## Game and Economic Theory: Selected Contributions in Honor of Robert J. AumannGame and Economic Theorystudies the interactions of decision makers whose decisions affect each other. The analysis is from a rational viewpoint: every participant would like to obtain the outcome that he prefers most. However, each one has to take into account that the others are doing the same--trying to get what they prefer most. At times this leads to fierce competition; at other times, to mutually beneficial cooperation; and in general, to an appropriate combination of these two extreme behaviors. Game theory, which may be viewed as a sort of "unified field" theory for the rational side of social science, develops the theoretical foundations for the analysis of such multi-person interactive situations, and then applies these to many disciplines: economics, political science, biology, psychology. computer science, statistics and law. Foremost among these is economic theory, where game theory is playing a central role.This volume consists of twenty-two selected contributions to various areas of game and economic theory. These important and pathbreaking contributions are all by former students of Robert J. Aumann, to whom this volume is dedicated. The volume will no doubt shed light on the far-reaching pertinence of game theory and its application to economics, and also on the monumental impact of Aumann on this discipline. Sergiu Hart is Alice Kusiel de Vorreuter Professor of Mathematical Economics and Director of the Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Abraham Neyman is Professor of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Leading Professor of Economics and Mathematics, State University of New York at Stony Brook. |

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### Contenido

Introduction | 1 |

Chapter | 15 |

On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria | 47 |

Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium | 87 |

The Value of TwoPerson ZeroSum Repeated Games | 113 |

JeanFrançois Mertens and Shmuel Zamir | 139 |

Correlated Equilibria in TwoPlayer Repeated Games | 177 |

The Asymptotic Theory of Stochastic Games | 203 |

Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders | 279 |

Equivalence Theorem for the core of a Duopolistic 315 | 315 |

Values of NonDifferentiable Markets with a Continuum | 321 |

Demand Compatible Equitable Cost Sharing Prices | 335 |

Formulation of Bayesian Analysis for Games with | 355 |

Approximating Common Knowledge with | 385 |

Subjective Probability and Expected Utility | 407 |

Consistent Voting Systems | 427 |

Stochastic Games | 215 |

A Nondiagonal Value on a Reproducing Space | 239 |

Renewal Theory for Sampling without Replacement | 247 |

An Axiomatization of the Core of Cooperative Games | 265 |

Parametrized Integration of Multifunctions with | 437 |

Discrete and Continuous BangBang and Facial Spaces | 449 |

Contributors 463 | |

### Otras ediciones - Ver todas

Game and Economic Theory: Selected Contributions in Honor of Robert J. Aumann Sergiu Hart,Abraham Neyman Vista de fragmentos - 1995 |

### Términos y frases comunes

actions additional allocation applications assigns assume assumption atoms Aumann axioms behavior beliefs bounded called choice chooses closed coalition common compact competitive complete concept consider consistent contains continuous convergence convex core Corollary correlated corresponding defined definition denote described deviation distribution Economics element equal equilibrium equivalent event example exists expected fact finite follows function Game Theory given Hence holds implies independent induced infinite integral knowledge Lemma limit mapping Mathematical means measure namely Nash normal Note obtained optimal particular payoff perfect persistent play player positive possible preference probability problem proof Proposition prove pure random rational relation Remark repeated game respect result retract satisfies selection sequence solution space stable stage strategy subset sufficiently Suppose Theorem traders unique University utility vector