tions reflect the conservative influence of the past, rather than the progressive movements of the present. For instance, the southern states, where property rights and institutions arising out of the same reflect the spirit of the patriarchal slavery system, divorce is less common. And yet the morality among the lower social classes there does not compare favorably with other sections of the country where the divorce-rate is high. It is among the better classes that the family represents a compactness and stability wherein divorce has little play.

It is true there are some states which represent an advanced industrial development as is found in the country where divorce is granted only for adultery. But in these states such restriction is felt to be oppressive. This is evident by the number who seek release from conjugal ties in other than their home state. What is true of England is true of certain American states, that is, the low divorce-rate is the result of the difficulty of obtaining legal separations. For example the home life in New York is not any more admirable than the home life in the extreme west where the divorce-rate is the highest.

Unless the industrial development and economic conditions are similiar it is impossible to measure the moral standards of communities by a comparison of their divorce-rates. Legislation dealing directly with family relations ought to take into consideration the industrial habits of the community as well as the moral and social ideals arising out of existing conditions.

It is true, a high divorce-rate has been a symptom of a decadent race, but on the other hand it does not necessarily follow that a deteriorating race is characterized by a high divorcerate, or that a high divorce-rate signifies a retrogressive people. It may be a symptom of a decline of moral conceptions, but it may also mean a higher conception of morality, and a decline of respect for property rights in women. The frontiersman is not inspired with the same awe of wealth as the man who remained at home in a settled community; and his moral conceptions tend to conform less to tradition and custom and more to his own individual conscience.

Howard says, "Divorce is a remedy and not the disease. It is not a virtue in a divorce law, as it appears to be often assumed, to restrict the application of the remedy at all hazzards,

regardless of the sufferings of the social body. If it were always the essential purpose of a good law to diminish directly the number of bona fide divorces, the more rational course would be to imitate South Carolina and prohibit divorce entirely. Divorce is not immoral. It is quite probable on the contrary, that drastic, like negligent, legislation is sometimes immoral. It is not necessarily a merit, and it may be a grave social wrong, to reduce the legal causes for a decree to the one 'scriptural' ground.

Divorce is an expression of revolt. It may be an expression of revolt against conditions imposed by one individual upon another, or against a position of inferiority in the family group imposed upon women by tradition. Instead of a wide spread incompatibility of temperaments of two individuals held together by wedlock, the incompatibility may exist in part between the social institution called "the home" and the ideas and ideals of a democratic community.

The entire social atmosphere outside the home-whether in the school or in the club, or in any other social group aims to inspire an individualization and socialization in harmony with high moral precepts. We are living in an age when the individual counts as an important part of the social groups of which he is a member, and some vital matter must be at stake when the individual is required to sacrifice himself against his will for the good of the community.

Women have been considered the property of their husbands for so long that an initiative on their part, disturbing the stability of the conjugal bond is viewed by many as a symptom of rampant anarchy. What it does indicate is a marked growth in the rights of women, and a tendency for these rights, especially economic rights, to approach the plane of the rights of men.

If the present tendency to divorce is a superficial phenomenon only, measures ought to be taken to check it. But if it is vital, and has its roots deep down in our social order, it cannot be checked by mere repression without perpetrating a grave social wrong.

There are no historical facts enabling us to predict the out

♦ Howard, A History of Matrimonial Institutions, III, pp. 219–220.

come. Divorce in the past was a masculine institution and worked great hardships upon women and children. It was the rich and not the poor, the men and not the women who enjoyed the privilege of breaking the marriage bond. To counteract its evil influences, all social institutions combined in impressing upon man the necessity of accepting his family responsibilities out of justice to his wife, his children and the community. So long has the lesson been impressed that many men consider it a grave moral responsibility to remain as a protector of their families. Such is not the case with women. No matter how great their industrial burdens in the home, the past taught them submission, and not responsibility. All their training-other than industrial-had as its goal accomplishments that in nowise involved responsibilities. Whatever industrial responsibilities the home imposed upon them, the business world of today has largely freed them from. This economic situation is leaving an increasing number of women without the discipline of work or necessity. This lack of responsibility on the part of women may be in part a reason why they more often than men seek a divorce. Many women are showing by their unselfish public spirit an appreciation of the importance of the social forces dealing with the care and the protection of children. In their social capacities they are working out many of the social problems dealing with all humanity, as well as the problems of their sex alone. Many of the serious problems, especially those bearing directly upon the home, the relations of husband and wife, and mother and children, will be solved in time-not by our law makers alone but with the co-operation of women.

It is true many of our cherished traditions and customs are in grave danger of complete annihilation. If this destruction is to be brought about by the baser elements in human nature— the love of sensual ease, dissipation and depravity-our civilization is indeed in danger. But if the motive power is the love of freedom as against the needless sacrifice of the individual-a desire to give expression to creative instincts which are alike in men and women--there exist signs that out of the alarming confusion will arise something better, and more conducive to a progressive civilization.

CHAPTER X

THE POLITICAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN AND INDUSTRIAL CHANGES

In studying the history of primitive societies, we find authority resting upon economic strength of military prowess, the latter nearly always associated with material advantages. Property is synonymous with power whether it consists of implements, herds or lands. Excepting personal belongings, women possessed little property and had little incentive to hold property as exclusively their own.

There is a striking difference between the political powers and property rights of men and women, not only in primitive society, but all through history. To point out some fundamental reasons for this divergence will be the purpose of this chapter.

In modern society, we are accustomed to ascribe this divergence in the political status of men and women, to custom, tradition, and the tyranny of one sex over the other. Customs have their roots in habits of life, and habits more often result from a convenience at an earlier stage of culture. Tyranny of one sex over the other-especially of man over woman- -is not likely to occur among a peaceable people who show no aggressive qualities, or among a people the women of which outnumber men and apparently possess an equal degree of physical strength. All existing societies as well as all societies of the past that have left traces of their civilization, show the same tendency to place political power in the hands of men, and not in the hands of women. This practice has been so common among all peoples as to suggest some fundamental reason for a social development apparently so unjust to half the race---other than an inherent conflict of interests, between the sexes. Certainly such a conflict of interests, as some would have us believe, has never existed in the animal world. The reason therefore must be social and not inherent. The injustices arising out of such a social scheme have little in common with the fundamental causes out of which the existing situation arose.

It is difficult to trace the relation of primitive economic development to the political status of women since our knowledge of the origin of society, and its early development is very limited. But a vivid picture of the reactions of economic changes upon the political status of women in historical times, is possible as well as suggestive.

sense.

Morgan says, "The experience of mankind . . . has developed but two plans of government, using the world plan in its scientific Both were definite and systematic organizations of society. The first and the most ancient was a social organization, founded upon gentes, phratries and tribes. The second and the latest in time was a political organization, founded upon territory and upon property. Under the first a gentile society was created, in which the government dealt with persons through their relation to the gens and the tribe. These relations were purely personal. Under the second a political society was instituted, in which the government dealt with persons through their relations to territory, e. g.-the township, the county, and the state. These two relations were purely territorial."1

So long as the government dealt with personal relations and property belonged to small groups of people rather than to individuals, women would naturally be conceded a more conspicuous position. We ourselves, not necessarily from any preconceived notion, but because of the nature of things, associate women more closely with family ties than we do men. This does not mean women, that because of their status within the family group or their relation to the family group, have greater authority in the affairs of the community than men, or that the balance of power rests with them, but that their importance in the social consciousness depends upon where the emphasis is placed.

Morgan accounts for the practice of reckoning descent in the female line to the fact that paternity was uncertain. The women and the children formed a nucleus around which gathered a social organization composed of the female descendants. Women, especially old women, had a voice in the affairs of the gens, but when a leader was chosen the choice invariably fell upon some man.

1 Morgan, Ancient Societies, p. 62.

1