Game and Economic Theory: Selected Contributions in Honor of Robert J. Aumann

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University of Michigan Press, 1995 - 463 páginas
Game and Economic Theorystudies the interactions of decision makers whose decisions affect each other. The analysis is from a rational viewpoint: every participant would like to obtain the outcome that he prefers most. However, each one has to take into account that the others are doing the same--trying to get what they prefer most. At times this leads to fierce competition; at other times, to mutually beneficial cooperation; and in general, to an appropriate combination of these two extreme behaviors. Game theory, which may be viewed as a sort of "unified field" theory for the rational side of social science, develops the theoretical foundations for the analysis of such multi-person interactive situations, and then applies these to many disciplines: economics, political science, biology, psychology. computer science, statistics and law. Foremost among these is economic theory, where game theory is playing a central role.
This volume consists of twenty-two selected contributions to various areas of game and economic theory. These important and pathbreaking contributions are all by former students of Robert J. Aumann, to whom this volume is dedicated. The volume will no doubt shed light on the far-reaching pertinence of game theory and its application to economics, and also on the monumental impact of Aumann on this discipline.
Sergiu Hart is Alice Kusiel de Vorreuter Professor of Mathematical Economics and Director of the Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Abraham Neyman is Professor of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Leading Professor of Economics and Mathematics, State University of New York at Stony Brook.
 

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Contenido

Introduction
1
Chapter
15
On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
47
Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
87
The Value of TwoPerson ZeroSum Repeated Games
113
JeanFrançois Mertens and Shmuel Zamir
139
Correlated Equilibria in TwoPlayer Repeated Games
177
The Asymptotic Theory of Stochastic Games
203
Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
279
Equivalence Theorem for the core of a Duopolistic 315
315
Values of NonDifferentiable Markets with a Continuum
321
Demand Compatible Equitable Cost Sharing Prices
335
Formulation of Bayesian Analysis for Games with
355
Approximating Common Knowledge with
385
Subjective Probability and Expected Utility
407
Consistent Voting Systems
427

Stochastic Games
215
A Nondiagonal Value on a Reproducing Space
239
Renewal Theory for Sampling without Replacement
247
An Axiomatization of the Core of Cooperative Games
265
Parametrized Integration of Multifunctions with
437
Discrete and Continuous BangBang and Facial Spaces
449
Contributors 463
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