real and concrete to the student. Furthermore, it will be said that such a course would have no practical value to the student because the knowledge gained could have no practical application. I do not think this is entirely true, for I believe that this knowledge may have some practical application in the practice of medicine, law, education, etc. But even if it were true, as furnishing a sound scientific basis for further study of social science, this course would be justified in the long run, even on practical grounds.

HENRY P. FAIRCHILD, YALE UNIVERSITY

The opinion that a general course in sociology should include, as a preliminary, a study of organic evolution and anthropology seems to me well founded. The study of society is, after all, the study of man and can only be understood as the origin and nature of man is understood. Man is primarily an animal and the product of evolution, and unless the student knows something about him as an individual he can hardly hope to comprehend his actions in groups. Just how this preliminary matter shall be given depends, of course, upon the curriculum of each institution. If there are satisfactory courses in organic evolution and anthropology, these may be required as prerequisites, rather than embodied in the sociology course. My point is that the student must have this elementary knowledge of the materials he is to work with before he is fitted to go on and study their interrelations.

It has sometimes occurred to me that in the allied field of economics something of the same sort might be done to good advantage. That is, to have as a prerequisite to an elementary course in economic theory a course in the mechanics of wealth-getting, so to speak. Take up the study of the organization and conduct of a typical factory, the operation of a typical farm, the organization and management of a corporation, the physical constituents of a railroad system, etc. It seems to me logical that before the student undertakes to study the theories which underlie business, he should know something about what business actually is, what the materials are that he is to work with, and what the relationships are that he is to seek to explain. The technical terms and business phrases, many of which are now dead and meaningless to him when he meets them in the textbook, would then be vital and significant.

JOHN L. GILLIN, THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

This report is a most interesting and helpful one. Here we have spread before us the various methods of approaching the problem of teaching sociology. Such diversity of method is very suggestive, but perhaps to the young instructor may be perplexing.

It seems to me, from an experience of some seven years in teaching sociology, that, if possible, the simpler and more concrete aspects of the subject

should be presented before the more abstract. Therefore, to put the students at work upon some of the concrete social problems and social facts is the best method to begin the work. For some reasons it is best to begin with a simple analysis of concrete social facts, such as the students are more or less familiar with, such as the simpler facts concerning the family or an analysis of the various social organizations. From other points of view perhaps the study of what is usually called "charities" is the most practical way of introducing the student to the study of society. This has the advantage of concreteness, of being familiar, and of having already demanded some attention from the student. However, the important thing is to have the student commence with things rather than with principles; then proceed from the concrete to the abstract, from the known to the less well known. On the basis of facts which he has observed, tendencies will appear and principles will naturally develop from his study.

GEORGE B. MANGOLD, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

I want briefly to express my own views on the availability of the courses on sociology, as outlined in the report. Although I have had but a limited experience in the field of theoretical sociology, my courses being limited largely to the practical phases of the subject, I am very strongly of the opinion that the courses as outlined are on the whole too difficult for the first or second year's work in a college or university. I do not believe that Freshmen and am doubtful whether Sophomores are able to digest the subject-matter of these courses and gain a sufficiently adequate knowledge of their theoretical aspects to justify so difficult a course.

In the University of Pennsylvania I taught a course in introduction to sociology to a group of Freshmen, although some higher-class men also enrolled for the course. I know that the first-year men were on the whole unable to understand the scheme of the course and the theoretical discussions as presented in the assigned readings. It became necessary for me to reconstruct the course and to try to interest the men in the concrete phases of human life. After gaining their attention and interest in this way I attempted to carry them into the field of social evolution and tried to explain the laws of progress. I do not believe that first-year men should be given any course in sociology and think that probably the Junior year is the one in which the introductory course should be given. As for the nature of the course, my experience leads me to think that it is necessary to begin with the facts of social life, with concrete sociological material, and then to develop the theoretical aspects, using this concrete material to assist in the formulation of the general principles of sociology. On the whole the students beginning this subject must not be fed with abstractions and theories but must begin with life and the observed facts of life, and have them supplemented with the theories underlying our social fabric. Otherwise I fear that the best results will not be attained.

CHARLES H. COOLEY, THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Replying to a remark by Professor Ross, to the effect that he had found the "socius" too hard for an opening topic, Professor Cooley said: I think this is largely a matter of personal idiosyncrasy. The "socius" is precisely that phase of the subject in which I would confidently undertake to interest any student; while the topics that Professor Ross prefers are those that I have to make some effort to interest myself in, and a greater effort to interest the students.

REVIEWS

The Psychology of Religious Experience. By EDWARD SCRIBNER AMES. Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910. Pp. XII+428. $2.50. This is the most comprehensive treatise on the psychology of religion that has yet appeared. It deals not merely with the religious experience of the individual but also with psychological aspects of the genesis of religion in the race and its status in modern society. The standpoint is rather obtrusively "functional," and to one not used to this method of thinking, the interpretation of religion in terms of activity may seem to be very little akin to psychology.

The book begins with a history of the psychology of religion. The motives leading to this type of treatment are four: First, there is the motive of pure science which regards all aspects of experience as its legitimate material. Second, considerations of practical religion have led to a demand for a psychological study of the processes of religion, and directed that they may be better controlled. Third, the study of comparative religion has also created a demand for such an examination of the psychical basis of religion as a basis for explaining the endless diversity of types as well as appreciating their underlying unity in being religious at all. Last, there is an increasing need felt on the part of the philosophy of religion and theology for an interpretation in the parlance of science of the concepts of faith, inspiration, knowledge, personality, free-will, evil, etc.

The psychological standpoint is next explained. Functional psychology starts with an examination of the native needs and impulses, the circumstances of their appearance, their function in the rest of the experience of the individual or of the race. Its emphasis is throughout upon activity and adjustment as the common denominators of diverse psychological states. The genetic problem is consequently prominent in this study of religion. From such a point of view it will be seen that religion is not an absolute or fixed affair but that it exists in various grades and types or, even, not at all in some persons.

The basic impulses of primitive religion are said to be social and economic. A number of illustrations are given to make clear this social and economic determination. It seems to the reviewer, however, that the author does not clearly demonstrate any fundamental genetic

relation between religion and this social background. He leaves it about where it has been left by many other writers by saying that religion reflects the fundamental life-experiences of man, the impulses of sex and of food.

In the satisfaction of these basic impulses, social customs develop, and as these customs become firmly fixed they come to be regarded as sacred and variations are looked upon with dread. This is offered as the origin of taboo. The act tabooed is the act which departs from custom. The theories of taboo held by Frazer, Jevons, and Crawley are acutely criticized on the ground that they stop short of a real genetic account. The author's position is suggestive, but even the sympathetic reader is apt to feel that the roots of the idea of taboo may be more complex than this. However that may be, the older writers undoubtedly referred too much to ideas and logical categories and failed to credit the predominate influence of a consciousness which is prevailingly motor.

Religious ceremonies are said to have a social origin-to be, in fact, social reactions. They are essentially public in character and center about social interests, for example, the phenomena of nature, birth, initiation, marriage, death, burial, war, etc. Religious ceremonies are both magical and spiritistic as are all the activities and interests of the savage. Hence the presence or absence of these qualities cannot be used to delimit religion from what is commonly called magic or from any other types of primitive action.

The author gives a large number of the common illustrations of magical practices but makes no satisfactory attempt to relate them genetically to instinctive reactions. Merely to classify them as imitative, as direct, or as sympathetic magic does not carry us beyond previous discussions.

The intellectualistic conception of spirits is properly criticized as based upon the impossible condition of a highly organized self or personality in the savage. Spiritistic conceptions emerge within and symbolize the great interests of life. Whatever attracts attention and is useful for attaining an end is suffused with power and vitality, i.e., it has a spirit. All objects are spirits and all spirits are objects at the first. The next stage is that of the separation of the spirit from the object. Growth and objectification of the god goes hand in hand with the social experience and achievements of the social group or nation. The life of the tribe is registered in its sacred objects.

The theory of sacrifice is based on that of Robertson Smith, namely, that it originates in the communal meal. It becomes a suggestive and