culation, whereby the estate of another is lesed, though it be the signature of one who could not write which is forged, or of an entirely fictitious person.

Imitation of a subscription and of handwriting, is the most ordinary and dangerous, but not the only kind of forgery. Every writing is false which narrates a falsehood, and is used as a document to the hurt and prejudice of another.1 In many such cases there is no forgery of a handwriting at all. Thus, suppose money is obtained by the false acceptance of a bill, in the name of one to whom it is specially addressed by name and description, but who could not write, this, nevertheless, is as much forgery as the imitation of a genuine signature.2 In the case of John Robertson, accordingly, 9th December 1709, no objection was moved to the indictment, on the ground that two of the receipts said to be forged, was of persons who could not write. And in Gillespie's case, Aberdeen, autumn 1827, many of the subscriptions forged proved to be those of persons who could not write, notwithstanding which he was convicted of all the charges. Numerous cases have occurred in later practice, where the signatures forged proved to be those of persons who could not write, notwithstanding which convictions have uniformly followed where the evidence was complete.

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On the same principle, it is now completely settled in our practice, that the crime of forgery is complete, though the signature forged is not that of a real, but a fictitious person, provided that, by the use of that fictitious name, the patrimonial interests of a third party have been prejudiced. Mr Hume states this point as undecided; but it has since been settled, in the case of Alexander Anderson, May 20. 1822, where the High Court were clear, that a charge of forgery was good, though the name forged was that of an entirely fictitious person. Again, in the case of Patrick Miller Maclatchie, Dumfries, April 16. 1824, the pannel was charged with uttering a bill for £20, in which the signature of the drawer was that of a fictitious character, or of an unknown person, and that of the accepter of a real person. Lord Justice-Clerk Boyle had no doubts of the relevancy of the whole charge, and he was transported for life. More lately

1 Burnett, 177.—2 Hume, i 141; Burnett, 179.— Hume, i. 141.-4 Unreported, Hume, i. 142.6 Unreported. Unreported.

still, this point came again under the consideration of the whole Court, in the case of Andrew Ovens, November 24. 1828. The indictment against this person set forth, that he had entered into a fraudulent design of raising money and purchasing goods, by means of forging the subscriptions of fictitious firms, or persons, to the bills granted for payment of these goods, and charged three different acts of purchasing and obtaining goods, by uttering notes on which were the signatures of fictitious persons and mercantile houses. The indictment charged both forgery and uttering, and also falsehood, fraud, and wilful imposition, especially when committed by uttering promissory notes, "having such false, fraudulent, and fictitious subscriptions thereon, of any person or persons, or company firms, as drawers, indorsers, or accepters thereof." The Court had no doubt that the charge of forgery was relevantly laid, though the whole subscriptions were charged as being fictitious; but the prosecutor, being desirous to avoid a capital conviction, departed from the charge of forgery, and the pannel having been convicted of the fraud aggravated by uttering the fictitious bills, was transported for fourteen years. In the case, also, of Malcolm Gillespie, Aberdeen, September 1827, several of the charges were laid alternatively as the forgeries of a person specified, or of " some person to the prosecutor unknown," and the indictment was found relevant, and a capital execution followed. An indictment was found relevant by Lord Pitmilly, against James Whyte, September 13. 1827, at Perth, which charged the forging and uttering of bills, having some real and some fictitious signatures, and the pannel was transported seven years.3

The law of England is founded on the same principle. Thus it is established that the use of a mere fictitious name is of itself sufficient to constitute a forgery. A bill of exchange drawnin fictitious names, where there was no such persons existing as the bill imports, is a forged bill within the 2d George II. c. 25.5 An order on a banker in a fictitious name, or in the name of one who had no authority to draw, is within the 7th George II. c. 22, and amounts to forgery. It is clearly forgery to indorse a bill with a fictitious name, though the money

1 Unreported. Unreported.-3 Unreported. Bolland's Case, Leach, i. 83; Russell, ii. 328.-3 Wilk's Case, Russell, ii. 328.6 Lockett's Case, Leach, i. 94; Russell, ii. 329.

might have been as well obtained by indorsing it in the real name of the person who uttered it, and no additional credit has been used by adhibiting the false name.1 It is the same

crime to give to the drawer of a bill of exchange a receipt in a false name, as for the prisoner's own name, for the contents of the bill indorsed in blank, to avoid detection, though no additional credit has thereby been gained to the prisoner. And it was held forgery to draw a draft upon a banker in a fictitious name, assumed by the party at first for the purpose of fraud, though the credit was given not on the assumed name but the personal appearance of the prisoner.3

3. It is also forgery if one put his own name on a negotiable instrument, instead of one of the same name, but of a different designation, for whom it was intended; and by this substitution of his own name for that of another prejudice a third party.

The most extensive and dangerous forgeries may be committed in this way. Thus, suppose that one has, by accident or fraud, got possession of a bill which stands indorsed to another person of the same name and surname, but who is of better credit, and is fully described in the indorsement, and that he transfers and indorses this with his own name, and gets the value from some one who mistakes him for the person described in the indorsation; though he sign his own name and surname, and do not counterfeit the hand of the real indorsee, still he signs for him and assumes his person and character, and therefore he is guilty of nothing less than forgery. In England, accordingly, it is settled that such an act is forgery. Thus it was held, that if a bill of exchange payable to A B on order get into the hands of another person of the same name as the payee, and such person, knowing that he is not the real payee, in whose favour it was drawn, indorse it for the purpose of fraudulently possessing himself of the money, it is forgery.5 But if the prisoner have merely assumed the character of being the real indorser of a bill, but written nothing upon it, and uttered it as such, it is a fraud, not a forgery.

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1 Taft's Case, Russell, ii. 329; Leach i. 172.-2 Taylor's Case, Leach, i. 172; Russell, ii. 330.—3 Shepherd's Case, Russell, ii. 332; Leach, i. 226.— ↑ Hume, i. 142.—5 Mead v. Young, 4th Term. Rep. 28; Russell, 321.—6 Hevey's Case, Russell, ii. 324.

4. Forgery is also committed if the name of a person really existing be assumed, and an obligatory writ be uttered in his name to the fraud of another.

If a note be uttered in the name of another person, who is either really existing or represented so to be, it is a forgery. Thus in Hadfield's case, the prisoner assumed the name and character of brother to the Earl of Hopetoun, and in that character drew a bill upon a gentleman in the neighbourhood, who would have paid it had the imposture not been discovered. He was convicted and executed.1

5. Where the name of the person signed is one who never existed, but to whom at the time a certain character and description is attributed to increase its circulation, or where authority to sign for a real person is falsely asserted, and signature for him is adhibited, it amounts to forgery.

A charge of this complex description has been more than once the subject of trial in the Scotch Courts. Thus, in the case of William Hunter, February 5. 1708, it appeared that he had obtained a confirmation of Margaret Grieve, spouse of John Hodge, as executor to her deceased brother Robert Grieve, who was creditor to the African Company. In truth, there was no such person as Margaret Grieve; John Hodge was dead, and the name of his widow was not Margaret Grieve, but Agnes Crauford. Hunter proceeded to forge an indorsement in his own favour of this certificate of the debt to the African Company, in the name of John Hodge and Margaret Grieve, and he was condemned to die without any exception as to the forging the name of Margaret Grieve. Here, however, the forgery of the name of a real person, John Hodge, rendered it perhaps not worth while to plead the objection. But in the case of Mungo Strachan and William Hunter, February 5. 1708, the point occurred without any such addition. The requisite number of persons had there conspired to frame a false deed, signed by two notaries and four witnesses; and this was done of course without the imitation of any handwriting, but by the

1 Russell, ii. 327.-2 Hume, i. 143.

mere false assertion of a mandate, authorizing the signature of the notaries. It was held as forgery in all concerned, and they were condemned to die, though the only falsehood consisted in the false narrative of the authority to the notaries. Every obligatory writ signed as for another, without his knowledge or authority, is as much forgery as if his handwriting be imitated. Thus, if one personate another who cannot write, and then impose on notaries and give them a mandate to sign for the assumed and absent person, this is undoubtedly forgery. So the Court held in the case of David Donaldson, December 12. 1611, and of John Watson, July 16. 1623.3 In England the rule is the same. In the case of Elizabeth Dunn, September 1765, who had made a note in an assumed name and character, by desiring another person to sign for her, as she could not write, and by this instrument got some money as a seaman's executrix, it was held to be forgery. Indeed, since the decisions that have since that time been pronounced, finding the affixing a fictitious signature forgery, there can be no doubt that the assumption of a false name and character amounts to that offence.

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6. It is forgery in England to counterfeit the mark or initials of another, and hold out that mark or initials as his valid subscription.

The question whether the imitation of a mark or initials amounts to forgery depends on this, whether, by such irregular instruments, the law permits a man's estate to be bound; for if it do, there is no reason why such false affixing of a binding signature should not amount to forgery as well as the imitation of his name. Now, a bill signed by initials," or by a mark, without the subscription of witnesses, is insufficient to authorise summary diligence, but may be received as an adminicle of evidence in an action for constituting the debt.7 The point therefore is, whether this secondary and more loose species of obligation created in this irregular fashion will raise the imitation of the mark up to the rank of forgery. There is no decided case yet on the subject, but from that very absence it may

1 Hume, i. 143; Burnett, 177.-2 Burnett, 177.-3 Hume, i. 144.-4 Russell, ii. 326.5 Monro v. Monro, Nov. 14. 1820.-6 Stewart v. Russell, July 11. 1815; Bell, i. 39-7 Cockburn v. Gibson, Dec. 8. 1815; Fac. Coll.