to prove their right of voting. This therefore comes within the acknowledged rule, that where a verdict or judgment can be afterwards given in evidence by the person called as a witness in support of his right, his testimony is inadmissible. Secondly, G. Weaver was also incompetent; because, though he were not actually rated, he was liable to be rated. He was therefore interested in the decision of the Sessions; because he came to multiply the number of persons who were to bear the burdens of the parish, and consequently in ease of himself. This objection prevails universally in all parochial questions; and it is founded in reason and justice, since otherwise a parish would omit one person who was liable to be rated in particular rates, for the very purpose of obtaining his evidence in certain cases. Formerly, the rule respecting the admissibility of evidence, required that the person called as a witness should be wholly indifferent; and though in modern times the rule has been considerably narrowed, and the Courts have been inclined to let the objection go to the credit of the witness rather than to his competency, still the rule is, That if the party called have a direct interest in the very decision, he is incompetent; and the objection is not confined to those cases only where the party may afterwards use the verdict or judgment in his favour.

Erskine, Piggott, and Douglas, contrà, were stopped by the Court.

Lord KENYON, Ch. J. I purposely avoid saying any thing upon the first question, as it is not necessary for the decision of this case. But, on the second, if I were aware of any possible interest which the witness G. Weaver had, I should hesitate before I held that his testimony was improperly rejected. The poor-rates are made for a short space of time only; they are adapted to the situation of the parish at the time they are made; and persons who are liable to be rated one month, may not be so in the next. The rateability of one person cannot affect the rateability of another; and therefore, whatever rateable property G. Weaver may have had in this parish, yet, as his name was not inserted in the rate, his testimony was improperly rejected.

BULLER, J. I have often heard Lord Mansfield say, that the question whether the evidence be admissible or not, depends on the subject-matter to which it is applied. Then consider the subject-matter here: A number of persons, who insist on being rated (not wishing to be exempt from paying the rates) called a wit

1790.

The KING against PROSSER.

1790.

The KING against

PROSSER.

ness who is not rated, to prove that they have rateable property in the parish; and it is objected that he is an incompetent witness to prove this fact, because he himself is liable to be rated: but supposing that the appellants succeed in having their names inserted in the rate, it does not follow that the witness ought to be rated; that question will remain untouched, and it must depend on the fact of his having rateable property within the parish. It has been argued, that a person who is liable to be rated only, is equally an incompetent witness as if he were actually rated: but there is a material difference between the two cases. It has been settled in so many cases at Nisi Prius, that the liability to be rated is no objection to his being called as a witness, that it is now considered as an established point. The first question on this subject arose before Mr. Baron Burland, at Salisbury, in an action on a penal statute, which gave part of the penalty to the parish; and a person being called as a witness to support the action, who was liable to be rated to the poor, it was objected that such liability rendered him incompetent; but that learned judge said that as he was not rated, he had not an immediate interest at that time; and the witness was admitted. The same point has since been repeatedly ruled by different judges. The rule stated by one of the counsel, that the witness is to be totally indifferent at the time when he is examined, is not accurate: if such a rule were to prevail, every objection, which now goes to the credit of the witness only, would render him incompetent. That rule more properly applies to jurors, who are rejected on very slight grounds. I take the rule to be this, That, if the witness can derive no benefit from the cause then before the Court, he is competent.

GROSE, J. In many cases it is difficult to draw the line between competency and credit. But in this case there is no doubt: here the question is, Whether G. Weaver had any interest in the appeal at the moment when he was called to be examined? It is said that he was interested, because when another rate is made he will be so the answer is, That, if his name be inserted in the next rate, he will be interested, and consequently incompetent; but he had no interest on this rate to render him an incompetent witness.

Order of Sessions quashed (a)

(a) Vid. R. v. The Inhabitants of South Lynn, pošt, 5 vol. 664; and R.. The Inhabitants of Little ‍Lumley, post, % vol. 157. R. v. Kirdford, 2 East. 559.

The

The KING against The Mayor, &c. of LONDON.

1790.

Wednesday, Nov. 17th.

A barge-way

in the hamlet

subject of Hampton

The appel

Wick, purchased by the

city of London,

by virtue of the 17 Geo. 3. c.

18. (an act

passed for

tion of the

towards the

rateable to

of the poor in

there, notwith

THE HE defendants having been rated for the barge-way and tollgate in the hamlet of Hampton-Wick, Middlesex, appealed and toll-gate against the same to the Sessions; who confirmed the rate, to the opinion of this Court on the following case: Hampton-Wick is a vill maintaining its own poor. lants, by virtue of the stat. 17 Geo. 3. c. 18. and out of the fund provided by that act, purchased from Sir William Dolben, for the sum of 4200% an ancient barge-way or towing-path within the more effectually completsaid hamlet, upon the banks of the Thames, and certain ancient ing the navigatolls and duties, payable in respect of horses drawing barges along Thames, and the same; and such barge-way and tolls were, in January, 1778, empowering the city to levy conveyed to the appellants for the purposes of the act. The ap- tolls and duties pellants have leased the herbage and pasture of the barge-way or charges of the towing-path to Mr. Spencer, at an annual rent of 30%. 10s. which navigation) are is expressly appropriated to the use of the navigation; and their wards the relief lessee is in the occupation, of the herbage and pasture so leased that hamlet for such part of to him, and pays the several rates for the same. Immediately shells as beon the purchase and conveyance, the tolls upon barge-horses comes due were in pursuance of the direction of the act discontinued, and standing the ever since that time the new tolls authorized by the statute to be tolls are colcollected in lieu thereof, have been taken by the appellants for all barges and other vessels navigating the river between London Bridge and the City Stone above Staines Bridge, according to the quantity of tonnage. Barges and other vessels are daily navigated on that part of the Thames which is within the hamlet and adjoins the barge-way; and, under the authority of the Act, an additional toll of one halfpenny per ton becomes payable, and is paid to the appellants for every barge or other vessel navigating upon the river beyond Kingston or Hampton-Wick, and towed along the bargeway to Ditton, Hampton-Court, Moulsey, or Hampton, within part of which limits the barge-way in question is included; and barges from London frequently stop and unload within the limits of the barge-way. None of the new tolls are actually received within the hamlet of Hampton-Wick; but the whole of them collected by the appellants' appointment at Strand on the Green, below Kew Bridge, Sir William Dolben and his ancestors, previous tothe above purchase and conveyance, were always assessed to the land-tax, poor's rate, and other taxes for the barge-way and ansent tolls; and constantly paid all such assessments up to the time

of

lected in ano

ther parish.

[4 M. & S. 222.]

1790.

The KING

against The Mayor,

&c. of LONDON.

of such purchase and conveyance; and from the time of such purchase and conveyance the appellants have been regularly assessed in respect of the barge-way and tonnage; and the land-tax and poor's rate have been several times demanded by the officers of the hamlet; but the appellants have never paid the same. The whole interest which the appellants have in the tolls is derived under the before-mentioned Act, and purchased under the authority thereof. And the rates appealed against have been duly made, allowed, and published according to law.

The act of the 17 Geo. 3. c. 18. is entitled "An Act for en"abling the Mayor, &c. of London to purchase the present tolls " and duties payable for navigating upon the river Thames, west"ward of London Bridge, within the liberties of the city of Lon"don, and for laying a small toll in lieu thereof, for the purpose "of more effectually completing the said navigation; and for "other purposes." The act states, that great expenses had been already incurred by the city for improving the navigation, under the 14 Geo. 3; that further sums of money were necessary to be laid out, over and above the annual expenses; and it enables them to purchase lands and the several tolls and duties collected for the navigation of barges, and for horses drawing the same: that, immediately after the purchase of such tolls and duties, those tolls and duties should cease; and then it enacts, that, "in "consideration of the great charges and expenses the said mayor, "&c. will be at in improving and completing the said navigation, "and for keeping the works in repair, and in purchasing the tolls " and duties now collected and taken for barges and other ves"sels navigating, and for horses drawing, &c. it shall and may "be lawful to and for the mayor, &c. to take for all barges, &c. "which shall be navigated upon the said river between London "Bridge and the City Stone above Staines Bridge (except as is " hereinafter mentioned) such sums of money, in the nature of a "toll or duty, as the said mayor, &c. shall think proper, not ex"ceeding the tolls and duties hereinafter mentioned." It then stated the tolls which might be taken from London Bridge to several other places up the river as far as Staines (amongst others) to Hampton-Wick, 2d. per ton; to Staines and upwards, 4d. per ton. It also gives the city power to collect the tolls where they please. It then requires that "an account of the said tolls and "duties granted by the act, be annually laid before parliament." It then recites, that the money to be collected by the receipt of

the

the tolls or duties to be made payable by virtue of this act, will not be sufficient for the purpose of the act and of 14 Geo. 3. &c. and then gives power to the city to raise money upon the security of the tolls.

Erskine, Fielding, and Marryat, in support of the order of Sessions.-1st, The corporation of London are, in the eye of the law, the occupiers of this property, and are therefore liable to be rated for it. 2dly, The subject-matter is rateable. And 3dly, The tolls, in respect of which the defendants are rated, became due within the hamlet of Hampton-Wick. 1st, It is objected that, whether the property be rateable or not, the defendants are not rateable for it, because it is vested in them by the 17 Geo. 3. c. 18. for public purposes; and they are accountable to parliament for the money raised under it. But the objection is not well founded; for it by no means appears upon the face of the act that they may not be beneficial owners of this property. It is vested absolutely in the corporation like any other of their estates, and not subject to any other control; they have the sole management and disposition of it. And though the act is stated to have been passed for the purpose of enabling them more effectually to complete the navigation of the river, yet non constat that they will not derive great private advantages therefrom; and they are enabled by the same Act to raise very considerable annual sums by way of toll. With respect to the requisition of the act that an account of the tolls and duties be annually laid before parliament, it can by no means be inferred from thence that the money raised is to be under the control of parliament; nor can the Legislature be considered as having so intended, there being no direction to lay before them an account of the disbursements. If property were necessarily exempted from the poor's rates because it is vested in a public body for public purposes, the objection would have prevailed in the case of The King v. The Dock Company of Hull (a); and in R. v. Rebowe (b); but it was never thought tenable by those who argued against those rates. And in R. v. Cardington (c), the grantee of the Ouse Navigation was held rateable for tolls arising from a sluice, though it was stated that the river had been made navigable for the public benefit at a great expense, and was still attended with considerable charges. The defendants therefore are not only such occupiers as are capable of being rated in point of law, but must be (b) Bott. 384. (c) Cowp. 581.

(a) Ante, 1 vol. 219.

1790.

The KING against The Mayor, &c. of LONDON.

con