accidents in both the forenoon and afternoon periods to increasing fatigue ("zunehmender Müdigkeit, zunehmender Abgespannheit"). Professor G. Pieraccini and Dr. R. Maffei, head physicians in the Royal Main Hospital, Florence, have made an investigation of the accidents (with reference to accident-hours) which took place in some of the railway machine-shops of Italy (1901 to 1905). The results of their tabulation of accident-hours are given in Table XI. They omit the first hour of work of both periods of the day-because fewer workmen are at work than during the succeeding hours. The accidents for the corresponding hours of the forenoon and afternoon periods are added together. Professor Pieraccini concludes that the protraction of the hours of labor raises the number of accidents with each successive hour, in both the first and second half of the day.18 In Vienna, Dr. Leo Verkauf has made some investigation of accident-time in connection with insurance studies. His figures refer to those industries (in Austria) in which a short recess, sometimes of thirty minutes, is given at 10 A.M. and at 4 P.M.19 They show an increase in the number of accidents for the first three hours of the forenoon and of the afternoon periods. Without some sort of comparative basis covering the same industries, the effects of the recess are difficult to determine. Many conditions in Europe are different from those in the United States. Yet the fact that European investigations are uniformly emphatic in the assertion that the danger of accident increases with continued work is most significant for the American situation. The fatigue effects of the great and feverish haste " See Brandeis and Goldmark, op. cit., 252. "E. R. Krejcsi, op. cit., 328. at which things are done in the United States must be added to the regular fatigue effects of the more deliberate European methods of operation. Table XII gives the statistics to which reference has been made in the preceding paragraphs. The totals appear at the bottom of the table. From these figures it is not possible to make a comparison of the number of accidents occurring in the forenoon with those of the afternoon because the Saturday and other half-holidays depress the afternoon totals and because the forenoon period is frequently of greater length than the afternoon period. No attempt has been made to tabulate accidents TABLE XII SUMMARY OF ACCIDENT-HOURS 7 to 8 8 to 9 9 to 10 10to11 11 to12 12 to 11 to 22 to 3 3 to 4 4 to 55 to 6 Hours Illinois.. Wisconsin 97 150 193 156 244 427 246 257 49 III 156 227 260 145 94 247 407 435 446 277 208 251 242 121 Indiana, etc. 818 1,072 1,332 1,137 765 368 943 1,054 1,199 899 353 France (for1903) 25 30 20 57 63 France(for1904) 232 305 340 478 292 Germany (for 1887) 794 815 1,069 1,598 1,590 587 745 1,037 1,243 1,178 1,306 738 982 1,408 1,986 2,016 1,518 74 136 403 787 504 568 23 II 18 22 24 24 9 14 26 29 20 3,732 4,993 6,326 7,566 7,068 2,289 3,914 5,646 7,184 6,533 4,834 according to the days of the week. Not only are there insufficient statistics to be tabulated in this way, but the Sunday period of supposed rest introduces new and complex factors. The records for the day following pay-nights indicate that abnormal factors have entered. As far as accident records go which may be tabulated by the days of the week, they indicate a large number of accidents on Monday, a much less number on Tuesday, a gradual rise till the close of the week, when the number of accidents on Monday is exceeded. "In many industries, notably the iron and steel, mining, textile, and railway, the number of accidents steadily increases from the first or middle of the week and attains a maximum for Saturdays."20 Sunday recreation seems to unfit workmen for steady work on Monday, "but fatigue evidently plays a rôle also; for even on Monday the number of accidents between 9 A.M and 12 M. is larger than between 6 and 9 A.M., even in proportion to the hours worked in the two periods." Table XII gives the same general results as Table V (Illinois statistics): (a) A marked increase of accidents during the forenoon period; (b) A decided fall after the noon period; and (c) Another marked rise in the afternoon period. Accurate conclusions regarding fatigue effects must be confined to those workhours when the number actually at work is uniform and when the rapidity of work is fairly uniform. The hours of uniform employment and of uniform rapidity of work as determined in the early portion of this section, are from 8 to II A.M. and from I to 4 P.M. On the basis of this analysis, Table XIII has been constructed; the figures have been taken from Table XII. The number of accidents for the first hour of the three-hour morning period of uniform employment and rapidity has been added to the number of accidents for the first hour of the afternoon period of uniform employment and rapidity, and so on. The more or less regular increase in the number of accidents, hour by hour, from 9,113 to 12,230 and from 12,230 to 15,064, indicates quite definitely the results of fatigue in terms of actual accidents— inasmuch as extraneous elements have been largely accounted for and not included in these figures. Table XIII serves as a basis for the following conclusion: Continuous work, other things being equal, is accompanied, hour by hour, by an increasing number of accidents. Table XIII adds weight to the statement of the law of fatigue given at the close of Section III; the increasing muscular inaccuracy which accompanies uninterrupted work results in increasing danger of accident. Table XIII is offered in support of the thesis of this investigation, that fatigue is a cause of industrial accidents. In the following section an attempt will be made to answer the question, Has fatigue attracted attention to itself to the extent that it has been indicted as a cause of accidents by men of judicial and conservative mind? VI. JUDICIAL FINDINGS AND DECISIONS The accident statistics presented in the preceding section were related mainly to the development of fatigue and to the increase of accidents during the regular ten-hour day. The figures for accidents occurring during overtime work are very inadequate. Light is thrown on this point from two important sources: (a) the reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and (b) the decisions of the courts. Although the material used in this chapter and gleaned from these two sources is largely incidental to the main function of these sources, it is for that reason of special value for this investigation. The overtime accident cases cited in this section are not intended to show the relative danger of working "overtime," since there is no adequate basis of comparison. The accident cases cited here are those apparently due to fatigue of overwork and per se are offered as additional evidence in defense of the thesis that fatigue is a cause of accidents. No attempt has been made here to offer an exhaustive list of such cases. The purpose at this point is to cite cases which will establish the fact, not the quantitative extent, of fatigue resulting from working overtime as a cause of accidents. For several years past the Interstate Commerce Commission has concerned itself with a study of railway accidents; its findings are published quarterly. An excerpt germane to this investigation follows: In nearly or quite every bulletin that has been issued, it has been necessary to record one or more collisions due to the mistakes or negligence of men who have been on duty so many hours as to raise the supposition, if not the presumption, that they had become drowsy, if they had not actually fallen asleep; and cases in which enginemen are definitely reported as being asleep on duty are common.1 Table XIV presents a list of fifty-four railway accidents compiled from the reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission. In these cases, the person or persons responsible for the accident had been on duty periods of time varying from eleven hours and nineteen minutes to thirty-nine hours and twenty-five minutes without intermission (except where noted).2 In respect to the accidents tabulated, the Interstate Commerce Commission either states or directly implies that "the men at fault had been on duty an excessive number of hours." The implication is clear that the fatigue of overtime work was the chief cause of these accidents involving loss of life and property. The facts upon which Table XIV is based are submitted as proof from an angle different from that of the preceding chapters that fatigue is a cause of accidents. Typical illustrations of what happened directly previous to the occurrence of the given accidents are given: Accident No. 8 (Table XIV). Flagman, who had been ordered to hold one of the trains, went into caboose to get red light; sat down to warm himself and dry his clothes; fell asleep; had been on duty sixteen and a half hours. 'Interstate Commerce Commission, Report, No. 18, 10. • The size of Table XIV is such that limitations of space do not permit its publication. Its contents, however, are indicated here. 3 See Footnote 1. |