REVIEWS

A History of Education during the Middle Ages and the Transition to Modern Times. By FRANK PIERREPONT GRAVES, PH.D., Professor of the History and Philosophy of Education in Ohio State University. New York: Macmillan, 1910. Pp. xv+328.

A brief notice of the first volume of Professor Graves's History of Education appeared some time ago in this journal. At that time the writer of the notice called attention to the value of educational history for the sociologist. This second volume emphasizes this value. The author shows very clearly the close connection in the Middle Ages between education and the social changes and movements of that time. There can scarcely be a doubt, the followers of Marx to the contrary, that in the Middle Ages there was a much clearer and closer connection between education and the social life than between economic conditions and the social life. When the sociologist has made his inventory of history to construct a satisfactory theory of social evolution, he will probably give as large a place to methods of education in determining the social life process as to methods of production and distribution of wealth.

Professor Graves takes up the history of educational processes and ideals during this period in a very clear and illuminating way. He continues to interpret the educational process from the standpoint of the development of individualism, which, as he says, is abundantly justified for the period in question. He brings down this interpretation through the Renaissance and the Reformation to the culmination of individualism in the doctrines of Rousseau. In his concluding sentence he promises another volume in which he will attempt to show how individualism in the nineteenth century was put under reasonable limitations and made to harmonize with the welfare of society. This, he says, is the underlying desideratum for which modern society and education have been striving. Those interested in interpretation of the social history of the nineteenth century from the standpoint of education will await Professor Graves's third volume with interest.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

Individualism. Four Lectures on the Significance of Consciousness for Social Relations. By WARNER FITE, PH.D., Professor of Philosophy in Indiana University. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1911. Pp. xix+301. $1.80 net. The present work belongs primarily to the neo-utilitarian social philosophy (though the author would probably resent such a classification), and, consequently, it would require but slight notice here, but for the fact that the numerous descendants of this particular intellectual parentage are now eagerly searching for rehabilitated doctrines bearing the guise of plausibility.

The primary contention of the author is that with the growth of self-consciousness-which is also social consciousness, and which has possibilities of unlimited expansion (pp. 94 ff.)—an enlightened self-interest will take care of all the relations of men (p. 179). Even now, with our consciousness imperfectly developed, the only reliable and acceptable criterion of conduct is this same intelligent selfinterest (p. 299). In addition to the fundamental assumption already mentioned, to the effect that the individual consciousness is capable of unlimited expansion, he makes use of three other gratuitous assumptions as the bases of his argument. These are: (1) that with a perfect consciousness of the relations of men to each other there can be no social, ethical, or individual conflict (pp. 37 ff.); (2) that knowledge of the right insures the doing of the right (pp. 188, 191, 224); and (3) that the conscious person can do as he pleases, is an end and law to self, but is incapable of acting from whim or unjust motive (pp. 87 ff.). From these four principles, which he resurrects from the dead isms of a prescientific age, he deduces, quite without concern for the results of experimental science, his theory of individualism, which he conceives as a fundamental solution of the problems of human associations.

At no point does he attempt to explain or take account of the functional derivation of consciousness-his principal term; he simply assumes it, and he attributes to it an absoluteness and invariability which is unknown either to the experimental psychologist or to the pragmatic philosopher. Apparently he has escaped the message of pragmatism altogether. Especially, in this connection, does he offend by way of omission of all consideration of the environmental factors. He succeeds in making consciousness absolute only by failing to conceive of it as the evolutionary method of the adjustment of the individual to his environment. Instead,

he assumes that it is an absolute, underived, and unchangeable force which independently fits the individual into his situation. Such a recognition of the functional and derivative nature of consciousness would at once reveal its weakness, as well as invalidate the fundamental gratuitous assumptions upon which he builds his argument.

It is at this point, where he assumes that one's self-regard, coupled with an indefinite capacity to know results, is the sufficient and only criterion of adjustment of individuals to their fellows, that he argues himself factually into the position of Bentham and the Utilitarians.

The sociologist, of course, recognizes the primary importance of consciousness in making social adjustments, but he is by no means able to neglect the importance of custom, tradition, and even of organized social control as factors in securing order and adjustment in the world. Neither can he agree to leave the attainment of this order and adjustment to the individual alone. He must recognize that the limitations placed upon the expansion of consciousness by spatial, temporal, and technological factors to say nothing of the size and capacity of the nervous system and its receiving apparatus are so great that a more or less automatic machinery for the guidance of man's social activities must be maintained and kept in order. Likewise he does not find it advisable to leave the fashioning of this system of social control to any one individual or group; for experience has taught him that knowledge is at least as frequently used in the service of corruption as for the good of all individuals together. Hence precaution is everywhere taken to put the machinery of social control out of the reach of whimsical or selfish interference. In a word, the sociologist does not believe that the average individual is or ever will be wise and unselfish enough to be permitted independently to make his own adjustments to the group as a whole, to say nothing of regulating the affairs of the group. Briefly, then, the practical sociologist can have no patience with Professor Fite's views.

So much for the general argument. In the minor details there is so much nonchalant self-contradiction and misdirected effort that one dislikes to pursue the matter farther. The author will not find many to disagree with his paradox that socialism is fundamentally individualistic (pp. 22, 196, 280), or that art (the aesthetic) is the more mystical and less efficient method of expression as compared

with that of science (p. 13). In this connection he indulges in a characteristic soliloquy to the effect that, while various sciences deal with relatively isolated aspects of man, there is no science of man as a whole, and that this particular method of interpretation is left to art (p. 211). Here he ignores, or is ignorant of, the chief aim and purpose of sociology, which is to discover the whole man and to relate him quantitatively and qualitatively to his group-life. His statement that there is no unity in the objective world and that its seeming unity is the product of the unity of consciousness (p. 59) will not be accepted by those who look upon consciousness as simply the correlate of so much of the external world as has influenced the individual with the consciousness. The candid experimental psychologist might even regard the external world (including the individual anatomically) as fundamental and consciousness as derived. The sociologist will have more sympathy for his contention that all consciousness is qualitatively the same, and that the more or less prevalent textbook distinction between animal consciousness, consciousness, and self-consciousness is a survival of the preevolutionary philosophy (pp. 70 ff.). His contention that there is no heredity of "intelligent" or socially co-ordinated instincts, because inherited reactions are without objects at birth (p. 159), ought to be welcomed by the sociologists. However, such contentions as that society must be conscious of itself to exist (p. 100), that the individual is an original force, the product of his intelligence and not of social adjustment (p. 233), and his attempted revival of the natural rights and social contract theories on the basis of his philosophy of individualism (pp. 257 ff.) belong to the realm of pure subjectivism. His statement that the social problem is a purely practical one, one of technical adjustment (p. 297), appeals strongly until he discloses the fact that this adjustment is brought about only by "intelligent self-interest" (p. 298).

Considerable ammunition is wasted on philosophical theories which never were entertained by the more advanced and practical sociologists. L. L. BERNARD

WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY

The Jews: A Study of Race and Environment.

By MAURICE

FISHBERG. New York: Scribner, 1911. Pp. xix+578. This is a worthy addition to the "Contemporary Science Series." It is a capably written treatise by a Jewish author about his own

people. It will be of good service to students of anthropology and ethnology, as well as to Jews who desire to be well posted. It is packed with information. One hundred and forty illustrations from photographs are given; and a large bibliography of related titles is appended. Topics discussed are: the number and distribution of Jews in the world; physical characters; types; origin of types; proselytism and intermarriage; demographic characteristics; pathological characteristics; social and economic conditions; education; occupations; criminality; political conditions; social disabilities; assimilation v. Zionism.

The author works in view of the generally accepted conclusion that there are no "pure" races in the civilized world (chap. ii). Unlike most Jews, he is familiar with the Bible from the critical standpoint. He does not accept the traditional view of the Israelite conquest of Canaan as outlined in the Book of Joshua; for he points out, on the basis of the historical Bible books, that during the period of "Hebrew consolidation" there was a wide and sweeping assimilation of the Israelites with the earlier population of the land (chap. viii). On the whole, this is one of the best books on the subject that we have seen.

LOUIS WALLIS

The Primary Cause of Antisemitism: An Answer to the Jewish Question. By ABRAHAM S. SCHOMER. New York: Israel Publishing Co., 1909. Pp. xiii+162.

The writer is obsessed by the idea that anti-Jewish prejudice arises from the fact that the Jews have no corporate identity. "Prejudice," he says, "is no more than a mental emotion caused by a phenomenon which the mind cannot understand and of which it can form no definite idea" (p. 68). He thinks that if the Jews could organize an international corporation which would give them a definite social character over against the rest of the world, then antisemitism would automatically disappear. "The cause of the emotion of prejudice against the Jews is that the mind cannot understand and explain what the collective body of Jews represents" (p. 151). The remedy is a kind of sublimated Zionism, in the form of an "International Jewish Congress with Executive Officers" (p. 156). This "praescriptum" will take away all ground for prejudice against the Jews.