secretary of state. And he conjectured that this practice had been continued after the expiration of that act,-a conjecture shared by Lord Mansfield and the Court of King's Bench. With the unanimous concurrence of the other judges of his court, this eminent magistrate now finally condemned this dangerous and unconstitutional practice. discussed in Meanwhile, the legality of a general warrant had been repeatedly discussed in Parliament.2 General Several motions were offered, in different warrants forms, for declaring it unlawful. While Parliament. trials were still pending, there were obvious objections to any proceeding by which the judgment of the courts would be anticipated: but in debate, such a warrant found few supporters. Those who were unwilling to condemn it by a vote of the House, had little to say in its defence. Even the attorney and solicitor-general did not venture to pronounce it legal. But whatever their opinion, the competency of the House to decide any matter of law was contemptuously denied. Sir Fletcher Norton, the attorney-general, even went so far as to declare that he should regard a resolution of the members of the House of Commons no more than the oaths of so many drunken porters in Covent Garden,'—a sentiment as unconstitutional as it was insolent. Mr. Pitt affirmed that there was not a man to be found of sufficient profligacy to defend this warrant upon the principle of legality.' Leach v. Money and others, Burrow's Rep., iii. 1692, 1767; Sir W. Blackstone's Rep., 555. The same view was also adopted by Blackstone, Comm., iv. 336, n. (Kerr's Ed., 1862.) 2 Jan. 19th, Feb. 3rd, 6th, 13th, 14th, and 17th, 1764; Parl. Hist., xv. 1393-1418 Jan. 29th, 1765; Ibid., xvi. 6. Resolutions of the Commons, April 22nd, 1766. In 1766, the Court of King's Bench had condemned the warrant, and the objections to a declaratory resolution were therefore removed; the Court of Common Pleas had pronounced a search-warrant for papers to be illegal ; and lastly, the more liberal administration of the Marquess of Rockingham had succeeded to that of Mr. Grenville. Accordingly, resolutions were now agreed to, condemning general warrants, whether for the seizure of persons or papers, as illegal; and declaring them, if executed against a member, to be a breach of privilege.' Declaratory bill, April 29th, 1766. 2 A bill was introduced to carry into effect these resolutions, and passed by the House of Commons: but was not agreed to by the Lords. A declaratory act was, however, no longer necessary. The illegality of general warrants had been judicially determined, and the judgment of the courts confirmed by the House of Commons, and approved as well by popular opinion, as by the first statesmen of the time. The cause of public liberty had been vindicated, and was henceforth secure. Suspension of Habeas The writ of Habeas Corpus is unquestionably the first security of civil liberty. It brings to Corpus Act. light the cause of every imprisonment, approves its lawfulness, or liberates the prisoner. It exacts obedience from the highest courts: Parliament itself submits to its authority.3 No right is more justly valued. It protects the subject from 1 Parl. Hist., xvi. 209. 2 Ibid., 210. unfounded suspicions, from the aggressions of power, and from abuses in the administration of justice.' Yet this protective law, which gives every man security and confidence, in times of tranquillity, has been suspended, again and again, in periods of public danger or apprehension. Rarely, however, has this been suffered without jealousy, hesitation, and remonstrance; and whenever the perils of the state have been held sufficient to warrant this sacrifice of personal liberty, no minister or magistrate has been suffered to tamper with the law, at his discretion. Parliament alone, convinced of the exigency of each occasion, has suspended, for a time, the rights of individuals, in the interests of the state. The first years after the Revolution were full of danger. A dethroned king, aided by fo- Cases from reign enemies, and a powerful body of lution to English adherents, was threatening the 1794. new settlement of the crown with war and treason. Hence the liberties of Englishmen, so recently assured, were several times made to yield to the exigencies of the state. Again, on occasions of no less peril, the rebellion of 1715, the Jacobite conspiracy of 1722, and the invasion of the realm by the Pretender in 1745,-the Habeas Corpus Act was suspended. Henceforth, for nearly half a century, the law remained inviolate. During the 1 Blackstone's Comm. (Kerr), iii. 138-147, &c. 2 Parl. Hist., viii. 27-39; xiii. 671. In 1745 it was stated by the solicitor-general that the act had been suspended nine times since the Revolution; and in 1794 Mr. Secretary Dundas made a similar statement.-Parl. Hist., xxx. 539. 1 American war, indeed, it had been necessary to empower the king to secure persons suspected of high treason, committed in North America, or on the high seas, or of the crime of piracy: but it was not until 1794 that the civil liberties of Englishmen, at home, were again to be suspended. The dangers and alarms of that dark period have already been recounted.2 Ministers, believing the state to be threatened by traitorous conspiracies, once more sought power to countermine treason by powers beyond the law. Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, 1794. May 16th. His Relying upon the report of a secret committee, Mr. Pitt moved for a bill to empower Majesty to secure and detain persons suspected of conspiring against his person and government. He justified this measure on the ground, that whatever the temporary danger of placing such power in the hands of the government, it was far less than the danger with which the constitution and society were threatened. If ministers abused the power entrusted to them, they would be responsible for its abuse. It was vigorously opposed by Mr. Fox, Mr. Grey, Mr. Sheridan, and a small body of adherents. They denied the disaffection imputed to the people, ridiculed the revelations of the committee, and declared that no such dangers threatened the state as would justify the surrender of the chief safeguard of personal freedom. This measure would give ministers absolute power over every individual in the kingdom. It would em2 Supra, Vol. 11. In 1777, act 17 Geo. III. c. 9. p. 302. power them to arrest, on suspicion, any man whose opinions were obnoxious to them,--the advocates of reform, even the members of the parliamentary opposition. Who would be safe, when conspiracies were everywhere suspected, and constitutional objects and language believed to be the mere cloak of sedition? Let every man charged with treason be brought to justice; in the words of Sheridan, where there was guilt, let the broad axe fall;' but why surrender the liberties of the innocent? 6 Yet thirty-nine members only could be found to oppose the introduction of the bill.1 Ministers, representing its immediate urgency, endeavoured to pass it at once through all its stages. The opposition, unable to resist its progress by numbers, endeavoured to arrest its passing for a time, in order to appeal to the judgment of the country: but all their efforts were vain. With free institutions, the people were now governed according to the principles of despotism. The will of their rulers was supreme, and not to be questioned. After eleven divisions, the bill was pressed forward as far as the report, on the same night; and the galleries being closed, the arguments urged against it were merely addressed to a determined and taciturn majority. On the following day, the bill was read a third time and sent up to the Lords, by whom, after some sharp debates, it was speedily passed.2 The strongest opponents of the measure, while denying its present necessity, admitted that when 1 1 Ayes, 201; Noes, 39. 2 Parl. Hist xxxi. 497, 521, 525. |