3dly. Form and effect of accept ances. should seem essential that his name should appear By the practice of the London bankers, if one banker who holds a cheque drawn on another banker, presents it after four o'clock, it is not then paid, but a mark is put on it to shew that the drawer has effects, and that it will be paid, and this marking amounts to an acceptance, payable next day at the clearing house. When an acceptance is made by one partner only, on the partnership account, he should regularly subscribe the name of the firm, or express that he accepts for himself and partner; but any mode which indicates an intention to be bound by the terms of the request in the bill, will bind the firm. And when by an agent for his principal, he must subscribe the name of such principal, or specify that he does it as agent, as otherwise it may, if he be named or described in the direction of the bill, make him personally responsible. It has been adjudged, that if a bill be made payable in a city or large town generally, it must, by the acceptance, be made payable at some particular house or place there, and if not, that the holder may protest it, which seems reasonable, as otherwise it would be difficult in many cases for the holder to find out the residence of the drawee". Much discussion has of late taken place upon the effect of an acceptance payable at a particular place, and which we will consider when we examine the presentment for payment. In general, however, as no formal act is required to constitute a simple contract, and any mode which demonstrates an intention to become bound by it, will have an obligatory force on the contracting party; any act of the drawee which evinces a consent to comply with the request of the drawer, will constitute Ante, 51, 3.-Mason v. Rumsey, 1 Campb. 384. 5 Póth. pl. 118.-Thomas v. Bishop, 2 Stra. 955.-Macbeath v. Haldimand, 1 T. R. 172.-et ante, 36. 6 Gregory. Walcup, Comyns, 75.-Mutford v. Walcot, Lord Raym. 574. seen 3dly. Form and effect of accept an acceptance. Thus the word "accepted," An acceptance may also be implied as well as expressed; and it is said that it may be inferred from the drawee's keeping the bill a great length of time, or by any other act, which gives credit to the bill, and induces the holder not to protest it; or is intended as a surprise upon him, and to induce him to consider the bill as accepted'. 2 1 Poth. pl. 45. Anon. Comb. 401. Per Holt, C. J. If the drawce underwrites a bill "presented such a day, or only the day of the month," 'tis such an acknowledgement of the bill as amounts to an acceptance, and this was declared by the jury to be the common practice; and see Vin. Ab. tit. Bills of Exchange, L. 4.-Bayl. 77. 3 Id. ibid. Moor. Whitby, Bull, Ni. Pri. 270. A bill, drawn by Newton on the defendant was presented for acceptance; the defendant wrote upon it," Mr. Jackson, please to pay this note, and charge it to Mr. Newton's account-R. Whitby." It was insisted that this was no acceptance, but only a direction to Jackson to pay it out of a particular fund, and if there were no such fund the money was not to be paid. Per cur. This is a direction to Jackson to pay the money, and it signifies not to what account it is to be placed, when paid; that is a transaction between them only, and this is clearly a sufficient acceptance. Bayl. 77, 8.-Selw. N. P. 4th edit. 314. 5 Wilkinson v. Lutwidge, Stra. 648. Drawer against the acceptor of a bill of exchange. The question was as to the validity of the acceptance. The bill was drawn in New England, and remitted to the plaintiff's correspondent in London, together with another bill drawn upon the same account, both which were sent to the defendant for his acceptance, who, in his letter acknowledging the receipt of them, wrote thus, "the two bills of exchange which you sent me, I will pay them in case the owners of the Queen Anne do not, and they living in Dublin, must first apply to them. I hope to have their answer in a week or ten days. I do not expect they will pay them, but I judge it proper to take their answer before I do, which I request you will acquaint Mr. Wilkinson with, and that he may rest satisfied with the payment." The defendant insisted that this was only a conditional acceptance, to pay in case the owners of the Queen Anne did not. But Raymond, C. J. held the acceptance an absolute one, See also Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3 Burr. 1663. Ante, 223, n. 4. Clavey v. Dolbin, R. T. Hardw. 278. post, 232, n. 4.-Peach v. Kay, post, 232, n. 5.-Harvey v. Martin, 1 Campb. 425.-Feruandez 3dly. Form and effect of accept ances. v. Glynn, 1 Camp. 426.—Mason v. Barf, Jeane v. Ward, Bayl. 81, 2. Poth. pl. 46. Harvey v. Martin, 1 Campb. 425.-Bayl. 81. n. 2. In an action by the payee and holder of a bill against the defendant as acceptor, it appeared, that the bill was drawn in Guernsey, where the drawer and the plaintiff resided, on the defendant, who lived in Cornwall, dated 13th of March, 1805, at three months; that within a fortnight after it was drawn, the plaintiff sent it to the defendant, desiring him to accept it, and remit to S. Dobree, the plaintiff's correspondent in London. On 13th April, 1805, the plaintiff, finding that the bill had not been sent to S. Dobree, wrote to the defendant, requesting him to accept and send it, stating, that though he considered the keeping of the bill as tantamount to an acceptance, yet that it was not the same to him, as S. Dobree would not give him credit for it until he received it accepted. The defendant, however, did not accept the bill, or remit it, or give any notice of his refusal so to do. On 1st of June the defendant signed a letter, admitting that he had kept the bill, though told by the plaintiff that he considered his doing so as tantamount to an acceptance, as he intended to have paid it, but having no effects of the drawer's, refused to pay; and on 4th of July, when the bill was protested for non-payment, he said he had neglected to write an acceptance upon it, thinking it of no consequence as he meant to pay it. Lord Ellenborough referred to a MS. case of Trimmer v. Oddie, in which Lord Kenyon expressed an opinion, that a mere keeping of a bill was an acceptance, and said he inclined to entertain the same opinion, but should leave that question to the jury, on the custom. Gibbs, however, for the defendant, admitting that he could not answer the case, a verdict was found for the plaintiff. And on an application to Lord Ellenborough to certify for a special jury, his lordship refused, saying, that this was a clear case, but that if it had not been attended with such strong admissions on the part of the defendant, but had been a mere case of a bill kept by the drawer, he should have thought it a fit case for a special jury to decide whether such detention of the bill amounted to an acceptance. See Scaccia de Commerciis et Cambio, folio 383. num. 335. who, in enumerating the different acceptances, mentions, that which is made tacite per receptionem et detentionem literarum. See also Poth. Contrat de Change, part 1, chap. 3d. page, 39, who observes, that the ordonnance having directed that an acceptance should be in writing, had rendered inadmissible the acceptation tacite resulting from the drawee's having received and retained the bill. Mason v. Barff, Guildhall, A. D. 1817. The declaration contained a special count for not accepting, and two counts against defendant as acceptor of two bills. The plaintiffs (having received the bills from the drawer, and discounted them on the previous representation of the defendants, that they the defendants would accept all bills drawn on them, as soon as plaintiffs were informed by the drawer that he had sent off goods purchased by him on account of the defendants) sent the bills on 24th February to defendants for acceptance; they received them on the 27th February, but returned no answer, and kept the bill till the 7th March, and then sent word that they could not accept till the invoices were sent by the drawer. And the jury, under the direction of Lord Ellenborough, held the defendant liable as acceptor; and his lordship said, the law is settled, that the keeping by the drawee, of a bill of exchange, an unreasonable length of time, may amount to an acceptance, (what is a reasonable time depends on the particular circumstances of the case).. His keeping the bill suspends the holder's proceedings. He afterwards said, that he thought, though the mere keeping might not be a virtual acceptance in the strict legal sense of the term, yet it was an undertaking to accept, effect of accept Thus where in an action on a bill of exchange it 3dly. Form and appeared that the plaintiff had transmitted the bill by auces. post to the defendant, the drawee desiring him to ac which made him equally liable under the special count. He directed a general verdict. Scarlett and Reader for plaintiff. One Jeune v. Ward, Guildhall, 25th Feb. 1818. This was an action on a bill of exchange drawn by Godfrey upon the defendant, for the sum of £150, payable at sight, dated the 28th of May, 1817. count alledged an acceptance by the defendant, another alledged that the plaintiff sent the bill to the defendant for acceptance, and that the defendant undertook to return it either accepted or not accepted; but that he did not return it at all. Godfrey, when a minor, had been supplied by the plaintiff with shoes, for an adventure to the East Indies, and on his return to England in 1817, being entitled to a legacy of £200, under a will, of which the defendant was a co-executor, drew the bill in question as a security for the amount. The plaintiff delivered the bill to the defendant for his acceptance; and it appeared that the defendant, in July 1817, wrote to the plaintiff to inform him, that upon the application of Godfrey and his mother, he had paid him his legacy; and that not conceiving that the bill would be of any use, he had destroyed it. Upon this evidence, Lord Ellenborough was of opinion, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, since the destruction of the bill was tantamount to an acceptance; and he referred to a note of his own, of a case before Lord Kenyon, where his lordship held, that the not returning a bill sent for acceptance, was equivalent to an acceptance. Gurney, in support of the plaintiff's case, referred to the cases of Bentinck v. Dorrien, &c. Topping contended, that the cases cited did not entitle the plaintiff to recover, and that they were distinguishable from the present, since in those there was a previous course of dealing between the parties, which rendered the detention equivalent to an acceptance; but that here, on the contrary, the defendant had always declined to accept, and had never given the plaintiff any reason to believe that he would accept the bill. He further insisted on the fact, that at the time when the bill bore date, the drawee was an infant. Lord Ellenborough, upon the fact of infancy, was willing to reserve the point, but he said, that there were many cases to shew, that according to the custom of merchants, if a party declined to accept a bill he ought to return it, and that he made himself liable by detaining it; that in the case which he had already alluded to, he had conceived that the proper mode of declaring against a party who detained a bill was to alledge the special circumstances; but that Lord Kenyon thought otherwise.-That even the alteration of a bill had been held to render the party liable; here he had gone further, and had absolutely destroyed the bill. It was possible that the infancy of the drawee might make a difference. In order to prove the infancy of the drawee at the time of drawing the bill, the defendant proved a certificate of baptism, copied from the books of the East India Company, from which it appeared, that Godfrey, the drawer, had been baptised at Madras, on the 3d of July, 1796, and no other evidence was given to prove the minority. Lord Ellenborough then left it to the jury to say, whether the drawer was of age or not when he drew the bill. The jury found that he was of age, and then, under the direction of his lordship, they found a verdict for the plaintiff. 'Harvey v. Martin, 1 Campb. 425. ante, p. 228. in notes. cept it, and hand it over to plaintiff's agent in London, which was the usual mode of dealing between the parties; and the plaintiff hearing nothing of his bill from his agent, wrote to the defendant, remonstrating with him on account of his delay; and the defendant answered he had retained the bill because he once thought of accepting it, but now declined doing so. In this case Lord Ellenborough said, This is clearly an acceptance. If the bill is left for the express purpose of being accepted, and is retained by the drawee, this retention is as much an acceptance, as if he had written his name on the face of it." So where the drawee kept the bill some time, and then destroyed it, this conduct was held to render him liable as acceptor'. But by the usage of trade in London, a check may be retained by a banker, on whom it was drawn, till five o'clock in the afternoon of the day on which it is presented for payment, and then returned, though it has been previously cancelled by mistake'. A verbal or written promise to accept, at a future period, a bill already drawn, or that a bill then drawn, shall meet due honour', or shall be accepted, or certainly paid when due 4, amounts to an absolute acceptance; and a promise of the same nature, as for instance," leave the bill and I will accept it "," and it be Jeune v. Ward, ante, 229. Fernandez v. Glynn, 1 Campb. 426, in notes; plaintiff paid into the house of Vere and Co. a check on the defendant's house, Vere's clerk took it to the clearing house to be paid, and put it into the defendant's drawer. Vere's clerk received it back before five, cancelled, with a memorandum written under it, "cancelled by mistake." The course was proved to be for the clerks to take the checks from the drawers, and send them to the respective bankers, and those which they will not pay are returned before five o'clock. Lord Ellenborough beld, that notwithstanding the cancelling, the defendant had till five o'clock to return the bill; and having so returned it, it amounted to a refusal to pay. See also Turner v. Mead, 1 Stra. 416. 3 Clark v. Cock, 4 East. 69, 70. 4 Wynne v. Raikes, 5 East. 514.-Ex parte Dyer, 6 Ves. jun. 9. ante, 220, n. 2. 5 Bul. Ni. Pri. 270.-Molloy, b. 2. c. 10, s. 20.-Mar. 17.-Bayl. 81.-acc. Pierson v. Dunlop, Cowp. 573. Semb. contra. and quære if this answer would amount to an acceptance, if given within the twenty-four hours which the drawee usually has to accept the bill. Bul. Ni. Pri. 270. A small matter amounts to an acceptance, as |