THE

AMERICAN NATURALIST

VOL. XXX.

September, 1896.

357

PROF. BALDWIN'S "NEW FACTOR IN EVOLUTION."

BY HERBERT NICHOLS.

That the pendulum of opinion swung too violently against the conception that mind is an active factor in Evolution I count the major misfortune of the modern epoch of Science. That there is now a return of interest I esteem to be the most important outlook of our day. That this return of interest centres in Psychology is inevitable. If now this new movement should become abortive through any false lead of Psychology the result would be deplorable.

It is with anxiety, therefore, that I read the numerous writings of Prof. J. Mark Baldwin upon the rôle played by mind in Evolution (see above Reprint for complete list). The prolific earnestness of this author, together with his conspicuous position as professor at Princeton and Alternate Editor of The Psycological Review, give unusual prominence to his views. Yet these views, as I believe, are precisely of the kind which we have most to dread. It is in this belief that I am prompted to the analysis of them which I here propose. And as Prof. Baldwin has no more enthusiastic admirer of his sincerity and

1 Reprinted from THE AMERICAN NATURALIST, June and July, 1896.

zeal, so I beg him to permit me to point out the more freely the objections to his main assumption.

In Professor Baldwin's latest paper, above referred to, he has gathered into one sketch" an outline of his theory. In this pamphlet, as in all else that he has written on this subject, we are presented with a vast pyramid standing on its apex. We are told how he conceives Evolution to work under his assumption, and gradually his story narrows toward an explicit statement of what this assumption is. Unfortunately, however, the vast superstructure closes in to a cloud of mist, and does so, alas, not only before he has made clear in exact detail what his assumption is, but even before making understood how the things he vaguely suggests could ever clearly be conceived to be possible.

The gist of Mr. Baldwin's notion is that Pleasure-Pain is a psychic" factor" that crucially determines Evolution. Pleasure results from beneficial stimulus. It causes, in turn, "excessive" neural discharge. Neural discharge causes "expansion." Expansion brings the creature into continued subservience to the beneficial stimulus. Excessive neural discharge makes the paths of actual discharge more pervious to the continued stimulus and to subsequent discharges from the same source. Thus a " Circular Reaction " becomes fixed which, because it is beneficial, conduces to the preservation at once of the peculiar habit and variation in the organisms so developed, and also of the creature in which it is developed. The antithesis of all this happens with pain.

Now for the difficulties; and to bring them out let us imagine an unorganized creature before us-say an amœba. Our problem is to find how it becomes organized. Let us imagine it attacked by any given stimulus at some point of its periphery. Mr. Baldwin tell us that if this stimulus is beneficial it will give pleasure, and the pleasure will cause "excess movements." Mr. Baldwin does not pretend that these are yet organized movements. To do so would be to beg his whole question. Yet he claims that this unorganized movement would complete his "Circular Reaction" with the beneficial stimulus and perpetuate the beneficient work. But how can we conceive

that unorganized movement, or movement in the abstract, should do such an organized act as to select beneficial stimuli and avoid those which are detrimental? Especially how shall this be done after Mr. Baldwin has carefully laid it down than there can be no such thing as benefit or detriment in a mere muscular movement in and of itself? Of course Mr. Baldwin knows that various propositions have been suggested by different physiologists to explain why an undifferentiated creature like an amoeba, puts forth pseudopodia and makes definite prehensile movements in response to certain stimuli; and makes definite revulsions in response to others. But if so he is aware that all these propositions are based upon some purely physical relationship of the different stimuli to the protoplasmic substance, whereby some act in one way and others in a reverse manner. All such movements are definite and concrete and can be perfectly understood. But how mere movement in the abstract should be able to select that sort of nutriment which is beneficial and to avoid those forces which are harmful is surely above human power to conceive-unless, perhaps, Mr. Baldwin can explicitly describe to us how it is to be conceived. To assume outright that the movements resulting from pleasure would locomote intelligently toward proper nutriment, or do aught differently than the same movements caused in any other way, is simply to leap the whole problem by one absolutely unbounded bald assumption. Than this it is more respectable to say that Ormozd takes the kitten by the neck and chucks it bodily to the saucer.

But, perhaps, Mr. Baldwin merely means that the excess movement would work to continue the contact with the original stimulus already made. If so, then must we contend that absolute quiescence would most conduce to the preservation of a contact already made, and incoordinate wiggling would be the thing in the world most likely to break the contact, and to drive the creature away from the beneficial stimulus.

Mr. Baldwin's assumption that excess movements, however caused, would be any more likely, in the abstract, to secure circular reactions among beneficial stimuli than among detri* Mental Development, p. 189.

mental ones is, therefore, wholly false. All would depend on the prevalence of one or the other sort of conditions. If dangers most abounded the creature would be all the more quickly destroyed by his excess locomotion. If benefits abounded then the creature would prosper because of that fact, but not because of any power of muscular tissue to select these benefits, save that be by its physical properties-i. e., the same which are being studied by the physiologists as before mentioned.

Thus falls the king-bolt in Mr. Baldwin's "circular reactions." But falling back upon the second link it does seem at first sight that advantage should be secured to a creature by a“ new factor," which should have the power of saying when the creature should act and when not; and that had the intelligence to decide that the creature should move only when in the presence of beneficial stimuli and not move in response to detrimental ones. But here again there is a snare and delusion, and just where it was least to be expected. For it is just as likely as not that to move would be the most beneficial thing in the world under attack of detrimental forces-for instance, to get away from them; or that to move under beneficial conditions would be the most detrimental thing in the worldfor example, would wiggle the creature away from a newly secured morsel of food. In short, so long as it remains true, as shown in our last paragraph, that abstract movement is equally likely to do harm or good, so also must it remain true, that even a "new factor," with the power attributed to it by Mr. Baldwin, could not by any possibility favor the organism by the means described. How should it by the exercise of a power which in itself is alike blind to good or ill?

Thus falls the main swivel in Mr. Baldwin's chain of reactions, and falls at a simple touch. But lest it seem to fall too easily in proportion to the mighty and world-deciding destiny asserted of it, let us pursue it further and in more detail. Thoroughly to dispose of an error we must see how and why it was made. The doctrine of pleasure, of which Mr. Baldwin's "excess discharge" is the attempted physiological expression, dates back to Aristotle. Aristotle declared that pleasure ac