MARX'S "ECONOMIC DETERMINISM" IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY* CHARLES A. ELLWOOD Is Karl Marx the Darwin of sociology? The claim that he must be so considered has been vigorously put forward in recent years by a number of socialist writers,1 but strangely enough has thus far been largely ignored by the sociologists. The claim is that Marx did for social evolution with his "materialistic conception of history" what Darwin did for organic evolution with his theory of natural selection; namely, that he revealed the essential method or mechanism of the evolutionary process in human society. Moreover many economists who are antisocialists oddly enough accept Marx's formula as an adequate theory of social evolution. Much has been written in criticism. of Marx's theory and of Marxian socialism, but an adequate sociological and psychological criticism of his "materialistic conception of history," the doctrine which is fundamental to his whole social philosophy, is still strangely lacking. It is the purpose of this paper to indicate some of the bearings of modern psychology and sociology upon this doctrine, and to what extent it may be accepted by the student of society. It is not easy to criticize Marx's theory of social evolution upon the basis of the results of scientific psychology, for it is difficult to discover exactly what Marx's theory really was. *While this paper deals specifically with Marx's "economic determinism," it is equally directed against any other exclusively or preponderatingly economic interpretation of history or society. 'See, e.g., Ferri's Socialism and Modern Science, 88, 95, 160, 163. 'Cf. Ferri's statement: "This law is truly the most scientific and the most prolific sociological theory that has ever been discovered by the genius of man."-Op. cit., 163. 'Professor Seligman's admirable little book on The Economic Interpretation of History does not, of course, attempt a definite psychological criticism of the theory; the same is true of practically all other critical studies of Marx's theory. However, Dr. M. M. Davis in his Psychological Interpretations of Society (chap. xiii) offers a psychological criticism which, though worded differently, is very similar to the one given in this paper. Some of his latest apologists present his "materialistic conception of history" in such a modified form that scarcely any student of society would object to it. An examination, however, of the writings of Marx, Engels, and the older Marxians shows quite conclusively that these thinkers held in general to what may properly be called a theory of "economic determinism" in social evolution.5 Marx himself asserted in his Critique de l'économie politique that "the method of production of the material life determines the social, political, and spiritual life process in general." Moreover, it is noteworthy that Marx and his colaborers usually make use of the phrase "the methods of production and distribution" rather than of the word "economic," so that it cannot be claimed that their doctrine results from the ambiguity of the word "economic." They were evidently speaking of the economic in the narrow and exact sense. Quite rightly, therefore, Professor Ferri, who must be regarded as one of the most distinguished exponents of Marxian socialism, unhesitatingly speaks of Marx's theory as one of “economic determinism." Professor Ferri sums up Marx's theory with great accuracy in the following words: "The economic phenomena form the foundation and determine the conditions of all other human or social manifestations, and consequently ethics, law, and politics are only derivative phenomena determined by the economic factor in accordance with the conditions of each particular people in every phase of history and under all climatic conditions." Professor Ferri would modify this formula only to this extent that "the moral, juridical, and political institutions from effects become causes and react in their See, e.g., Spargo's statement of the theory in the American Journal of Sociology for July, 1910 (XVI, 27). However, in Karl Marx, His Life and Work, Spargo accepts the statement of theory given by Engels. That both Marx and Engels qualified considerably their statement of the theory in their later years is only an indication that they felt the force of criticism. Some of these qualifications appear quite inconsistent with the general trend of their social philosophy (cf. Engels' letter to the Sozialistischer Akademiker, quoted by Seligman and Bernstein). "It is noteworthy that recent socialist writers usually make use of the same phrase; for example, Mr. W. J. Ghent states the theory as follows: "The superstructure of society in all times, with all of its institutions, its codes of morals and of laws, is a reflex of the prevailing system of production and distribution." 'Op. cit., 160. turn, although with less efficacy on the economic conditions."8 Ultimately, however, Ferri agrees with Marx that all of these other social phenomena must be a resultant of the economic forces. Accordingly Ferri says the physical determinism of such thinkers as Buckle and the anthropological determinism of the ethnologists must issue in the "economic determinism" of Marx.9 Moreover, Marx's whole social philosophy necessarily presupposes that the economic is fundamentally determinative of all other social phenomena. Marxian socialism has always held that a revolution in the economic life of society would mean an equal revolution in all other phases of the social life. The Marxian socialist philosophy, in a nutshell, has always been: "Economic conditions are wrong, consequently other social conditions are wrong; make economic conditions right, and all other social conditions will be right too." The reality. of other aspects of the social life than the economic was, of course, not denied by Marx, nor even was the presence of other factors in social evolution disregarded. The point is, however, that with Marx and the Marxians generally these other forces are what we might call epi-phenomena of the economic process, not being themselves in any way fundamental, or in the long run determinative of the social life.10 Indeed, if this were not the case there would be no sense in attempting a criticism of the "materialistic conception of history," because this theory would be in no way distinct from other conceptions. The theory becomes a distinct theory of social evolution only when it is asserted that the economic factors in the social life (methods of production, distribution, Op. cit., 162. The theory in Marx's mind was unquestionably simply a corollary of his general philosophical materialism. If viewed in this light, it is open to all of the criticisms which apply to philosophical materialism. For a brief criticism of the theory from this point of view, see Bernstein's Evolutionary Socialism, 6 ff. 1 Cf. Labriola's statement that the theory attempts "only to explain in the last analysis all the historic facts by means of the underlying economic structure" (Essays on Materialistic Conception of History, 111); also Ferri's statement noted above, and Engels' quoted by Seligman (op. cit., 143). For typical socialist applications of the theory see Lewis' Vital Problems in Social Evolution, chap. i, or Rappaport's Looking Forward: A Treatise on the Status of Woman and on the Origin of the Family and the State. and exchange) either determine the whole course of social evolution or condition it in such a way that all other social factors are mediated and their expression ultimately determined by the economic factors.11 There can be no doubt, then, that Marx's theory of social evolution, upon which his followers rest his claim to be considered the Darwin of sociology, is that the biological and psychological factors in human social life are all mediated and ultimately determined in their expression by economic processes. The theory is, therefore, in spite of the objections of recent apologists of Marx to the term, essentially a theory of "economic determinism."12 According to this theory the economic interpretation of history, or of social evolution, is the all-sufficient interpretation; and if this is true sociologists should certainly make haste to hail Marx as the Darwin of their science.13 It is this theory which we propose to examine in the light of modern psychology. The conception of individual life which modern psychology necessitates is that of an organism responding, now this way, now that, to the various stimuli in the environment. The stimuli do not compel activity, but are rather the opportunities for the discharge of energy, the organism itself being selfactive and a relatively independent center of energy. Various classes of stimuli, then, impinge upon the organism and stimulate its activity. The character of the response depends upon the hereditary equipment and "acquired characters" of the organism; in other words the instincts, or native impulses, and the acquired habits of the individual determine very largely the "As Labriola and Ferri agree in stating it. To say that economic factors are the main or principal factors is in no way to offer a distinct theory of social evolution; for it leaves the question of other factors and the exact part which they play quite undetermined. "The objection that "economic determinism" as a term suggests "economic fatalism," while valid from a popular point of view, is not valid from a scientific point of view, since "determinism" in scientific usage is not necessarily that of mechanical causes, but may be psychological. As we have just seen, the essence of the theory is that all of the biological and psychological forces of the social life are mediated (controlled) by the economic process. The determinism implied is psychological; hence only a psychological criticism is adequate. "The claim constantly put forth by Marx's followers that Marxian socialism is "a theory of social evolution," is certainly a challenge to sociology. Either sociologists should accept Marx's theory and stop trying to construct independent theories of social evolution, or they should give good reasons for rejecting it. |