receive a legacy, executed by her husband: the Lord Chancellor ordered a transfer to the Accountant General with liberty to the legatees to apply upon such documents for payment." But where the husband and wife were both inhabitants of Prussia, the money was ordered to be paid to the husband without examination, as by the law of that country the whole personalty of the husband and wife is at the absolute disposal of the husband. Payment of a

legacy amounting to 1677. to the agent of the husband without a commission to take the consent of the wife, has been refused, although the parties lived at Tortola, and it was urged that the expense would run away with a great part of the legacy. Now however legacies to married women under 2001., or ' 107. in annual payments, may be paid by the Accountant General to them or their husbands upon an affidavit by them that there is no settlement or agreement affecting or relating to such legacy or annuity."

When a settlement is decreed it is for the wife, and the children. Sir W. Grant remarked, he was not aware that the wife had in any case béen permitted to say, she claimed a settlement for herself, but not for her children. If the wife die after an order directing the Master to approve of a proper settlement, the children are entitled to the benefit of that order: although if there were no children it would not prevent the right of the husband by survivorship."

Hence where a legacy was left to a married woman, whose husband became a bankrupt, and the executors of the will filed a bill to carry the trusts of it into execution; and the wife died before answer put in, leaving children: Sir J. Leach was of opinion, that upon the bill being filed, the equity of the wife attached upon the property, and that her subsequent death pending the suit, without waving her equity, gave to the children an immediate title to the provision that the wife could have acquired, if living.* And where a legacy was left to the wife of a bankrupt, and the assignees agreed with the executor to settle part on the wife and her children; and the wife afterwards died before any settlement was made, leaving a daughter: it was held that her death could not disappoint the claim of the child. How far the children have any substantive and independent right to claim after the death of their mother, if a settlement was not directed during her life, was at one time much doubted. But in a late case where this point came under consideration, Sir T. Plumer said, that though the cases as printed were contradictory, yet on consulting the registrar's books they were all found reconcileable, and all concurred in showing that the children had no right independent of contract or a decree.d

The wife will not in general have the whole of the property decreed to her. The Court, in determining the question how much she shall have, has exercised ́a

Jam. 64.

b Lloyd v. Williams, 1 Mad. 450. • See 13 Ves. 7.

and see I Glyn & Jam. 66.

e

Pryor v. Hill, 4 Belt's Bro. 139. Beresford v. Hobson, 1 Mad. 362.

Goose v. Davis, Cooke, B. L. 298,

Lloyd v. Williams, 1 Mad. 450; marginal note, 8th ed.

discretion, and has not tied itself down to any precise rule. Any settlement of other property made by the husband upon the wife is to be taken into consideration; and regard must also be had to any other property possessed by the husband in right of his wife. The most usual course seems to be to give her one half. In one case however where the wife was a ward of court, the whole of the property was decreed to be settled upon her and her, children, notwithstanding the husband had assigned her interest to secure the repayment of money borrowed for the support of himself and his wife. The bad conduct of the husband may perhaps give the wife a special equity to have a larger part of the fund settled on her; but if a divorce from ill-treatment takes place only after the bankruptcy of the husband, it makes no difference, as the right to the legacy has become vested in the assignees."

SECTION II.

Of the Time and Rate of Payment.

By the civil law executors have a year's time from the death of the testator to get in the estate, and to pay legacies; and, in conformity to this, the same rule, where no earlier time is mentioned in the will, has been taken up, and is now followed in the Court of Chancery. Where therefore a testator

Green v. Otte, 1 Sim. & St. 250. See 1 Mad. 375. 377. Goose v. Davis, ante 285. Ex parte Newham, 1 Glyn & Jam. 40. Ex parte O'Ferrall, id. 347.

Like v. Beresford, 3 Ves. 506. d Green v. Otte, 1 Sim. & St. 250. Beresford v. Hobson, 1 Mad. 362. • Bac. Ab. Leg. K. 2 1 Ves. 310. 2 Salk. 415.

willed that his executors should within three months. after his death transfer 1000l. stock to each of his relations, naming them; and in another part of his will gave legacies of stock "as aforesaid:" it was held there was not sufficient to take the latter legacies out of the general rule, and that the value of the stock must be taken at the end of a year, the usual time. The legacy however vests on the death of the testator, so that if a residuary legatee dies before the debts are satisfied, or it appears how much the surplus will amount to, his representatives will nevertheless be entitled to it when ascertained."

If it can be collected that the testator had any other intention in this respect, it will of course be followed as near as possible. Thus where a man gave legacies to his grandchildren to be paid at twenty-one or marriage, and by a subsequent clause in his will appointed all the legacies thereby devised to be paid within one year after his death: this last clause was construed only to relate to the other legacies given by the will, so as not to contradict the time specially appointed for the payment of the legacies to the grandchildren. Where also a man by a codicil postponed for a particular reason the time he had appointed for payment of his legacies, and that reason became inapplicable by the events that hap pened: the legacies were declared to be payable at the original time appointed by the will.

When a legatee, whose legacy is to be paid him at the age of twenty-one, dies under that age, his

a

Sibley v. Perry, 7 Ves. 522.

b Carth. 52; and see Wilson v. Spencer, 3 P.W. 172. So if a child dies after his portion is payable but

before the estate is sold. Bartholomew v. Meredith, 1 Ver. 276.

Adams v. Clerke, 9 Mod. 154. a Wordsworth v. Younger,3Ves.73.

representatives must wait till such time as he would, if living, have attained twenty-one; unless the legacy be given with interest; for then they will be entitled immediately on his death. Although if maintenance or an annual sum only, and not the interest itself, be given to the legatee, his representatives must wait till such time as he would himself have been entitled."

If a legacy be given to J. S. payable at twentyone, and if he die before, to go over to A.; and J. S. die under twenty-one; the legacy is due to A. immediately; for the devise over to him is a new substantive bequest. But this does not seem to be the case in gifts payable out of land: for where certain premises were charged by will with portions for daughters at their respective ages of twenty-two or marriage, and if any died before her portion became payable the share of the one so dying to go to the survivors; and one of the daughters attained twentytwo, and another died under that age; it was held that the portion of the latter should not be raised before such time as she would have attained twentytwo if she had lived.d

When the bequest is not payable till a future time, as at the age of twenty-one; or at the end of ten years from the death of the testator; or after the determination of a previous life interest; the legatee is entitled to have the amount of his legacy appro

a 1 Ves. 307. 1 Stra. 239. 1 Bro. 105. 3 Ves. 13. Cloberry v. Lampen, 2 Freem. 24. Anon. id. 64. Sanders v. Earle, 2 Ch. Rep. 188, cited 2 Ver. 199. Fonnereau v. Fonnereau, 1 Ves. 118. 3 Atk. 645. Chester v. Painter, 2 P.W. 335.

Roden v. Smith, Ambl. 588. Harrison v. Buckle, 1 Stra. 238.

1 And. 33. Pl. 82. Papworth v. Moore, 2 Ver. 283. Laundy v. Williams, 2 P.W. 478, 1 Eq. Ab. 299; and see 1 Atk. 556.

d Feltham v. Feltham, 2 P.W. 271.