to these witnesses; one of these signatures was sworn to be genuine by one of them, and the other to be imitated. Lord Kenyon, in summing up to the jury, said he should leave the question of forgery on the evidence they had heard, without any observations. Evidence was also given on the ground of influence. The jury found for the plaintiff (a). Mingay, Partridge, Shepherd, Garrow, Gibbs, Raymond, and Jermyn, for the plaintiff; and Erskine, Bower, Law, Le Blanc, Serjt. Baldwin, and Wilson, for the defendant. (a) In a former ejectment brought by the present defendant, and tried at the last Spring assizes, at Bury, before Ashhurst, J. the jury found in favour of the will. 1792. GOODTITLE against BRAHAM. DANIEL against PHILLIPS. Wednesday, cannot object to orari to remove RUSSELL shewed cause against a rule for quashing a certi- Third persons orari, which had issued to remove a cause from the bo- the misdirecrough Court of Caermarthen into this Court. Two objections tion of a certihad been made to the issuing of the writ; 1st, That it was di- a cause from an inferior Court, rected to the mayor, commonalty, and burgesses, which was if the proper the name of incorporation; whereas it ought to have been directed to the mayor, recorder, and town-clerk, before whom the Court was holden. on The Court said, he need not trouble himself to answer this objection; for however the proper parties, in whose keeping the record was, might have objected to make any return of it account of the writ of certiorari being improperly directed, yet, having, in fact, returned the record into this Court, no such objection could be started by third persons. The second objection was, that the damages were laid under 40s. and therefore this Court would not take cognizance of it, To this it was answered, that however that might have held as an objection in general cases, where the action was brought to recover a debt under 40s. yet this was an action for an assault, brought against excise officers, who could not have an impartial trial there. The Court were satisfied with this reason, and Wigley in support of the rule. Discharged the Rule. officers, in whose keeping the record was, wave the objection, and return the record upon such writ. Neither will quash such writ the Court here because the da mages laid in the record be low, which was an action for an assault against excise officers, were under 40 1792. Thursday, Jan. 26th. It is sufficient to satisfy the provisions of the annuity act HODGES against MONEY and BAILEY. IN the last Term, the defendant Money, who had joined with Bailey, in granting and securing an annuity to the plaintiff, 17 Geo. 3. c. 26. obtained a rule for the plaintiff to shew cause why the judg ment entered up on the bond and warrant of attorney, given to secure the annuity, should not be set aside, and why those, and all other securities should not be given up to be cancelled, and to state the consideration of granting the annuity in the memorial by way of recital If several deeds be given to st cure an annuity, the memorial need only state all further proceedings staid. The matter, after argument, was directed to stand over till this Term, that the Court might be and the consi- more fully apprized of all the circumstances; and now it apderation be exexpeared, that the memorial of the annuity, directed to be enrolled by the 17 Geo. 3. c. 26. set forth a bond in the penal sum of 600l. to secure an annuity of 50l. a year; a warrant of attorney to confess judgment thereon; and also an indenture between the parties, which is referred to in the bond, "where"by, in consideration of the sum of 300l. &c. to Bailey in "hand paid by Hodges," H. Bailey assigned to Hodges his the warrant of half-pay as a security, &c.; "On the back of which said in"denture is a receipt, under the hand of the said H. Bailey, for "the sum of 300l. being the consideration-money paid to him by "Hodges, for the purchase of the said annuity." Neither the bond, nor warrant of attorney, as set forth in the memorial, stated the consideration of granting the annuity; nor did the warrant of attorney itself, which was now produced in Court, contain the consideration, but was in the usual form. The same objections, which were made to the grant of the annuity in the last Term, were now renewed by attorney need not express the 66 Erskine and Gibbs. 1st, There is no express substantive averment in the memorial that any consideration was paid for the grant of this annuity. The annuity act (a) requires, “That 66 a memorial of every deed, bond, instrument, or other assurance, whereby any annuity, &c. shall be granted, &c. "shall within twenty days of the execution of such deed, bond, "instrument, or other assurance, be inrolled in the Court of "Chancery; and that every such memorial shall contain the "day of the month and the year when the deed, bond, in"strument, or other assurance, bears date, &c.; and shall set "forth (inter alia) the consideration or considerations of granting the same; otherwise every such deed, bond, instrument, (4) 17 Geo. §. 6. 26. 1. 1. :or "or other assurance, shall be null and void," &c. What is stated in the memorial as being on the back of the indenture is mere recital, and no direct averment of the fact of the 300%. being paid. Non constat but that such a receipt may be written on the back of the indenture, and yet the money may not have been paid. It should have been averred in the memorial that the consideration was paid. In Robinson v. Howell (a), where it was only stated by way of recital, that in consideration of so much money paid to the grantor, the annuity was granted, the Court held it insufficient. 2dly, The act requires that every deed, &c. whereby the annuity is secured, shall be set forth in the memorial, and the consideration or considerations of granting the same; otherwise every such deed, &c. shall be void. Now the memorial does not state the consideration of the bond or warrant of attorney, but only of the indenture. It is no answer to say, that it would be an useless repetition to state the consideration of every deed set forth in the memorial, which must be the same. It is sufficient that this is a matter of positive regulation expressly enjoined by the Legislature, who were abundantly cautious to prevent the frauds which had before been practised while these transactions were in secret. But, 3dly, Supposing the first clause of the act should be satisfied, by stating the consideration only once in the memorial, and not repeating it with respect to every instrument, &c. yet at all events the consideration must be set forth in every ins.rument itself, by the express requisition of the third clase; which, pursuing the words of the first section, enacts, "That "in every deed, instrument, or other assurance, whereby any annuity, &c. shall be granted, the consideration really and "bona fide paid, and also the names, &c. shall be fully and truly set forth, &c. and in case the same shall not be fully "and truly set forth, &c. every such deed, instrument, or other "assurance, shall be null and void," &c. Here the warrant of attorney produced does not contain the consideration for granting the annuity and that was held by this Court (b) to be an instrument for securing the annuity, within the meaning of the act, which ought to be registered in the memorial; and if so, it is equally necessary by the third clause that it should contain the consideration. 66 66 Wood, contrà, as to the first objection, said, that the words following the receipt of the 300l. " being the consideration-money "paid by the said W. Hodges, for the purchase of the said an(a) E. 31 Geo. 3. B. R. ante, 494. (n. b.) (b) Hopkins v. Waller, ante, 463. "nuity," 1792. HODGES against ΜΟΝΕΤ. 1792. HODGES against MONEY. "nuity," were a sufficient averment that the money had been actually paid: it is the form in which averments in pleadings are often made. And as to the suggestion that it might be the mere recital of the words of the receipt on the back of the indenture, that was not so; the receipt concluded thus: "Being "the consideration-money within mentioned to be paid by him "to me." In answer to the second objection, he said, that the first clause of the act only requires that every memorial should contain the consideration of granting the annuity, not that every deed, &c. set forth in the memorial should contain it: that would have been an useless tautology, and unnecessary for the purpose of the act, which was merely to ascertain what the consideration for granting the annuity was, that the Court might see that the grantor had not been imposed upon: and that end is as well answered by one averment of the consideration as by many. And so it was determined last Term, by the Court of Exchequer, in Oliver v. Style. One of the objections there was, that the consideration of the warrant of attorney was not stated in the memorial; to which the Court answered, that a warrant of attorney to confess judgment, does not contain upon the face of it any apparent consideration, but it was referred to by the indenture; and they were of opinion, that they ought to couple the transaction, and take the whole memorial together; and if the consideration appeared, that was sufficient. They added further, that a Court of justice ought not to strain a remedial law for the purpose of injustice. As to the third objection, that the warrant of attorney ought to have stated the consideration on the face of it, that never could have been the intention of the act, for then it would be equally necessary to state the consideration in the judgment, which is part of the assurance of the annuity: but that would be impossible. The true meaning of the Legislature was, that the assurance, whether it consisted of one or more deeds or instruments, should contain the consideration; not that it should be stated as many times as there were deeds: several deeds for the same purpose make in law but one assurance. The Court disposed of the first objection last Term; being of opinion that the memorial contained a sufficient averment that the consideration was paid; though they agreed, that if it were merely stated by way of recital (a), that would be sufficient. And now Lord KENYON, Ch. J. said, in answer to the second objec(a) Vide Sowerby v. Harris, ante, 494, S. P. tion, that as the act of parliament only required that the memorial should contain the consideration of granting the annuity, it would be absurd to repeat the same thing several times in the same memorial, though several deeds were given to secure the same annuity, each of them expressing the consideration. That such a requisition would be deservedly subject to the objection of tautology; a complaint to which legal proceedings were already too much open; and that there was no foundation for the third objection, that the consideration ought to have appeared in the warrant of attorney; for that the bond, the warrant of attorney, and the judgment taken together, only constituted one assurance; and that the act of parliament was satisfied by inserting the consideration in any part of this one assurance, namely, the bond. That if an assurance of an annuity consisted of a lease and release, or of a fine and other deeds, it could not be necessary to insert the consideration of the annuity in the lease for a year, or in the fine; but it would be sufficient if it appeared in the assurance, whether constituted of one or of several deeds. Per Curiam, Rule discharged. DOULSON against MATTHEWS and Another. 1792. HODGES against MONEY. Thursday, Jan. 26th. Trespass will not lie in this country THIS HIS was an action of trespass for entering the plaintiff's dwelling-house in Canada, and expelling him: there was for entering a another count for taking his goods; but as there was no proof house in Canada, to support the second count, the only question was, Whether an action of trespass could be brought in this country for the injury stated in the first count? Lord Kenyon, at the trial, was clearly of opinion that the cause of action stated in that count was local: and as the plaintiff could not support the second count, he was nonsuited. Erskine now moved to set aside that nonsuit; observing, that this was not an action to recover the land, but merely a personal action to recover a satisfaction in damages, which was transitory, and might be tried here. In a case of a similar nature, Lord Mansfield was of opinion that the action might be tried in this country. It was an action brought against Captain Gambier, for pulling down, by order of Admiral Boscawen, the houses of some suttlers, upon the coasts of Nova Scotia, who supplied the sailors with spirituous liquors. In another case (a) Lord Mansfield himself mentioned this, and said, "The objection (a) Corp. 180. " was |