Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations

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Robert P. Gilles, Pieter H.M. Ruys
Springer Science & Business Media, 1994 M07 31 - 318 páginas
Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations analyzes the organization of economic decision making in a contemporary setting. The contributors focus on two important aspects of this analysis. First, they address the issue of imperfect or incomplete information and communication in economic organizations and consider imperfections arising from the interaction of the market organization with its environment. Second, the issue of cooperation in a competitive environment is thoroughly analyzed and alternative social trade organizations are designed to dissipate the allocation problems that arise in these situations.
 

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Contenido

INHERENT IMPERFECTION OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS
1
2 CHARACTERIZATION OF ECONOMIC GOODS
3
3 CHARACTERIZATION OF ECONOMIC ALLOCATION ORGANIZATIONS
7
4 INTERACTION BETWEEN RESOURCES AND VALUATIONS
11
THE KINKED DEMAND CURVE FACILITATING PRACTICES AND OLIGOPOLISTIC COORDINATION
15
2 MODEL
19
3 INADEQUACY OF THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPT
23
4 SEQUENTIALLY DOMINANT STRATEGIES
24
6 PREINFRASTRUCTURE AND GRAPH TOPOLOGY
146
DEMAND IN A DUOPOLY WITH HORIZONTAL PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION
149
2 DEMAND FUNCTIONS
153
3 RATIONING SCHEMES
163
4 CONCLUSIONS
168
IMPLEMENTING STRONG AND LOWER STRONG POSITIVE ASSOCIATION SOCIAL CHOICE RULES BY SOCIAL PROCEDURES
177
1 INTRODUCTION
178
2 PROCEDURES
180

5 TWO APPLICATIONS
28
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
33
A REVELATION PRINCIPLE FOR BOUNDEDLY BAYESIAN RATIONALIZABLE STRATEGIES
39
2 COMMONLY MODELLED GAME FORMS
43
3 BAYESIAN RATIONALIZABLE GAME FORMS
45
4 IMPLEMENTATION
46
5 A GENERALIZED REVELATION PRINCIPLE
49
6 CONCENTRATING UPON INTRINSIC TYPES
52
7 DOMINANT STRATEGY INCENTIVE CONSTRAINTS
54
8 BOUNDED MODELLING
55
9 DESIRABLE EXTENSIONS
59
10 CONCLUSION
60
WIDESPREAD EXTERNALITIES AND PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS EXAMPLES
71
2 AN AUTOMOBILE MARKET WITH POLLUTION A PURE PUBLIC BAD EXTERNALITY
74
3 THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS OVEREXPLOITATION CAUSED BY EXTERNALITY AND MARKET FEEDBACK
78
4 AN ECONOMY WITH CONFORMISTS AND NONCONFORMISTS A PURE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXTERNALITY
80
5 A HOUSING MARKET WITH NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECTS PSYCHOLOGICAL EXTERNALITIES CREATE ECONOMIC VALUE
82
6 CONCLUSION
85
MODELLING OF ECONOMIES WITH RELATIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON COALITION FORMATION
89
1 INTRODUCTION
90
2 COALITIONALLY STRUCTURED ECONOMIES
94
3 RELATIONALLY STRUCTURED ECONOMIES
114
4 COALITION FORMATION IN NETWORK ECONOMIES
128
TOPOLOGIES AS TRADE INFRASTRUCTURES
137
2 LINKS BETWEEN TRADERS
139
3 COST OF CONTACTING AND MAXIMAL TRADING GROUPS
141
4 NUMBER AND SIZE OF MAXIMAL TRADING GROUPS
143
5 TYPOLOGIES
144
3 STABLE STANDARDS OF BEHAVIOR
182
4 STRONG POSITIVE ASSOCIATION
186
5 LOWER STRONG POSITIVE ASSOCIATION
188
COOPERATION AND COMMUNICATION RESTRICTIONS A SURVEY
195
2 COMMUNICATION GAMES AND SOLUTION CONCEPTS
197
3 DIVIDENDS AND CALCULATION METHODS
203
4 PROPERTIES OF COMMUNICATION GAMES
207
5 STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR AND ENDOGENOUS FORMATION OF COMMUNICATION LINKS
211
6 GENERALIZATIONS
215
OUTLINE OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COOPERATIVE NATURE OF THE FIRM
229
2 BASIC MODEL
232
3 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES
239
4 EQUILIBRIUM EXISTENCE THEOREM
242
5 PARETO NONOPTIMALITY
244
6 COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
245
COOPERATIVE PROCESSING OF INFORMATION
249
INTERSECTION THEOREMS ON THE UNIT SIMPLEX AND THE SIMPLOTOPE
257
2 PRELIMINARIES
259
3 INTERSECTION THEOREMS ON THE UNIT SIMPLEX
261
4 INTERSECTION THEOREMS ON THE SIMPLOTOPE
268
A SOCIAL POWER INDEX FOR HIERARCHICALLY STRUCTURED POPULATIONS OF ECONOMIC AGENTS
279
1 INTRODUCTION
280
2 HIERARCHICALLY STRUCTURED POPULATIONS
284
3 SOCIAL POWER INDICES
291
4 A SUBJECTIVE APPROACH TO THE BGINDEX
296
5 AN EXAMPLE
306
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