Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co.

tion without the consent of the employer, incidentally abolishing the defenses referred to."

This question is fully considered by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis., 327, 133 N. W., 209, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.), 489. In that case the court said:

"Passing from these questions of classification we meet the objection that the law, while in its words presenting to employer and employee a free choice as to whether he will accept its terms or not, is in fact coercive, so that neither employer nor employee can be said to act voluntarily in accepting it.

"As to the employer, the argument is that the abolition of the two defenses is a club which forces him to accept; and as to the employee, the argument is that if his employer accepts the law the employee will feel compelled to accept also through fear of discharge if he do not accept.

"Both of these arguments are based upon conjecture. Laws cannot be set aside upon mere speculation or conjecture. The court must be able to say with certainty that an unlawful result will follow. We do not see how any such thing can be said here. No one can say with certainty what results will follow in the practical workings of the law. These matters are, however, purely speculative and conjectural; none can say what the practical operation of the law will be. It is enough for our present purpose that no one can say with certainty that it will operate to coerce either employer or employee."

Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co.

To the same effect is the ruling of the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Deibeikis v. Link Belt Co., 261 Ill., 454, 104 N. E., 211, Ann. Cas., 1915A, 241.

It is insisted that the act contravenes section 17 of article 2 of the Constitution of the State, which provides: "No bill shall become a law which embraces more than one subject, that subject to be expressed in the title."

It is said that the act embraces more than one subject, and that it embraces subjects not expressed in its title, and that it repeals and amends former laws without reciting in the caption the title or substance of the laws repealed or amended.

It is first insisted that the act is broader than the title, in that the title mentions the regulation of the business of insurance companies writing workmen's compensation insurance under the act, whereas section 40 of the act provides:

"That every person, partnership, association, organization, or corporation, whether organized under the laws of this or any other State or county, which has or may hereafter comply with the laws of the State of Tennessee, and is authorized to write accident or indemnity insurance in the State of Tennessee, shall be authorized and empowered to write workmen's compensation insurance under the terms and provisions of this act and likewise every reciprocal or mutual insurance association or corporation shall have the like privilege, and shall be subject to the same tax on premiums now imposed by law on casualty or indemnity insurance underwriters."

Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co.

It is said that, while the title only embraces the regulation of insurance companies, the body of the act relates to "every person, partnership, association, organization, or corporation," writing workmen's compensation insurance under said act. It is insisted that the words "person, partnership, association, organization, or corporation," are broader than the term "insurance companies," which is the subject expressed in the title.

Our general insurance statute provides that the term "company" includes "corporations, associations, partnerships and individuals." Shannon's Code, section 3274. Also such is the holding in many cases, some of which are as follows: State v. Stone, 118 Mo., 388, 24 S. W., 164, 25 L. R. A., 243, 40 Am. St. Rep., 388; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 97 Ga., 114, 25 S. E., 249, 35 L. R. A., 497; Chicago Dock Co. v. Garrity, 115 Ill., 155, 3 N. E., 448.

It is also said that both the title and the act contain two subjects, because each provides for a system of workmen's compensation, and also for a system of liability or accident insurance.

It is provided by section 41 of the act that the compensation shall be secured to the employees in one of two modes. Either the employer shall insure his liability under the act with an insurance company authorized to do business in the State or shall furnish to the insurance commissioner satisfactory proof of his financial ability to pay all claims that may arise against him.

We think this provision of the act is germane to the general subject, in that it requires the employer to secure the compensation which may accrue, and thus prevents an

Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co.

insolvent or irresponsible employer from defeating the payment of the compensation for which the act provides. It is not a matter foreign to the subject of workmen's compensation, but is only a means provided for the securing of the compensation which the act provides.

It is also said that the act embraces more than one subject, in that, in addition to providing for the payment of compensation to injured employees, it provides that the sums paid shall be exempt from the claims of the employees' creditors.

We think this is pertinent and germane to the subject of workmen's compensation, the purpose of this provision being to secure to injured employees reasonable compensation, so as to prevent them from becoming public charges, and, in the event of death, to secure the compensation provided by said act to their dependents. Providing that the compensation shall be exempt from the claims of creditors only renders certain the provisions of the act.

It is next insisted that the act denies the employee the right to contract, and that this subject is not expressed in the title.

We are of the opinion that this insistence is not well grounded. Both the title and body of the act expressly declare that the act is elective. Employees may accept the act and agree to work under its terms, or not. They are given free choice, and no right or remedy is taken away from an employee who elects not to accept the provisions of the act,

Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co.

It is next insisted that both the title and body of the act contain two subjects, in that they provide revenue for the State and compensation to employees.

The act does provide for the imposition of fines, after conviction, in case of a violation of certain of its provisions, and it does make appropriation from the revenues of the State of such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the act. To withhold the necessary revenue to carry out the provisions of the act would render it a nullity.

The general disposition of the courts is to construe this provision of the Constitution liberally rather than to embarrass legislation by a construction whose strictness is unnecessary to the accomplishment of the beneficial purposes for which it has been adopted. Cannon v. Mathes, 8 Heisk., 504; Heiskell v. Knoxville, 136 Tenn., 376, 189 S. W., 857; State v. Cumberland Club, 136 Tenn., 84, 188 S. W., 583.

The generality of the title is no objection to it, so long as it is not made a cover to legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered as having a necessary or proper connection. Cole Mfg. Co. v. Falls, 90 Tenn., 466, 16 S. W., 1045; Ryan v. Terminal Co., 102 Tenn., 111, 50 S. W., 744, 45 L. R. A., 303; State v. Yardley, 95 Tenn., 546, 32 S. W., 481, 34 L. R. A., 656; State v. Cumberland Club, 136 Tenn., 84, 188 S. W., 583.

It is not essential to the constitutionality of a statute that its title should epitomize or recite in detail the provisions contained in its body. All provisions of the act