authority which an agent has, to draw, indorse, and By act of agent, accept bills, in the name of his principal, may be, and indeed most usually is, by parol1. As to the extent of the agent's authority, if a person be appointed a general agent, as in the case of a factor for a merchant residing abroad, the principal is bound by all his acts; but an agent, constituted so for a particular purpose, and under a limited and circumscribed power, cannot bind the principal by any act exceeding his authority. Therefore, where A. desired B. to get a bill discounted for him, but declared that he would not indorse, it was decided', that no representation of B. could bind A. as an indorser, though it was insisted that what B. had done, was within the scope of his employment, which was to raise money on the bill, and that a subsequent promise to pay was inoperative. It appearing, however, on a second trial, that A. did not declare that he would not indorse it, it was adjudged, that as he had authorised B. to get the bill discounted, without restraining his authority, as to the mode of doing it, he was bound by his acts*. 'Per Lord Eldon, in Davison v. Robertson, 3 Dow. Rep. 229Porthouse v. Parker, 1 Campb. 82. and per Holt, C. J. in Anonymous, 12 Mod. 564.-Harrison r. Jackson, 7 T. R. 209.-The King v. Bigg, 3 P. Wms. 432.-Bac. Ab. Corporations, E. 3,Bayl. 226.-Payley Prin. & Agent, 117. and see 3 and 4 Ann. c. 9. 2 Per Buller, J. in Fenn v. Harrison, 3 T. R. 757.-East India Company . Hensley, 1 Esp. Rep. 111. * Dissente Kenyon, C. J. Fenn v. Harrison, 3 T. R. 757.-4 T. R. 177.-The defendants employed F. H. to get a bill discounted, but said that they would not indorse it; F. H. employed his brother J. H. and said he would indemnify him if he would indorse it. J. H. indorsed it, and the plaintiffs discounted it. The bill being dishonoured, the plaintiffs applied to the defendants, who promised to take it up, but did not, and this action for money had and received, and money paid, was brought against them. Lord Kenyon told the jury, that if they thought that J. H. had made himself answerable as the agent of the defendants, that was sufficient consideration for their promise. A verdict was found for the plaintiffs, and on a rule nisi for a new trial and cause shewn, Lord Kenyon inclined to think the verdict right, because, though the agent had exceeded his authority, he thought the principal bound by what he did, but the other Judges differed, because. F. H. was a particular agent only, and the rule was made absolute." On the next trial it did not appear that the defendants had told By act of agents Upon the question what is a general authority, it has been decided, that a person signing his name on a blank stamped piece of paper, and delivering it to I. S. authorizes I. S. to insert any sum which the amount of the stamp will warrant'. It has also been held, that a letter of attorney, given by an executor to A. B. authorizing him to transact the affairs of the testator, in the name of the executor, as executor, and to pay, discharge, and satisfy all debts due from the testator, conveys to A. B. a sufficient authority to accept a bill of exchange in the name of the executor, drawn by a creditor for the amount of a debt due from the testator, and thereby to make the executor F. H. that they would not indorse the bill, a verdict was found for the plaintiffs; and on a rule nisi for a new trial, and cause shewn, the whole court thought the verdict right; because, as F. H. was not restrained as to the mode of getting the bill discounted, the defendants were bound by his acts; but Buller and Grose, Js, said, that if the facts had been the same, they should have continued of their former opinion. Rule discharged. See observations on this case, Bayl. 168, 9. Pal. on Prin. and Agent, 124,5. 138. 146. See also Helyear v. Hawke, 5 Esp. 75.-Alexander v. Gibson, 2 Campb. 555. $ Collis v. Emmet, 1 Hen. Bla. 313. Emmet signed his name on a blank paper, stamped with a shilling bill stamp, (the highest stamp then in force for bills,) and delivered it to Livesay and Co. that they might draw such bill thercon as they should please; they drew one for £1551 at three months date, which was duly transferred to Collis and Co., and Collis and Co. sued Emmet thereon. A special verdict was found, principally with a view to another point, and the Court held Emmet answerable, and the plaintiffs had judgment. Russell v. Langstaffe, Dougl. 496. 514. The defendant, to ac-. commodate one Galley, indorsed his name on five copper-plate checks, måde in the form of promissory notes, but in blanks, without any. sums, dates, or tines of payment being mentioned therein, and delivered them to Galley; Galley filled them up as he thought fit, and the plaintiff discounted them; the plaintiff knew the notes were blank at the time of the indorsement; Galley not paying them when they became due, plaintiff brought this action. Hotham, B. before whom the cause was tried, was of opinion, that as the notes were incomplete when the defendant indorsed them, no subsequent act of Galley could make them otherwise, because that would alter the effect of the defendant's indorsement, and he accordingly directed a verdict for the defendant; but upon application for a new trial, and cause shewn, Lord. Mansfield said, " Nothing is so clear as that the indorsement on a blank note is a letter of credit for an indefinite sum; the defendant said, trust Galley to any amount and I will be his surety, it does not. lie in his mouth to say the indorsements were not regular." See also. Snaith . Mingay, 1 M. & S. 87.-Crutchley v. Mann, 5 Taunt. 529.1 Marsh. 29. S. C.--Crutchley . Clarence, 2 M. & S. 90. Iloward v, Baillie, 2 Hen. Bla. 618. personally liable, on the ground that an authority By act of agent. of this nature necessarily includes all intermediate powers, that is to say, all the means necessary to be used in order to effect the accomplishment of the object of the principal, namely, the paying, satisfying, and discharging the testator's debts. But in another case' which was upon the same letter of attorney, the court, after consulting with the Judges of C. P., determined that the executor was not personally liable, and that a power of attorney, given by an executrix, to act for her as an executrix, does not authorize the attorney to accept bills to charge her in her own right, though for debts due from her testator. So in a late case it was decided, that where one gives a power of attorney to another, to demand and receive all monies due to him, on any account whatsoever, and to use all means for the recovery thereof, and to appoint attornies for the purpose of bringing actions, and to revoke the same, "and to do all other business;" the latter words must be understood with reference to the former, as meaning all business appertaining thereto; and although the attorney may receive monies due, to the principal in auter droit, yet he cannot under this power indorse a bill for him, which comes to his hands. It has also been held, that a power of attorney to receive all salaries and money, with all the principal's authority to recover, compound, and discharge, and to give releases and appoint substitutes, does not authorize the attorney to negotiate bills received in payment, nor to indorse them in his own name; nor can evidence of an usage at the navy office, to pay bills, indorsed by the attorney in his own name, and negotiated by him, under such a power, be received to enlarge the operation of the power3. 'Gardner v. Baillie, 6 T. R. 591.-Kilgour v. Finlyson, 1 Ilen, Bla. 155. Hay v. Goldsmid, 2 Smith's Rep. 79, 80. By act of agent. An authority may also be implied and inferred from prior conduct of the principal, for a special authority is not necessary to constitute a power to draw, indorse, or accept by procuration, but the law may infer an authority from the general nature of certain acts permitted to be done, and usual employ is evidence of a general authority'; and therefore, if a person has upon a former occasion, in the principal's absence, usually accepted bills for him, and the latter on his return approved thereof, he would be bound in a similar situation on a second absence from home2; and if a drawee of a bill has previously paid several bills accepted in his name by a third person with whom he had connections in trade, he would be liable to an indorsee though such bill has been accepted without his authority; and it has been held, that if a person usually subscribes an instrument with the name of another, proof of his having done so in many instances, is sufficient to charge him whose name is subscribed, without producing any power of attorney 4. And we have seen, that where a married woman is permitted by her husband to carry on trade on her own account, and in her own name indorses a bill or note, received in the course of such trade, an authority may be presumed from the husband 3. It has also been decided, that a subsequent assent will make the act of 'Per Lord Eldon, in Davison v. Robertson, 3 Dow. 229.-Malynes, B. 3. c. 5. s. 6. page 264.—Bayl. 226. 2 Beawes, pl. 86.-Mar. 2d ed. 135. 3 Barber v. Gingell, 3 Esp. N. P. C. 60. In an action against the defendant as acceptor of a bill, he proved that the acceptance was forged by Taylor the drawer; in answer to which it was proved that the defendant had been connected in business with Taylor, and that he had paid several bills drawn as the present by Taylor, and to which Taylor (as it was supposed) had written the acceptances in the defendant's name. And Lord Kenyon held, that this was an answer to the case of forgery set up by the defendant, for though he might not have accepted the bill, he had adopted the acceptance, and thereby made himself liable to pay the bill. Verdict for plaintiff. 4 + Neal v. Erving, 1 Esp. Rep. 61.-Haughton v. Ewbank, 4 Campb. Cotes v. Davis, 1 Campb. 485.-Barlow v. Bishop, 1 East. 434. an agent binding on the principal; and though a By act of agent. promise alone to pay a bill endorsed by an agent would, not support an action if the indorsement were contrary to authority, yet if the authority is doubtful, such a promise is decisive. A general authority to an agent is supposed to continue until its determination is generally known, and therefore, after the discharge of a clerk or agent usually employed to draw, accept, or indorse bills or notes, the employer will be bound by his signature, made after the determination of his authority, until the discharge be generally known3. When, therefore, the authority of such an agent has been determined, or he has been discharged from his employ, and there is reason to apprehend that he will attempt to circulate bills in the name of his employer, it is advisable for the latter to give notice of the determination of the authority in the Gazette, and also to all his correspondents individually, notice in the Gazette not being in general sufficient to affect a former customer, unless he has had express notice thereof. As the authority of an agent is not coupled with an interest, he cannot delegate it, so as to enable another person to act for his principal'; if, however, 1 Ward v. Evans, Lord Raym. 930.—2 Salk. 442. S. C.-Boulton . Hillesden, Comb. 450.-12 Mod. 564.-Bayl. 226.-Payley, 124. 126,7. 211. accord.-Fenn v. Harrison, 3 T. R. 757.-Howard v. Baillie, 2 Hen. Bla. 618. semb. contra. and see post, 42 & 44, in notes. Fenn. Harrison, 4 T. R. 177.-Payley, 124, 5. 3 Beawes, pl. 231.-Molloy, B. 2. c. 10. s. 27. page 107.-Payley, 123, 4. 136.-Bayl. 226.-Anonymous v. Harrison, 12 Mod. 346.— A servant had power to draw bills of exchange in his master's name, and afterwards is turned out of the service. Holt, C. J. If he draw a bill in so little time after that the world cannot take notice of his being out of service, or if he were a long time out of his service, but that kept so secret that the world cannot take notice of it, the bill in those cases shall bind the master. Monk v. Clayton, Molloy, 282. cited in Nickson v. Broham, 10 Mod. 110. A servant of Sir Robert Clayton, who had been used to receive and pay money, took up 200 guineas after he had quitted the service, and the lender recovered against Sir R. Clayton, by the direction of Keeling, C. J. which was approved by the whole court en a motion for a new trial. *See post, 47, 8, cases of partners. 'Combe's case, 9 Co. 75.-1 Rol. Ab. 330. |