Imperfections and Behavior in Economic OrganizationsRobert P. Gilles, Pieter H.M. Ruys Springer Science & Business Media, 1994 M07 31 - 318 páginas Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations analyzes the organization of economic decision making in a contemporary setting. The contributors focus on two important aspects of this analysis. First, they address the issue of imperfect or incomplete information and communication in economic organizations and consider imperfections arising from the interaction of the market organization with its environment. Second, the issue of cooperation in a competitive environment is thoroughly analyzed and alternative social trade organizations are designed to dissipate the allocation problems that arise in these situations. |
Contenido
INHERENT IMPERFECTION OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS | 1 |
2 CHARACTERIZATION OF ECONOMIC GOODS | 3 |
3 CHARACTERIZATION OF ECONOMIC ALLOCATION ORGANIZATIONS | 7 |
4 INTERACTION BETWEEN RESOURCES AND VALUATIONS | 11 |
THE KINKED DEMAND CURVE FACILITATING PRACTICES AND OLIGOPOLISTIC COORDINATION | 15 |
2 MODEL | 19 |
3 INADEQUACY OF THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPT | 23 |
4 SEQUENTIALLY DOMINANT STRATEGIES | 24 |
6 PREINFRASTRUCTURE AND GRAPH TOPOLOGY | 146 |
DEMAND IN A DUOPOLY WITH HORIZONTAL PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION | 149 |
2 DEMAND FUNCTIONS | 153 |
3 RATIONING SCHEMES | 163 |
4 CONCLUSIONS | 168 |
IMPLEMENTING STRONG AND LOWER STRONG POSITIVE ASSOCIATION SOCIAL CHOICE RULES BY SOCIAL PROCEDURES | 177 |
1 INTRODUCTION | 178 |
2 PROCEDURES | 180 |
5 TWO APPLICATIONS | 28 |
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS | 33 |
A REVELATION PRINCIPLE FOR BOUNDEDLY BAYESIAN RATIONALIZABLE STRATEGIES | 39 |
2 COMMONLY MODELLED GAME FORMS | 43 |
3 BAYESIAN RATIONALIZABLE GAME FORMS | 45 |
4 IMPLEMENTATION | 46 |
5 A GENERALIZED REVELATION PRINCIPLE | 49 |
6 CONCENTRATING UPON INTRINSIC TYPES | 52 |
7 DOMINANT STRATEGY INCENTIVE CONSTRAINTS | 54 |
8 BOUNDED MODELLING | 55 |
9 DESIRABLE EXTENSIONS | 59 |
10 CONCLUSION | 60 |
WIDESPREAD EXTERNALITIES AND PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS EXAMPLES | 71 |
2 AN AUTOMOBILE MARKET WITH POLLUTION A PURE PUBLIC BAD EXTERNALITY | 74 |
3 THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS OVEREXPLOITATION CAUSED BY EXTERNALITY AND MARKET FEEDBACK | 78 |
4 AN ECONOMY WITH CONFORMISTS AND NONCONFORMISTS A PURE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXTERNALITY | 80 |
5 A HOUSING MARKET WITH NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECTS PSYCHOLOGICAL EXTERNALITIES CREATE ECONOMIC VALUE | 82 |
6 CONCLUSION | 85 |
MODELLING OF ECONOMIES WITH RELATIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON COALITION FORMATION | 89 |
1 INTRODUCTION | 90 |
2 COALITIONALLY STRUCTURED ECONOMIES | 94 |
3 RELATIONALLY STRUCTURED ECONOMIES | 114 |
4 COALITION FORMATION IN NETWORK ECONOMIES | 128 |
TOPOLOGIES AS TRADE INFRASTRUCTURES | 137 |
2 LINKS BETWEEN TRADERS | 139 |
3 COST OF CONTACTING AND MAXIMAL TRADING GROUPS | 141 |
4 NUMBER AND SIZE OF MAXIMAL TRADING GROUPS | 143 |
5 TYPOLOGIES | 144 |
3 STABLE STANDARDS OF BEHAVIOR | 182 |
4 STRONG POSITIVE ASSOCIATION | 186 |
5 LOWER STRONG POSITIVE ASSOCIATION | 188 |
COOPERATION AND COMMUNICATION RESTRICTIONS A SURVEY | 195 |
2 COMMUNICATION GAMES AND SOLUTION CONCEPTS | 197 |
3 DIVIDENDS AND CALCULATION METHODS | 203 |
4 PROPERTIES OF COMMUNICATION GAMES | 207 |
5 STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR AND ENDOGENOUS FORMATION OF COMMUNICATION LINKS | 211 |
6 GENERALIZATIONS | 215 |
OUTLINE OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COOPERATIVE NATURE OF THE FIRM | 229 |
2 BASIC MODEL | 232 |
3 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES | 239 |
4 EQUILIBRIUM EXISTENCE THEOREM | 242 |
5 PARETO NONOPTIMALITY | 244 |
6 COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS | 245 |
COOPERATIVE PROCESSING OF INFORMATION | 249 |
INTERSECTION THEOREMS ON THE UNIT SIMPLEX AND THE SIMPLOTOPE | 257 |
2 PRELIMINARIES | 259 |
3 INTERSECTION THEOREMS ON THE UNIT SIMPLEX | 261 |
4 INTERSECTION THEOREMS ON THE SIMPLOTOPE | 268 |
A SOCIAL POWER INDEX FOR HIERARCHICALLY STRUCTURED POPULATIONS OF ECONOMIC AGENTS | 279 |
1 INTRODUCTION | 280 |
2 HIERARCHICALLY STRUCTURED POPULATIONS | 284 |
| 291 | |
4 A SUBJECTIVE APPROACH TO THE BGINDEX | 296 |
5 AN EXAMPLE | 306 |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations Robert P. Gilles,Pieter H.M. Ruys Vista previa limitada - 2012 |
Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations Robert P. Gilles,Pieter H.M. Ruys Sin vista previa disponible - 2012 |
Términos y frases comunes
allocation organization assume assumption atomless Aumann Bayesian game Bayesian rationalizable behavior BG-index Cartesian product coalition formation coalitional structure coalitionally structured collusive price commodity communication graph communication situation competitive concept condition constraints consumer convex cooperative game core defined Definition denote dominant strategy echelon tree Econometrica economic agents example exists finite function game form Game Theory Gilles given Hence hierarchically structured population Ichiishi implementation incentive interaction intersection theorems Journal of Economic kinked demand left-optimal price Lemma Mathematical maximal mechanism mixed strategy modelling types Myerson value Nash equilibrium nonempty Nouweland oligopoly outcome p₁ potential predecessors primitive coalitions Proof rationing relationally structured economy result revelation game revelation principle Ruys satisfies semi-core semi-ring sequentially dominant Shapley simplotope social choice rule social power index space subgame perfect equilibrium Tilburg University topology TU-game U.S. Steel unit simplex utility Walrasian equilibrium