law.

and

ED

OF

at

Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEBU-SP No. 00920. The Court of Appeals upheld the default order dated 25 July 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Tacloban City (trial court) in Civil Case No. 97-11-203 for Reconveyance of Title with Damages and the trial court's succeeding orders dated 23 February 2005 and 12 May 2005 denying the motion to lift order of default and motion for reconsideration, respectively.

The Facts

On August 13, 2004, defendants Trinidad Alicer and the Heirs of Arturo Alicer filed a "Motion to Lift Default Order dated July 25, 2003" alleging inter alia that they did not receive a notice of the pretrial scheduled on July 25, 2003, which motion was denied by the trial court on February 23, 2005 for insufficiency in form and substance of the motion and for not being accompanied by an affidavit of merit. A motion for reconsideration thereon was also denied on May 12, 2005, hence the instant petition for certiorari.*

Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging that they

The facts as found by the Court of did not receive a resolution from the trial Appeals are as follows:

The instant petition stems from the complaint filed by Alberto Compas against Winefreda Pineda and Amando Pineda, Trinidad Alicer and Heirs of Arturo Alicer, Edgar Selda and the Rural Bank of Carigara (Leyte) dòcketed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Tacloban City as Civil Case No. 97-11-203 for Reconveyance of Title and Damages.

After all the answers have been filed and preliminary matters disposed of, the court a quo on December 10, 2002 set the pre-trial conference on February 20, 2003 which was rescheduled to March 13-14, 2003 upon motion of defendant Rural Bank of Carigara (Leyte) per Order dated January 29, 2003.

However, prior to the March 13-14, 2003 pretrial conference, counsel for the plaintiff Alberto Compas moved for the postponement of the hearings to March 20-21, 2003 on the ground of prior commitment.

Likewise on the same ground, defendants Trinidad Alicer and Administrator of Intestate Estate of the deceased Arturo Alicer through counsel moved for postponement of the suggested March 20 and 21, 2003 hearing dates to May 8, 2003.

It appears that both motions for postponement did not reach the trial court on time hence the case was still called for hearing on March 13, 2003. On the said date only the following parties were in attendance: Edgar Selda and his counsel Atty. Alexander Ang, Rural Bank of Carigara (Leyte) and its counsel Atty. Nilo Aldrin Lucinario and Trinidad Alicer and one of her counsels Atty. Samuel Lagunzad. Incidentally, the pre-trial conference was rescheduled to June 5, 2003 which was once more reset to July 25, 2003.

When the case was called for pre-trial on July 25, 2003, all parties were present except for defendants Trinidad Alicer and the heirs of Arturo Alicer and their counsels. Upon motion of counsel for the plaintiff, said defendants were declared in default by the court a quo. Afterward, pre-trial proceeded and after which a pre-trial order was issued by the trial court of even date. Thereafter, trial of the case ensued.

3 Id. at 57-63.

court denying or granting their motion for postponement dated 8 March 2003, requesting that the pre-trial conference be moved to 8 May 2003. Furthermore, they asserted that they were also not served a copy of the notice setting the pre-trial conference on 25 July 2003 and that such notice should have been served on Atty. Melencio Emata (Atty. Emata) and not on co-counsel Atty. Samuel Lagunzad (Atty. Lagunzad).

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. The Court of Appeals stressed that it should never be presumed that a motion for postponement would be granted. Petitioners' counsel should have been put on guard when they received no action from the trial court regarding their motion.

On the alleged lack of notice of the pretrial conference, the Court of Appeals found that the notice and a copy of the pre-trial order were actually sent to Atty. Lagunzad, one of the counsels of petitioner Trinidad Alicer. Contrary to petitioner's claim that Atty. Emata is the sole counsel of record for petitioners, the records reveal that petitioner Trinidad Alicer is actually represented by three counsels, namely, Atty. Emata, Atty. Lagunzad, and Atty. Von Kaiser Soro, who separately appeared in court on different dates and filed pleadings on behalf of petitioner Trinidad Alicer. Citing Section 2, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court,

4 Id. at 48-49.

5 Id. at 115-117.

the Court of Appeals held that if a party is represented by several counsels, service of pleadings, judgments and other papers may be made on any of them and that notice to one of the counsels is equivalent to notice to all.

With regard to petitioner heirs of Arturo Alicer, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court furnished both Atty. Lagunzad and Atty. Emata with the order dated 13 March 2003 scheduling the pre-trial on 5 June 2003, the order dated 5 June 2003 resetting the pre-trial to 25 July 2003 and the pretrial order dated 25 July 2003. The Court of Appeals held that notice sent to Atty. Emata is deemed service of notice to the heirs of Arturo Alicer. If Atty. Emata failed to receive the notice, it was because of his negligence in informing the trial court of his change of address. As explained by the Court of Appeals:

Undeniably, due service of such orders were sent to Atty. Melecio Emata. It is legal presumption, born of wisdom and experience, that official duty has been regularly performed; that the proceedings of a judicial tribunal are regular and valid, and that judicial acts and duties have been and will be duly and properly performed. It has also been held that "when a mail matter is sent by registered mail, there exists a presumption, set forth under Section 3(v), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, that it was received in the regular course of mail. Accordingly, notice sent to Atty. Melecio Emata is deemed service of notice to the heirs of Arturo Alicer.

therein is the Cardona, Makati City address which is likewise the same address provided by private respondent Compas in his "Motion to Transfer Hearing" dated February 10, 2003. But in the contentious "Motion for Postponement" dated March 8, 2003 in response to the "Motion to Transfer Hearing" of private respondent Compas, Atty. Emata once more utilized the Constancia Street, Makati City address. Finally in the "Motion to Lift Default Order" dated July 25, 2003, Atty. Melecio Emata gave a third address, that is FH Center, LDS Chapel Compound, Dela Costa cor. Solaiman Streets, Salcedo Village, Makati which address is currently being used.

Evidently, Atty. Emata's employing simultaneous and different addresses has muddled the service of pleadings and court notices and orders. It is elementary that it is a counsel's duty to make of record in the court his address and notify the court of any change thereof. The fact that counsel used a different address in later pleadings does not constitute the notice required for indicating his change of address. Jurisprudence teaches that when a party is represented by counsel, notice should be made upon the counsel of record at his given address to which notices of all kinds emanating from the court should be sent in the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of address.6

At this juncture, it is not amiss to highlight Atty. Melecio Emata's use of various office addresses which according to private respondent Alberto Compas, generated bewilderment as to said counsel's exact and official address. We take cognizance of private respondent Alberto Compas' declaration that in the Answer to the "Amended [Amended] Complaint" dated September 10, 2001 filed by Atty. Emata for and on behalf of petitioners, he supplied the following address: Ground Floor, Door B. Lagasca Apartments, 8259 Constancia Street, Makati City. Thereafter, said counsel sometime in the middle of 2001 used another address, to wit: Rm. 416 Margarita Bldg., J. Rizal Ave., Cor. Cardona, Makati City. In the answer to the "Amended Complaint" dated September 25, 2002 filed by Atty. Emata for and on behalf of the Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Arturo Alicer and the Heirs of Arturo Alicer the address given this time is Constancia Street, Makati City. We note however that in the Order dated January 29, 2003 the address of Atty. Emata as appearing

The Court of Appeals likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, thus:

In the instant case, it is an admitted fact that petitioners' counsel, Atty. Emata failed to notify the lower court of his change of address in violation of Rule 7, Sec. 3 (par. 3) of the 1997 Rules of Court. Atty. Emata claims that his failure to notify the lower court of his change of address was because of his elevated blood pressure and cerebral blood clot that he sustained which made him not intellectually functional to prepare the notice.

PRIL

court

derks

However, the Court finds the same lacking credibility considering that he was able to file a number of pleadings and motions for the petitioners using his new address. Why he did not endeavor to include a notice of change of address when he had a chance to do so was inexcusable negligence on his part. Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that clients are bound by the actions of their counsel in the conduct of their case. Counsel's omission was an inexcusable neglect binding upon petitioners.

record

before check

from

and

his ac

an in

Rule

H

It is not incumbent upon the court to determine the new address of party-litigants. On the contrary, it is the duty of the parties to inform the court of such change of address. Moreover, notices of the

6 Id. at 52-54.

Co ofE

OFFICIAL GAZETTE

court processes are ordinarily taken cared of by clerks who are naturally guided by addresses of record. To require the court and its personnel before sending out the notices to be continuously checking the records and the various addresses

from which a counsel may have filed his pleadings

and sending them to such addresses instead of his address of record is to sow confusion and add an intolerable burden which is not permitted by the Rules of Court.7

12 See Comment of respondent Rural Bank of Carigara, Inc., pp. 17-20; rollo, pp. 148-151. In their petition dated 22 June 2009, petitioners also mentioned the Decision dated 27 November 2006 of the trial court; rollo, p. 38.

e

e

[G.R. No. 182758. May 30, 2011]

SECOND DIVISION

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.

SEVERINO

SYLLABUS

Of the Ruling of the Court

LISTANA,

1. REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES;
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; FILING OF
INJUNCTION BOND IS A REQUISITE;
PURPOSE OF THE INJUNCTION BOND.-An
applicant for preliminary injunction is required
to file a bond executed to the party or person
enjoined, to the effect that the applicant will pay
to such party or person all damages which he
may sustain by reason of the injunction. Section
4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules of Court states: Sec.
4. Verified application and bond for preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order.-A
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order may be granted only when:*** (b) Unless
exempted by the court, the applicant files with
the court where the action or proceeding is
pending, a bond executed to the party or person
enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court,
to the effect that the applicant will pay to such
party or person all damages which he may
sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary
restraining order if the court should finally decide
that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon
approval of the requisite bond, a writ of
preliminary injunction shall be issued. As
correctly ruled by the lower courts, the
P5,644,773.02 bond shall answer for the
damages Listana may sustain if the courts finally
uphold the P10, 956,963.25 just compensation
set by the DARAB. In Republic v. Caguioa, the
Court held that, "The purpose of the injunction
bond is to protect the defendant against loss or
damage by reason of the injunction in case the
court finally decides that the plaintiff was not
entitled to it, and the bond usually conditioned
accordingly."

2. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; COM-
PREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW
(RA 6657); ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION OVER EMINENT DOMAIN
CASES AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL
OFFENSES UNDER RA NO. 6657 IS VESTED
WITH THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS,
AND MAY NOT BE USURPED
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.-The SAC has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over petitions
for determination of the amount of just
compensation of properties acquired under RA
No. 6657. Administrative agencies have no
jurisdiction over just compensation cases.
Section 57 of RA No. 6657 states that, "The

BY

Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners." In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that: In Republic v. Court of Appeals, it was held that Special Agrarian Courts are given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation; and (2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under R.A. No. 6657. *** The DAR, as an administrative agency, cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain and over criminal cases. The valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the Special Agrarian Courts and cannot be lodged with administrative agencies.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DECISION OF THE DARAB SETTING THE AMOUNT OF JUST COMPENSATION IS MERELY PRELIMINARY AND NOT EXECUTORY IF CHALLENGED BEFORE THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT; THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT MAY GRANT EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL OF THE DARAB DECISION ON MERITORIOUS GROUNDS.-[A]s a rule, the DARAB's decision setting the amount of just compensation is merely preliminary and not executory if challenged before the SAC. Execution pending "appeal" of the DARAB decision is allowed only on meritorious grounds. Even then, it is the SAC, not the DARAB, that can grant execution pending "appeal" because the SAC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over just compensation cases. The determination of the amount of just compensation is a judicial function that cannot be usurped by administrative agencies. In Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that: It is now settled that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. The same cannot be lodged with administrative agencies and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A WRIT OF EXECUTION AND A WARRANT OF ARREST ISSUED TO EXECUTE A DECISION WHICH IS MERELY PRELIMINARY AND NOT EXECUTORY IS CONSIDERED INVALID.-In the present case, LBP filed with the SAC a petition for determination of the amount of just compensation on 6 September 1999. The PARAD issued the alias writ of execution and warrant of arrest on 27 November 2000 and 3 January 2001, respectively. The writ of execution and warrant of arrest were invalid