cannot be omitted henceforth in cases where the other characters render the question of affinity uncertain. In the Sauria the male intromittent organ or hemipenis, presents much variety of structure, showing some parallels to the corresponding part in the snakes. It is, however, rarely spinous, as is so generally the case in the Ophidia, the only spinous forms being, so far as I have examined, the American Diploglossinæ and genera allied to Cophias. The higher Sauria have the apical parts modified, as in the Ophidia, by the presence of calyculi. Such are characteristic of the Rhiptoglossa and Pachyglossa. The Nyctisaura possess the same feature. The Diploglossa, Helodermatoidea and Thecaglossa have the organ flounced, the flounces often pocketed or repand on the margin. In the Leptoglossa we have laminæ only; in the Tiidæ mostly transverse, and in the Scincida mostly longitudinal. In various genera terminal papillæ are present. The organ may be simple or bifurcate or merely bilobate. I have not met with the case so common in the Ophidia, where the sulcus spermaticus is bifurcate and the organ undivided. The structures of the hemipenis have a constant systematic value. As in the Ophidia, the value differs with the character, but it varies from generic to superfamily in rank.-E. D. COPE. Food habits of Woodpeckers.-A preliminary report on the food habits of Woodpeckers has been published by F. E. L. Beal, the assistant ornithologist in the U. S. Dept. of Agriculture. The paper is based on the examinations of 679 stomachs of Woodpeckers, representing 7 species-all from the eastern United States. The results of the author's investigations are summarized as follows: "In reviewing the results of these investigations and comparing one species with another, without losing sight of the fact that comparative good is not necessarily positive good, it appears that of 7 species considered the Downy Woodpecker is the most beneficial. This is due in part to the great number of insects it eats, and in part to the nature of its vegetable food, which is of little value to man. Three-fourths of its food consists of insects, and few of these are useful kinds. Of grain, it eats practically none. The greatest sin we can lay at its door is the dissemination of poison ivy." "The Hairy Woodpecker probably ranks next to the Downy in point of usefulness. It eats fewer ants, but a relatively larger percentage of beetles and caterpillars. Its grain eating record is trifling; two stomachs taken in September and October contained corn. For fruit, it seeks the forests and swamps, where it finds wild cherries, grapes, and the berries of dogwood and Virginia Creeper. It eats fewer seeds of the poison ivy and poison sumac than the Downy." "The Flicker eats a smaller percentage of insects than either the Downy or the Hairy Woodpecker, but if eating ants is to be considered a virtue, then surely this bird must be exalted, for three-fourths of all the insects it eats, comprising nearly half of its whole food, are ants. It is accused of eating corn, but its stomach yielded only a little. Fruit constitutes about one-fourth of its whole fare, but the bird depends upon nature and not upon man to furnish the supply." "Judged by the results of the stomach examinations of the Downy and Hairy Woodpecker and Flicker it would be hard to find three other species of our common birds with fewer harmful qualities. The Ectal Relations of the Right and Left Parietal and Paroccipital Fissures.-A preliminary communication upon this subject was made by Dr. B. G. Wilder at the last session of the American Neurological Association in Philadelphia. The following abstract presents the salient points of the paper: "The parietal and paroccipital fissures may be either completely separated by an isthmus, or apparently continuous. When so continuous ectally there may still be an ental and concealed vadum or shallow. Disregarding the vadum on the present occasion, the ectal relations of the two fissures may be designated as either continuity or separation. That continuity occurs more frequently on the left side has been noticed by Ecker, Cunningham and the writer. Hitherto, however, statistics have included unmated cerebrums as well as mates from the same individuals. The following statement is based upon the cere brums of 58 adults of both sexes and various nationalities and characters. The speaker has examined 48; the other ten have been accurately recorded by Bischoff, Dana, Jensen and Mills." "The four possible combinations of right and left continuity and separation occurred as follows." "I. Left continuity and right separation in 27; 46.5 per cent. II. Right and left continuity in 22; 38 per cent. III. Right and left separation in 8; 13.8 per cent. IV. Left separation and right continuity in 1; 1.7 per cent." "When five groups of persons are recognized the combinations are as follows: A. In 8 moral and educated persons, combination I, 62.5; II, 25; III, 12.5. B. In 23 ignorant or unknown I, 56.5; II, 34.8; III, 8.7. C. In 20 insane, I, 40; II, 35; III, 20; IV, 5. So far as these 58 individuals are concerned, the most common combination, viz., left continuity and right separation, is decidedly the rule with the moral and educated, less frequent with the ignorant and unknown, the insane and negroes, and does not occur at all in the murderers. The only instance of the reverse combination (left separation and right continuity) is an insane Swiss woman. The only two known to be left-handed presented the more frequent combination I. (Journ. Comp. Neurol. Cincinnati, Vol. VI, 1896.) PSYCHOLOGY.' The Nature of Feeling.-A cardinal point of dispute in current psychology is the nature of feeling. The division of simple feeling into pleasure and pain is generally accepted; the question that remains unsettled is the relation of these latter to sensation. Wundt, Lehmann, Marshall and other recent writers, whose views differ in important respects, agree in regarding pleasure-and-pain as a characteristic of sensation (its Gefühlston) like quality or intensity. On the other hand there are those who claim that pain (at least) is a separate species of sensation, with a distinct set of nerves and end-organs. Goldscheider at one time believed that he had discovered these pain nerves, but he has recently retracted this claim. Others, again, regard pain as an extreme form or quality of sensation common to the touch, heat and cold senses. The problem is somewhat complicated by the ambiguity of the word pain. In the sense of "physical pain" (Schmerz) it may be a species of sensation; while at the same time in the sense of "displeasure" (Unlust) it may be regarded as either an "attribute" of sensation or a second element of consciousness. This distinction is maintained by Münsterberg and Baldwin, among others. The ordinary associations of the word pain have undoubtedly biased many writers and helped to keep alive the confusion between its two meanings. Edited by H. C. Warren, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J. 2 Dr. Nichols in his criticism of Baldwin in the September number of this magazine certainly misapprehends the latter's view on this point. Cf. Mental Development, pp. 483, f. Prof. Titchener in treating of the subject in his Psychology3 endeavors to avoid this ambiguity by discarding the terms pleasure and pain, and using pleasantness and unpleasantness instead. Apart from his terminology, Prof. Titchener's discussion is of special interest from the fact that, although an earnest follower of Wundt in most respects, he recognizes feeling or affection, as a distinct element of consciousness. Wundt reduces all consciousness (aside from the active) to a single element, sensation; Prof. Titchener restricts sensation to the cognitive side of consciousness, and makes affection a distinct and co-ordinate term. The mind, or consciousness, he says, "not only senses: it feels. It not only receives impressions and has sensations: it receives impressions in a certain way. . . . Life means the balance of power (more or less effective) in the perpetual conflict of two opposing forces-growth and decay. No impression can be made upon the living body that does not tend in some way to change this balance. . . . It must help either to build up nervous substance or to break it down. The organism is a whole and what effects it in either of these ways at one part, must affect it as a whole, in all. The conscious processes corresponding to the general bodily processes thus set up by stimuli-processes not confined to definite bodily organs-are termed affections.. There are only two bodily processes to give rise to affective processes: the building-up process (anabolism) and the breaking-down process (catabolism). We should expect, then, to find no more than two qualities of affection; and introspection tells us that expectation is correct. The anabolic bodily processes correspond to the conscious quality of pleasantness, catabolic processes to that of unpleasantness." Prof. Titchener then examines the relation of affection to sensation. "The processes of pleasantness and unpleasantness seem, at least in many cases, to bear a strong resemblance to certain concrete experiences which we have analyzed, provisionally, as complexes of sensations. Thus pleasantness may suggest health, drowsiness, bodily comfort; and unpleasantness pain, discomfort, overtiredness, etc. . . Now there can be no doubt of the resemblance in the instances cited. But the reason of it is simply this, that health, drowsiness and bodily comfort are pleasant, i. e., that pleasantness is one of the constituent processes, running alongside of various sensation processes, in the total conscious experience which we call health,' etc.; and that pain, bodily discomfort and overtiredness are unpleasant, i. e., that unpleasantness is one of the processes contained in each of these complex experiences. 3 An Outline of Psychology, by E. B. Titchener, Chap. V. Beyond this there is no resemblance: a sensation process is radically different from a pleasantness or an unpleasantness." This difference appears in several ways: (1). The sensation is looked upon as belonging to the object which gives rise to it, while the affection is regarded as belonging to the subject or conscious self. "Blue seems to belong to the sky; but the pleasantness of the blue is in me. Warmth seems to belong to the burning coals; but the pleasantness of warmth is in me. . . . The distinction is unhesitatingly drawn in popular thought, and clearly shown in language. It points to a real difference between sensation and affection as factors in mental experience—a difference which the psychologist must make explicit in his definition of the two processes. The same difference is observed even when we compare the affective processes with those sensations which are occasioned from within, by a change in the state of the bodily organ. The unpleasantness of toothache is far more personal to me than the pain of it. The pain is ‘in tne tooth; the unpleasantness is as wide as consciousness." (2). If a stimulus be long continued, the affection, if it is not of such a character as to pass over into pain, in the end becomes indifferent, while the sensation remains as strong and clear as ever, when the attention is directed to it. "Nervous substance, at the same time that it is very impressionable, is eminently adaptable. The organism adjusts itself to its circumstances-resigns itself, so to say, to their inevitableness. When once adaptation or adjustment to surroundings is complete, the surroundings cease to be taken either pleasantly or unpleasantly; their impressions are simply received, passively and unfeelingly." (3). "The more closely we attend to a sensation, the clearer does it become, and the longer and more accurately do we remember it. We cannot attend to an affection at all. If we attempt to do so, the pleasantness or unpleasantness at once eludes us and disappears, and we find ourselves attending to some obtrusive sensation or idea which we had no desire to observe." (4). "As a general rule, 'central' sensations are much fainter and weaker than peripheral.' A remembered noise has hardly anything of the intensity of the noise as heard. Affection can originate in the same two ways. But central' pleasantness and unpleasantness are not only as strong as they are in very many cases stronger than -peripheral.'" "We see, then," concludes Prof. Titchener, "that there are strong reasons for regarding affection as different from sensation. It must be |