tion of the intelligent selection will be preserved in just the same sense. I think it is a great feature of Prof. Cope's theory that he emphasizes the intelligent direction of evolution, and especially that he does it by appealing to the intelligent adaptations of the creatures themselves; but just by so doing he destroys the need of the Lamarkian factor. Natural selection kills off all the creatures which have not the intelligence nor the variations which the intelligence can use; those are kept alive which have both the intelligence and the variations. They use their intelligence just as their fathers did, and besides get new intelligent adaptations, thus aiding progress again by intelligent selection. What more is needed for progressive evolution?"

Third. We come now to the third point-the method of intelligent selection and on this point Prof. Cope does not understand my position, I think. I differ from him both in the psychology of voluntary adaptations of movement, and in the view that consciousness is a sort of force directing brain energies in one way or another (for nothing short of a force could release or direct brain energy). The principle of Dynamogenesis was cited in my article in this form: i. e., "the thought of a movement tends to discharge motor energy into the channels as near as may be to those necessary for that movement." This principle covers two facts. First, that no movement can be thought of effectively which has not itself been performed before and left traces of some sort in memory. These traces must come up in mind when its performance is again intended. And second (and in consequence of this) that no act, whatever, can be performed by consciousness by willing movements which have never been performed before. It follows that we can not say that consciousness by selecting new adaptations beforehand can make the muscles perform them. The most that psychologists (to my knowledge) are inclined to claim is that by the attention one or other of alternative movements which have been performed before (or combinations of them) may be performed again; in other words, the selection is of old alternative movements. But this is not what Prof. Cope seems to mean; nor what his theory requires. His theory requires the acquisition of new movements, new adaptations to environment, by a conscious selection of certain movements which are then carried out the first time by the muscles."

I keep to "intellegent" adaptations here; but the same principle applies to all adaptations made in ontogenesis. I am using the phrase "Organic Selection" in the article to appear in this journal to designate this "factor" in evolution (see the next heading below).

5" Conscious states do have a causal relation to the other organic processes." I do not find, however, that Prof. Cope has made clear just how in his opinion the "selection" by consciousness does work.

It may very justly be asked; if his view be not true, how then can new movements which are adaptive ever be learned at all? This is one of the most important questions, in my view, both for biologists and for psychologists; and my recent work on Mental Development is, in its theoretical portion (chap., VIIff), devoted mainly to it, i. e., the problem of ontogenetic accommodation. I can not go into details here, but it may suffice to say that Spencer (and Bain after him) laid out what seems to with certain modifications urged in my book, the only theory which can stand in court. Its main thought is this, that all new movements which are adaptive or "fit" are selected from overproduced movements or movement variations, just as creatures are selected from overproduced variations by the natural selection of those which are fit. This process, as I conceive it, I have called "organic selection," a phrase which emphasizes the fact that it is the organism which selects from all its overproduced movements those which are adaptive and beneficial. The part which the intelligence plays is "through pleasure, pain, experience, association, etc., to concentrate the energies of movement upon the limb or system of muscles to be used and to hold the adaptive movement, "select" it, when it has once been struck. In the higher forms both the concentration and the selection are felt as acts of attention.

Such a view extends the application of the general principle of selection through fitness to the activities of the organism. To this problem I have devoted some five years of study and experiment with children, etc., and I am now convinced that this "organic selection" bears much the same relation to the doctrine of special creation of ontogenetic adaptations by consciousness which Prof. Cope is reviving, that the Darwinian theory of natural selection bears to the special creation theory of the phylogenetic adaptations of species. The facts which Spencer called "heightened discharge" are capable of formulation of the principle of "motor excess "the accommodation of an organism to a new stimulation is secured-not by the selection of this stimulation beforehand (nor of the necessary movements)-but by the reinstatement of it by a discharge of the energies of the organism, concentrated, as far as may be, for the excessive stimulation of the organs (muscles, etc.), most nearly fitted by former habit to get this stimulation again," in which the word "stimulation" stands for the condition favorable to adaptation. After several trials with grotesquely excessive movements, the child (for example) gets the adaptation aimed at more and more perfectly, and the accompanying excessive and useMental Development, p. 179. Spencer and Bain hold that the selection is of purely chance adaptations among spontaneous random movements.

less movements fall away. This is the kind of "selection" that consciousness does in its acquisition of new movements. And how the results of it are conserved from generation to generation, without the Lamarkian factor, has been spoken of above.

Finally, a word merely of the relation of consciousness to the energies of the brain. It is clear that this doctrine of selection as applied to muscular movement does away with all necessity for holding that consciousness even directs brain energy. The need of such direction seems to me to be as artificial as Darwin's principle showed the need of special creation to be for the teleological adaptations of the different species. This necessity of supposed directive agency done away in this case as in that, the question of the relation of consciousness to the brain becomes a metaphysical one; just as that of teleology in nature became a metaphysical one; and science can get along without asking it. And biological as well as psychological science should be glad that it is soshould it not?

I may add in closing that of the three headings of this note only the last (third) is based on matters of my private opinion; the other two rest on Prof. Cope's own presuppositions-that of intelligent selection in his sense of the term, and that of the bearing of Social Heredity (which he admits) upon Lamarckism. In another place I hope to take up the psychology of Prof. Cope's new book in some detail. J. MARK BALDWIN.

Observations on Prof. Baldwin's Reply.-In order to comprehend the question at issue, it is necessary to state certain fundamental principles of evolution. This process consists in the development of the heterogeneous from the homogeneous as Spencer expresses it; or in more specific language, evolution consists in the development of specialized structures from generalized material. Primitive organic or living beings consist of protoplasm which is, as compared with higher organisms, generalized. That is, they are without distinct muscular, nervous, or digestive organs, etc. How are psychic conditions related to this process of specialization? Prof. Baldwin states that an animal is able to "select through pleasure, pain, experience, association, etc., from certain alternative complex movements which are already possible for the limb or member used." This means that under guidance of a form of consciousness, certain existing muscles are selected to perform certain movements, while other muscles are neglected. Now if this be possible to a muscular system specialized into discrete bundles, it is also possible to a primitive contractile protoplasm which is not yet differ

entiated into discrete muscular and other bodies. In other words it is possible to contract that part of the homogeneous protoplasm which is necessary for the production of a certain movement, and leave that part of the protoplasm which is not necessary to produce the movement, uncontracted. And this is exactly what undifferentiated animals (Protozoa) do, and it is what is done at all stages of differentiation of the muscular system, so far as the differentiation which that muscular system has attained, will permit. It is the sentence which I have quoted above from Prof. Baldwin which induced me to say that he admits the Lamarkian factor. For there is no doubt that it has been this habitual contraction of certain parts of undifferentiated protoplasm which has produced muscular bands, sheets, etc., as distinguished from other histological elements of the organism. If this be true, there is no necessity for the hypothesis of "overproduced movements as the source of new habits, since those habits may be produced by the direct effect of the selective power of the animal over its own protoplasm. It is not intended by this expression to claim anything more than simple sensation for simple forms of life, or that anything higher than hunger, reproduction temperature, etc., constitute their pleasures and pains.

The theory of natural selection from "overproduced movements" as a source of new movements stands on the same basis as all the other theories of natural selection as explanations of the origin of anything new. They are impossible in practice, and inaccurate in logic, since in my opinion, following that of Mr. Darwin, they demand of Natural Selection a function of which it is by its definition incapable. That natural selection regulates the survival of movements after they have originated, goes without saying. It is evideut that "overproduced movements" must on Prof. Baldwin's " Organic Selection" theory, include the adaptive one which is destined to survive. The question then is as to the origin of this particular " overproduced" and adaptive movement. The explanation has been given above; i. e. that it is a direct response to the stimulus supplied. The location in the organism of the responsive movement depends on the location of the stimulus, a fact testified to by the close local connection of motor with sensory nerves of general sensation. In the case of responses to special sensation, we may suppose that the responses only became exact as to locality after a period of trial and error, the new movement always having a local relation to the point of stimulus. The beast bites his wound, before he has traced the pain to his enemy. As already pointed out, this process would result in a perfected mechanism which would be inherited. No one can yet explain the mechanism of the control of a mental state

over a contraction of protoplasm. It is one of the ultimate facts of the universe. When Prof. Baldwin admits that an animal can select which of two muscles it will use, or when he admits that an animal can contract any muscle under the stimulus of "pleasure, pain, etc., he admits this ultimate fact, but does not explain it.

As to the scope of Social Heredity as a factor in psychic evolution, it appears to me to be, like that of the higher intelligence, mainly restricted to the higher animals and to man. Maternal instruction among all but the higher animals probably has no existence. Imitation may be supposed to be possible to animals a little lower in the scale. But both factors are to my mind only supplementary to the more vigorous education furnished by the environment, with its wealth of stimuli to "pleasure, pain, experience, association, etc." In regarding Social Heredity as the sole factor of psychic evolution, Prof. Baldwin temporarily loses sight of the intimate connection between mind. and its physical basis. The inheritance of mental characteristics is as much a fact as the inheritance of physical structure, and for the reason that the two propositions are identical. One does not believe in either education or imitation as a cause of the repetition of insanity in family lines. We rather believe in a defective brain mechanism, which is inheritable, though fortunately not always inherited. The doctrine of Weismann that acquired characters are not inherited, if true, would furnish the physical conditions for the theory that Social Heredity is the only psychic heredity, but it is impossible to believe that Weismann's doctrine is true. Hence while Social Heredity is true as far as it goes, Lamarkism is also true, and expresses the more fundamental law. The fact that no adequate physical explanation of the inheritance of acquired characters has been reached does not disprove the fact. E. D. COPE.

ANTHROPOLOGY.1

Indian habitation in the Eastern United States.—Mr. Thomas Wilson of the Smithsonian Institution in a recent letter refering to a discussion in Washington as to the shape of Indian habitations east of the Mississippi, says, that while certain of the disputants "agreed that the Plains Indians of the present or modern times used wigwams made with poles fastened together at the top and spreading out in a circle at the bottom after the fashion of a Sibley tent, they

1 This department is edited by Henry C. Mercer, University of Penna, Phila.