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proceed without apprehenfion; but no caufe was now affigned pending the existence of these powers, why refponfibility fhould be removed, which by the wifdom of the legiflature and conftitution had been always attached to them whatever powers they might poffefs. The fole reafon affigned was inapplicable to fuch a propofition; for the public inconvenience alleged from their defence, by dif covering the incomprehenfible myfteries of the feeret committee, could not go beyond a temporary fufpenfion of inveftigating their conduct-during the fufpenfion of the habeas corpus, the limited time of a year, or to the end of the war. The advice of the fecret committee never could be a motive for depriving the fubject of all redrefs from the oppreffive conduct of minifters. The grant of extraordinary powers was new, but refponfibility was not fo. Minifterial difcretion must be refponfible. The powers not lodged with them, nor entrufted to their discretion, if openly exercifed for the public good, might require indemnity. Such was the opening and shutting the ports; with acts done during open rebellion, or when there was no time for deliberation, and the public good muft abfolutely be fecured. But the circumftances fhould be publicly known, and capable of legiflative judgment; liable to objections at the time of indemnitynot given through ignorance of the offence. At prefent there could be no poffible inquiry-no objections admitted-all being fecret: there fore there could be no reafonable indemnity, which no more than condemnation could arife from ignorance. The indemnities after the rebellion of 1715 and 1745 were after the whole was over, and time

had for objections. They were given in gratitude for known benefits. The prefent cafe was not on that footing, nor pretended to be due to thofe protected by the indemnity. The pretence now was to protect the public from inconvenience, in difclofing the fecret motives of this conduct, in defence of that which may be pursued vindictively-not for the purpose of stopping vindictive profecutions. There were no precedents for this cafe; but otherwife they deferved not to be followed. The powers granted were fubjest to refponfibility. Former indemnities were not controuled by particular refponfibility, but were applied to public events paft and concluded. Facts pending, or events in contemplation, were out of the queftion; the bill aimed only at irrefponfibility, we being now ignorant of all that juftified or condemned minifters-they alluring us of their innocence and merit, but that a disclosure would hurt the public. If, therefore, in total ignorance we indemnified the past, we could not refufe the fame in future. Indemnity of all that had been done might be confined to the paft in terms, but was perfect irrefponfibility for the future. We had now broken down fome of the firmeft barriers of our freedom upon the affertion of unknown invisible dangers, to arm government for our deftruction. We were now invited one step further to render them invulnerable while affaulting the rights of the people. Step by step each ufeful maxim was degraded by fufpenfion; first through a difavowal of its permanent ufe to accuftom us to its final difufe. The favoured and effential maxim of refponfibility was now firft infringed; and this, with the deftruction of our liberties, under

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mined

mined the fecurity of the crown.
No maxim in the English law was
more useful than that the king can
do no wrong; which fecured the
throne and the tranquillity of the
people. This was rooted in and
grew out of the refponibility of
minifters; while the advifers of
fovereign power were anfwerable,
the king could do little harm, and
the mifchief ariling from his refpon-
ibility was obvious. It was not for
the public good that odium fhould
be caft on the throne. It was the
moft ingenious part of our confti-
tutional fabric, by which a limited
monarch fat firm amidst popular
liberty, and by which the law has
diverted the wrath of an injured
people from its fovereign to his
advifers and feducers. By in-
trenching on this, the fecuiity of
the crown was fundamentally thak-
en. If we now extended it to
fay the king and his minifters can
do no wrong, the confequence was,
that the odium of all the evil done
by his minifters would be imputable
to the king, whence their powers
were derived. This was another
dangerous infraction of confti-
tutional principles, not ending even
there; for while minifters de-
clared that they could not wrong
the people, under the arts fubject-
ing them to their power, they alfo
declared they cannot wrong the
king under whom they act, for the
act alfo makes them irrefponfible
to the king. To make minifters
wholly irrefponfible, the people
must be deprived of their right of
redrefs; and, that punishment might
be averted from delinquents, the
fubject was deprived of the king's
parental care and the protection of
the law. He therefore gave his dif-

fent.

The lord chancellor faid, that after what had patted he muft ftate to

their lordships and the public why the bill had his hearty concurrence. It was highly important, he agreed, and what the house fhould regard most zealously, and what the genuine principles of the conftitution required. The house should be convinced of its neceflity before it paffed, which ought to be the first confideration. One of his earliest maxims was (and which he now practically thought), that political liberty could not exift long, unless the adminiftration parted with it occafionally to fecure it for ever: if not, liber:y would destroy itself. It was their duty; and at prefent the bill before them afforded the best means of defending the genuine liberty of the British couftitution from all confpiracy against it; and he trusted, under the providence of God, it would be preferved for ever. As to neceffity, he knew it was often the plea of tyrants; yet on this the moft moderate men muft a&t when they took prudence for their guide. In all our history it would be found that the habeas-corpus was occafionally relinquished; and that must be fo while we would preferve the bleflings of the British conftitution. Thefe were lately often hazarded; but its fecurity would remain in the wildom of parliament and the fieady loyalty of the people. The fufpenfion of the act did not make minifters irrefponfible; yet the general term of fufpenfion was improper. Ninety-nine parts out of a hundred were not fufpended, but merely one which was certainly important. But yet a prejudice might be harboured by thofe ignorant of the circumstances: he therefore rectified the mistake. As to the advifers of the meafure, it should be confidered how they were obliged to act. He was aware of the irregularity of referring to what

was

hundred perfons, when not one contradicted them. Such people as created the neceffity of fpies deferved the cenfure and punishment in the organifation of treafon and fedition, where fome were directors, fome delegates, and others chiefs of certain divifions. Perfons were thus the inftruments of traitors, who went further, and bound them by an oath. No disclosure was to operate against them, but the government was to difclofe every thing for them. This were to palfy the finews of the executive government.-He then mentioned the Maidstone trials, particularly that of O'Connor on whom fonie of his defenders implicitly relied. His word was with them fufficient fecurity for his political integrity and love of the conftitution. But what was he?-what his defenders would formerly have utterly rejected. He affured their lordfhips, from his own knowledge, that traitorous confpiracies existed ftill in the country. To oppofe effectually, large powers must be given to the executive government, or the legislature, the fovereign, and the people, be facrificed. That the government might act more effectually, the measure was neceffary; for they must be safe, or betray their duty. Much had been faid of the late minifters' lenity.

was faid elsewhere; yet it was fometimes neceffary to be "regularly irregular." He was reported to have faid that minifters would never need indemnity. He had not fo afferted. As to thofe measures, the house should remember that when attorney-general he was no minifter. His advice was legalnot political. There were cafes when if a minister did not act he ought to lose his head. For instance, when ambaffadors paffed from Ireland through England to France, and vice verfa, for treasonable purpofes, where the fact was clear, if a minifter would not act what did he deferve? There could be but one opinion. And yet fuch a man could not be indemnified without fuch a bill. It was hard to fay how fuch information was obtained: perhaps by fecret fervicemoney through perfons in the enemy's country, whofe lives would be unfafe were fome difcoveries made. Nor could the real grounds of acting be proved. Therefore they properly applied for indemnity, even against the king's indictment, as the cafe might be incapable of eftablishment by evidence. Befides, thofe who created, not thofe who acted under, the neceflity were refponfible. He further ob served, that as a member of that house he must act from the committee's reports-not his own private knowledge; and nothing was harder than to fix a term for the act, as it was uncertain when the neceffity would ceafe-he might as well fay when affaffination would cease. Much had been faid of spies, &c. but they deferved much lefs cenfure and obloquy. He thought his noble and learned friend had the ftout heart of a British judge, not fuffering witneffes to be treat ed as they fometimes were, while Eating facts before more than a

He would do them justice; and, as to a profecution alluded to, circumftances appeared which made inquiry into the accufation neceffary. He muft exercife or be tray that duty-debafe himself or the law of the land. For, by the laws of England, the highett peer and meaneft peafant were equal: and he believed the noble lord would fuffer all the imprisonment fooner than not prove that only practical equality, that all men were equal in the eyes of its laws. [A

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cry

cry of Hear! Hear!] He concluded by faying, that, if their lordfhips meant not to dethrone their fovereign and exclude themfelves from the house, they would pafs the bill, which he entreated them to do, if they would fecure that conftitution preferved to them by the blood and virtue of their ancestors; nor fear thofe acts done for pofterity as well as for themfelves.

Lord Rawdon (earl of Moira) opposed the bill, as dangerous. He had expe fed its object to be explained; and heard with much furprise a noble lord ftating gravely to the houfe that he conceived no fuch explanation neceifary. But for want of it, he faid, he muft himself collect the motives for the bill. He had perufed the report whence the bill originated, and wished to give it all credit; but the conclusion was unfavourable. It fhowed the bad effects of martial-law in Ireland, from the fufpenfion of the habeas-corpus, and the other meafures purfued. This proved not its neceflity. At al times the poor wanted the poffeflions of the rich, but what then? Were there no judges formerly to reprefs them? Why act differently now? The noble and learned lord preceding him had dwelt much on a confpiracy here, and the neceffity of extraordinary measures.But had not the common operation of the law, with other powers of government, been fufficient formerly to repress rebellion and fedition? But if the ordinary law could not, a fpecific punishment might be provided. He knew not any confpiracy for which there was no adequate punishment. He proceeded to the mode of appointing the committee its partiality; and, knowing that the opinions of thofe compofing it had been long decided, their report ought to be received with the

utmoft caution. He faid, that by all fuch proceedings the conftitution was changed, and was now deplorably corrupted. The fyftem of fpies was hoftile to all free ftates, but efpecially to our English liberty and laws. He stated the fatal effects of fuch an establishment, formed to create hoftility between the governors and governed; and quoted a paffage in Tacitus, in the reign of Tiberius-that age of Roman corruption.

Was it confonant with the English law that the accused should not meet his accufer, and thus prove his innocence?-He then mentioned the powers given by the fufpenfion of the habeas-corpus, which had been groffly abufed; and mentioned two cafes, the one of an ingenious foreigner taken up only for not giving up fome particular papers and plans: the other of lord Cloncurry, who had been twice in cuftody, and the fecond time clofely confined with the utmoft rigour.Though fuffering under the most painful indifpofition, he was never permitted to be in a room alone; nor allowed to arrange his affairs, though the death of his father had left him greatly embarraffed. Was not this conduct inhuman? How could he confiftently agree to a bill deftroying all national juftice? Were it once paffed, all justice would be unfettled; and the confidence in the laws would be deftroyed, which had enabled the people to refift dangerous principles. If once agreed to, it would be decifive, and fupport every enormity and oppreffion. He would not term the prefent minifters tŷrannical; they had not the energy of tyrants, but they followed their meatures in the prefent inftance, which might ferve the worst purpofes. Once admit this principle, and law and juftice would be per

petually

petually mifconftrued. Of all the arrangements of Providence, the most beautiful was, that no one could be happy in fchemes deftructive to his neighbour. He cautioned their lordthips against a bill to blence the unfortunate, and indemnify oppreffive acts. The Irith report mentioned the robbery of a mail-coach as a proof of rebellion; but these robbers were no other than militia. He thought, that, if it was poffible to leffen the attachment of the people to the conftitution, it was by this measure. It was not a partial facrifice of liberty to fecure the reft, but a fatal change in the conftitution. There were no proofs of a general diffatisfaction. He adverted to the war, and faw no profpect of peace, but rather an extenfion of hoftilities ruinous to the country's finances. In fuch expenfes was it wife or politic to bring forward fuch unconftitutional bills? At all events, the object would be fully anfwered by limiting it to a year, or till the end of the war, and then their lordships might review their own proceedings.

The earl of Weftmoreland faid, this bill was fanctioned by precedents (which he quoted), and requifite from found policy. To fhow that the first indemnity bill fince the revolution was fimilar to this, he read the preamble to the act of William III. (1694), where it was deemed wife to indemnify acts of illegal feverity to prevent invafion and rebellion. Jacobinifm had given occafion to the bill, and if rejected the worst would follow. It would not protect cruelty or oppreffion, but only fecure against vexatious fuits. It would not fcreen minifiers from impeachment; but they were not accountable for the conduct of thofe who had fanctioned severities ufed un

The

der the act upon treasonable perfons. None but the fecretary of ftate (who figned warrants and commitments) could be called to account. Noble lords who oppofed the bill seemed not to comprehend its object. They were only called to answer for the principles of the bill. Had thofe who thought it needlefs forgotten the events of the last ten years, and the affair of O'Connor? The country would be always grateful to thofe who had preferved them from fuch dangers. British conftitution fuited the powers of government to the occafion, and granted extraordinary powers when requifite; but in times of peace recalled them-as happened in Ancient Rome. Spies and informers had been feverely cenfured, yet but for them many of thofe he then faw around him would have loft their lives by the schemes of the confpirators. Was it better to arreft a few perfons, or fuffer the whole nation to be deluged with blood? Great lamentations had been lavished on those who were imprifoned, but none on thofe whose lives had been facrificed for their loyalty, the lords O'Neal, Montjoy, Dr. Hamilton, &c., the proteftants murdered at the bridge of Wexford, &c. Let their lordships recollect their feelings when the country was threatened by affaffins from France and Ireland, by invafion and rebellion, a mutiny in the fleet, and a fear of the army. This bill then was due to thofe who had warded off these dangers.

The duke of Bedford was still at a lofs for the fpecific grounds of the measure after all that had been did. The arguments of the learned chancellor applied more to the sufpenfion of the habeas-corpus than to an indemnity for thefe exercising the powers given under fuch fuf

penfion.

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