
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Términos y frases comunes
abnormal returns agency costs analysis Andrei Shleifer assets banks Bebchuk billionaire block investors buyout Canada Canadian Canadian firms capital gains capital markets cash flows cash-flow rights CCPCs close corporation CMS structures companies concentrated ownership constraints control block controlling shareholder corporate control corporate governance corporate venture countries courts directors dividends domestic institutional ownership effect a freezeout entrepreneur equity evidence exit Financial Economics firm's freezeout go public group firms heir heir-controlled firms Holderness and Sheehan incentive income independent venture industry initial public offering investment Journal of Financial majority owners managers market power market price median minority shareholders minority shares monitoring Morck ownership structure p-value paper parties partnership percent potential pre-money valuation private benefits problem pyramids rata distributions regressions rent seeking sample self-dealing Shleifer significant tion Tobin's q transactions United valuation variables venture capital VentureOne voting wealth widely held firms
Pasajes populares
Página ix - RELATION OF NATIONAL BUREAU DIRECTORS TO PUBLICATIONS REPORTING CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS Since the present volume is a record of conference proceedings, it has been exempted from the rules governing submission of manuscripts to, and critical review by, the Board of Directors of the National Bureau.
Página 286 - Significant at the 5 percent level. * * * Significant at the 1 percent level.
Página 59 - Government service in 1970, he was professor of finance at the Graduate School of Business of the University of Chicago.
Página 160 - ... historic powers of the Chancellor to grant such other relief as the facts of a particular case may dictate. The appraisal remedy we approve may not be adequate in certain cases, particularly where fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, or gross and palpable overreaching are involved.
Página 216 - ... the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent...
Página 88 - While a complete discussion of the optimal choice of motor poles is beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it to say that...
Página 229 - To meet this test, if the stockholder whose shares were purchased was a member of the controlling group, the controlling stockholders must cause the corporation to offer each stockholder an equal opportunity to sell a ratable number of his shares to the corporation at an identical price.
Página 25 - ... (Venture capital can be defined as equity or equity-linked investments in young, privately held companies, where the investor is a financial intermediary who is typically...
Página 146 - Nasdaq and then moved to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the American Stock Exchange (Amex) between 1983 and 1992.