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Bourne's

Bourne's Act in 1818:1 but this same act, while it left select vestries otherwise un-reformed, Mr. Sturges made a further inroad upon the popular Act, 1818. constitution of open vestries. Hitherto every person entitled to attend, had enjoyed an equal right of voting; but this act multiplied the votes of vestrymen according to the value of their rated property: one man could give six votes: others no more than

one.

Hobhouse's

An important breach, however, was made in the exclusive system of local government, by Sir John Sir John Hobhouse's Vestry Act, passed Act, 1831. during the agitation for parliamentary reform.2 The majority of ratepayers, in any parish, within a city or town, or any other parish comprising 800 householders rated to the poor, were empowered to adopt this act. Under its provisions, vestries were elected by every rated parishioner: the votes. of the electors were taken by ballot: every tenpound householder, except in certain cases,3 was eligible as a vestryman: and no member of the vestry was entitled to more than a single vote. This measure, however democratic in principle, did little more than revert to the policy of the common law. It was adopted in some populous parishes in

158 Geo. III. c. 69, amended by 59 Geo. III. c. 85, 7 Will. IV. and 1 Vict. c. 35; Report on Poor Laws, 1818.-Hans. Deb., 1st Ser., xxxviii. 573.

2 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 60; Oct. 20th, 1831; Toulmin Smith's Parish, 240.

In the metropolis, or in any parish having more than 3,000 inhabitants, a 407. qualification was required. In the metropolis, however, the act was superseded by the Metropolis Local Management Act, 1855.-Infra, 297.

the metropolis and elsewhere: but otherwise has had a limited operation.'

Municipal

corporations,

The history of municipal corporations affords another example of encroachments upon popular rights. The government of towns, England. under the Saxons, was no less popular than the other local institutions of that race; 2 and the constitution of corporations, at a later period, was founded upon the same principles. All the settled inhabitants and traders of corporate towns, who contributed to the local taxes, had a voice in the management of their own municipal affairs. The community, enjoying corporate rights and privileges, was continually enlarged by the admission of men connected with the town by birth, marriage, apprenticeship or servitude, and of others, not so connected, by gift or purchase. For some centuries after the conquest, the burgesses assembled in person, for the transaction of business. They elected a mayor, or other chief magistrate: but no governing body, or town-council, to whom their authority was delegated. The burgesses only were known to the law. But as towns and trade increased, the more convenient practice of representation was introduced for municipal as well as for parliamentary government. The most wealthy and influential inhabitants being

In 1842, nine parishes only had adopted it.-Parl. Paper, 1842, No. 564.

2 Falgrave's English Commonwealth, i. 629; Merewether and Stephens' Hist. of Boroughs, Introd. viii.; Kemble's Hist., ii. 262; Lappenberg's England, App.; Hallam's Middle Ages, ii. 153.

3 Report of Commissioners on Municipal Corporations, 1835, p. 16; Merewether and Stephens' Hist., Introd. v. 1, 10, &c.; Hallam's Middle Ages, ii. 155.

chosen, gradually encroached upon the privileges of the inferior townsmen, assumed all municipal authority, and substituted self-election for the suffrages of burgesses and freemen. This encroachment upon popular rights was not submitted to without many struggles: but at the close of the fifteenth century, it had been successfully accomplished in a large proportion of the corporations of England.

from

to the Revu

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Until the reign of Henry VII., these encroachments had been local and spontaneous. The Charters people had submitted to them: but the law Henry VII. had not enforced them. From this time, lution. however, popular rights were set aside in a new form. The crown began to grant charters to boroughs,—generally conferring or reviving the privilege of returning members to Parliament; and most of these charters vested all the powers of municipal government in the mayor and town council,-nominated in the first instance by the crown itself, and afterwards self-elected. Nor did the contempt of the Tudors for popular rights stop here. By many of their charters, the same governing body was intrusted with the exclusive right of returning members to Parliament. For national as well as local government, the burgesses were put beyond the pale of the constitution. And in order to bring municipalities under the direct influence of the crown and the nobility, the office of high steward was often created: when the nobleman holding that office became the patron of the borough, and returned its members to Parliament. The power of the crown and aristocracy was increased, at the ex

pense of the liberties of the people. The same policy was pursued by the Stuarts; and the two last of that race violated the liberties of the few corporations which still retained a popular constitution, after the encroachments of centuries.1

from the

to George

III.

After the Revolution, corporations were free from Corporations the intrusion of prerogative: but the policy Revolution of municipal freedom was as little respected as in former times. A corporation had come to be regarded as a close governing body, with peculiar privileges. The old model was followed; and the charters of George III. favoured the municipal rights of burgesses no more than the charters of Elizabeth or James I.2 Even where they did not expressly limit the local authority to a small body of persons, custom and usurpation restricted it either to the town council, or to that body and its own nominees, the freemen. And while this close form of municipal government was maintained, towns were growing in wealth and population, whose inhabitants had no voice in the management of their own affairs. Two millions of people were denied the constitutional privilege of self-government.

Abuses of

close corpo

Self-elected and irresponsible corporations were suffered to enjoy a long dominion. Comrations. posed of local, and often hereditary cliques and family connexions, they were absolute masters over their own townsmen. Generally of one political party, they excluded men of different opinions,

Case of Quo Warranto, 1683; St. Tr., viii. 1039; Hume's Hist., vi. 201; remodelling the corporations, 1687; Hallam's Const. Hist., ii. 238.

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-whether in politics or religion,-and used all the influence of their office for maintaining the asElected for life, it

cendency of their own party.

was not difficult to consolidate their interest; and they acted without any sense of responsibility.' Their proceedings were generally secret: nay, secrecy was sometimes enjoined by an oath.2

Despite their narrow constitution, there were some corporations which performed their functions. worthily. Maintaining a medieval dignity and splendour, their rule was graced by public virtue, courtesy and refinement. Nobles shared their councils and festivities: the first men of the county were associated with townsmen: and while ruling without responsibility, they retained the willing allegiance of the people, by traditions of public service, by acts of munificence and charity, and by the respect due to their eminent station. But the greater number of corporations were of a lower type. Neglecting their proper functions,-the superintendence of the police, the management of the gaols, the paving and lighting of the streets, and the supply of water,—they thought only of the personal interests attached to office. They grasped all patronage, lay and ecclesiastical, for their relatives, friends, and political partisans; and wasted the corporate funds in greasy feasts and vulgar revelry.3 Many were absolutely insolvent. Charities were despoiled, and public trusts neglected and misapplied jobbery and corruption in every form were 2 Ibid., 36.

Report of Commissioners, p. 36. 3 Ibid., p. 46.

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