OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WASHINGTON, D. C. JANUARY 20, 1955 ORDER NO. 70-55 AMENDMENT OF PERSONNEL SECURITY REGULATIONS OF THE The Personnel Security Regulations of the Department of Justice approved by Order No. 25-53 of August 31, 1953, are hereby amended by adding the following provision to Section 7 (F): "Pending determination of suspension in cases in /8/ Herbert Brownell, Jr. ATTORNEY GENERAL The following group of letters was later received by the Subcommittee under cover of a letter dated March 20, 1963, over the signature of Mr. Yeagley: February 12, 1954 Honorable Hugh L. Dryden Dear Mr. Dryden: This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of January 29, 1954, to me, requesting, pursuant to Section 13 of Executive Order 10450, advice as to a proposed "statement of policy or interpretation outlining more specifically criteria for the selection of positions to be designated as sensitive." Your statement of policy is set forth in your letter in the following proposed definition of sensitive positions: Sensitive positions designated in the NACA Sensitive positions shall include, but shall not necessarily be limited to the following: 1. Any position the duties or responsibilities of which relate to the overall development, approval, or supervision of research projects, research programs, and policies potentially important to, or having a significant effect upon, the national defense or operations of war. 2. Any position the duties of which require access to, and knowledge of, the plans of defense or war operations, or a major portion or critical part thereof. Section 3(b) of Executive Order 10450 requires that "the head of any department or agency shall designate, or cause to be designated, any position within his department or agency the occupant of which could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, a material adverse effect on the national security as a sensitive position." Accordingly, it is the duty of your agency to determine the positions which are sensitive within this requirement of the Executive Order. However, your proposed definition as descriptive of the type of position which would be considered sensitive is, in the view of the Department, not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of Executive Order 10450. Sincerely, /S/ ROBERT W. MINOR Acting Deputy Attorney General DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL August 23, 1954 Honorable Philip Young Civil Service Commission Washington 25, D. C. Dear Mr. Young: This is with reference to proposed instructions to be issued by the Civil Service Commission to the various departments and agencies of the Government regarding the interpretation and administration of certain provisions of Executive Order 10450. As you are aware, the President on October 13, 1953, issued Executive Order 10491 whereby subsection (a) of Section 8 thereof was amended by adding as an additional criterion for determining whether an individual is a security risk, his refusal "on the ground of constitutional privilege against selfincrimination, to testify before a Congressional Committee regarding charges of his alleged disloyalty or other misconduct". Thereafter, on May 27, 1954, the President issued Executive Order 10531 whereby subsection (d) of Section 8 of Executive Order 10450 was amended requiring that all investigations conducted by any agency relating to matters covered by Executive Order 10491 be referred to the FBI. The Director of the FBI. has pointed out that the two amendments read together, might be construed to require the Bureau to investigate all individuals who refuse to testify concerning charges of misconduct including misconduct not relating to loyalty or the security of the United States and that such an interpretation would impose an undue burden on the FBI. However, the phrase "other misconduct" is meant to refer only to matters relating to disloyalty or subversive connections. It is accordingly suggested that in the proposed instructions the departments and agencies be informed that reference to the FBI under Executive Order 10531 be made only where an individual refuses on the basis of the Fifth Amendment to testify before a Congressional Committee to any matter pertaining to loyalty, security or subversive connections. Sincerely, /S/ WILLIAM P. ROGERS Deputy Attorney General DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE The Department of Justice today made public the following correspondence between the President and the Attorney General: March 4, 1955 Dear Mr. President: You requested the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice to review the Employee Security Program, and to recommend any needed improvements based upon a study of the actual operating practices thereunder. The program operates under a 1950 statute (Public Law 733, 81st Congress, approved August 26, 1950, 64 Stat. 476), and a 1953 Executive Order (No. 10450, dated April 27, 1953, 18 F.R. 2489). Congress by enacting the 1950 statute in effect made the head of each participating department and agency of the Executive Branch responsible for suspending and terminating the employment of any civilian officer or employee of the Government whenever he shall determine that such action is necessary or advisable in the interest of the national security of the United States. This imposes a grave responsibility upon each department and agency head. In our review we have kept in mind not only this responsibility but also your emphasis on a policy that the individual employee be accorded fair and impartial treatment at the hands of the Government. The program requires, first, that the files of those employees who had been the subject of a full field investigation under prior loyalty programs be re-examined in accordance with the new security standards and appropriate action taken. That phase of the security program is well on the way to completion. The second phase of the program involves the investigation of all employees occupying sensitive positions and the taking of appropriate action based upon any derogatory information disclosed concerning them. This phase is likewise well along and can, with diligence, be brought to substantial completion shortly. After these two phases have been completed, the cases of applicants for jobs and probationary new employees will be the principal concern of the security program. I believe that the program will continue to be improved by emphasizing the following procedures which experience has shown to be most helpful in protecting both the national security |