of inciting to violence at the Westminster election, was condemned to be committed to Newgate, and according to custom was ordered to receive his sentence on his knees. But to the general horror and indignation, Mr. Murray refused to kneel. The Speaker commanded, Mr. Pelham protested, equally in vain-Mr. Murray would not kneel down at the bar. The House began to surge and roar in its fury like a great sea, until at last, the tempest rising to its height, they carried an angry resolution, "That Mr. Murray, having in a most insolent and audacious manner at the bar absolutely refused to be upon his knees, is guilty of a high and most dangerous contempt of the authority and privilege of this House." He was then committed to Newgate, without pen, ink, or paper, and without permission to see his friends, and there he remained until the prorogation. Nor was it until near the end of the century (1772) that the odious necessity for kneeling at the bar of the House was repealed. Culprits brought before the Lords on the impeachment of the Commons were still, however, required to kneel.

CHAPTER XIII.

PARLIAMENT UNDER THE WHIG OLIGARCHY.

THE policy which had been begun by the Cabal, continued by Danby, and unwillingly revived by William III., which different Parliaments had attempted in vain to restrict or destroy by means of pension-bills, became during Sir Robert Walpole's long ministry of twenty years (17211742) a regularly organized system for the maintenance of the Government, for the continuance of a consistent policy, and for a safeguard against the disputes and violence which had hampered the Cabinets and disgraced the Parliaments of William III. Unusual facilities were undoubtedly supplied for this by the already corrupt state of the representation, and the influence of the Septennial Act. From the very earliest days Parliament had never been really representative of any but the leading men in town and country, whose influence in most matters was entirely undisputed by their inferiors. The Tudors had set the example of creating small borough constituencies in which the influence of the Crown was paramount. It was also part of the royal electioneering tactics to appoint on occasion High Stewards to particular boroughs, whose business it was to secure the return of satisfactory candidates, and in most cases these officers were naturally chosen from the ranks of the neighboring landowners. The Crown, in consequence, possessed the full control of a large parliamentary interest by way of direct nomination to a number of seats, besides considerable powers of influencing elections in other constituencies by the votes of the revenue officers and other Government officials. In much the same way, though on a less ambitious scale, there was a large amount of parliamentary interest in private hands. It was easy for a great landowner to create new votes, and to buy up old ones, either by direct payments in

hard cash or by making it a practice to distribute his custom, to grant privileges and favors, and to use a hundred and one modes of benefiting his inferiors directly or indirectly, solely with a view to insuring docility among them in electioneering matters. In many cases, moreover, the original borough had decayed entirely, and in the words of Lord John Russell on the Reform Bill, nothing was left but a park, a mound, or a wall to mark the site of the old constituency which originally really elected the two members, who now were simply nominated by the lord of the manor. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, in fact, most of the small boroughs were practically in the nomination of some one man, or at most were divided among the adherents of two, who invariably avoided contests by an amicable arrangement to halve the representation. In the larger boroughs, such as Liverpool, there were still some vestiges of a popular election, as there was also in the most of the counties. By this phrase, however, was simply meant that there was a never-ending contest between the influences of rival families or rival coalitions of families, and that the side which bribed with the greatest freedom and recklessness would probably be able to reinforce the votes of their own dependants by a sufficient number of comparatively independent votes to carry the day against the enemy.

The nomination boroughs being practically the property of their owners, were treated as property with a cynical disregard for aught but the advantage of the proprietor. In many cases the seats were directly sold to the highest bidder, and this custom became very prevalent as a wealthy middle class arose in the country, which possessed plenty of money but no land. The rich merchants and Indian nabobs who desired to get into Parliament purchased land, votes, and seats, in order to acquire parliamentary interest. In many cases they bought the whole interest in a borough from its needy proprietor; oftener they contented themselves with purchasing the right of nominating to the seat at the next vacancy-it being always easy to create a vacancy in a very short time by arrangement with the sitting member. Rich men, moreover, possessed advantages in contesting big county or borough constituencies, which in many

cases would outweigh the greatest talents, if the latter were unsupported by more solid considerations. It is not, therefore, strange that a change gradually came over the face of Parliament, and that political power ceased to be the monopoly of the landed interest. It was with the view of excluding from Parliament the rich landless merchants, who were generally Whigs, that the Tory Government of Harley brought in a Property Qualification Law, 1712, which enacted that the candidates for the boroughs should possess freehold or copyhold land to the annual value of £300, a similar qualification of double the value being required for candidates for the counties. A law like this, however, was too obviously opposed to the general pecuniary interest, and too easily evaded, to be of much practical value. Its utter inefficiency and speedy defeasance may be best estimated by the fact that it never even occurred to the Whigs in the hour of their triumph to move for its repeal.

The value of nomination boroughs was considerably increased by the Septennial Act, owing to the longer leases of life conferred on the member; for the vendor of the seat might now fairly charge at least double as much as under the old system of triennial Parliaments. The seat itself was worth more to the buyer, and he was not likely to grumble at the increased price. "Popular elections," moreover, naturally became more expensive; bribery had to be conducted on a more extensive scale than ever. Altogether there was a general rise in prices, owing to the increased value of the commodity. From this sprang two very important consequences: first that the members, when once elected for their term of seven years, felt themselves comparatively independent of their constituents, vendors, or patrons; secondly, that in most cases they regarded the money spent in procuring their admission to Parliament as so much capital sunk which should bear a rich harvest in the shape of lucrative places, comfortable pensions, or round, agreeable bags of hard cash. They borrowed a lesson from the electors, and they expected to be treated as they had treated the latter-only, as the commodity which they had to sell was so much more valuable, the tariff of prices was naturally arranged on a far higher scale.

Therefore, when Walpole sought for his majority, he found it ready to his hand. Voting-power might be had in great abundance, provided he could give the quid pro quo. In order to furnish the necessary rewards to the faithful, he misused his control of the enormous Crown patronage; places and pensions were multiplied and subdivided to an extraordinary extent, to provide for the numerous hungry claimants; peerages, ribbons, and stars were bestowed in equal profusion on those who preferred them; in many cases there appears to be no doubt that sums of money were directly handed over to individuals on the occasion of some particular division of great importance. The enormous secret service fund was employed, in a great measure, for the purchase of votes. Half the members at least were in regular receipt of money in some form or other. It is positively asserted in Wraxall's Memoirs that the supporters of the Government usually expected handsome gratuities at the end of each session, and were not disappointed. Lord Hervey incidentally mentions that he heard from both Sir Robert Walpole and the queen that a particular ministerial triumph only cost £900-£500 to one man and £400 to another; nor does he express any surprise at the disclosure, except perhaps at the marvellous cheapness of the bargain. There is a popular legend that Walpole's code of morality and his opinion of mankind were so extremely low, that he was wont to declare derisively that "all men have their price," and that in reply to the question what Sir John Barnard's price might be, he answered," Popularity." The phrase that he really used was, "All these men have their price," and was spoken with contemptuous reference to several members of the Opposition, who, though conspicuous for their uncompromising invective against the corruption by which the government was carried on, might, it was well known, have easily been converted into supporters of that very government by the offer of what they so ardently panted for-office. Still, though the motto attributed to him be delusive, there appears to be no reasonable doubt that Walpole did practise corruption on a very large scale as an engine of government, but it is impossible to view his conduct in this respect with any great disapprobation. In the first place, it was absolutely