Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co.

writ of error to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, where the cause shall be heard and determined in accordance with the practice governing other appeals in the nature of a writ of error in civil causes.'

The provision of section 17 of article 1 of our State Constitution is a mandate to the judiciary, and was not intended as a limitation of the legislative branch of the government. Bledsoe v. Wright, 2 Baxt., 471; Dodd v. Weaver, 2 Sneed., 672; Pawley v. McGimpsey, 7 Yerg., 502.

In the case of Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co., 162 Pac., 938, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the Workmen's Compensation Act of that State was not violative of a similar clause in its Constitution.

The act being optional and not compulsory, plaintiff's contention that it deprives him of a remedy given him by due course of law is not tenable. It is true that the remedy which he had prior to the passage of the act, that is, the common-law remedy, has been taken away, but this the Legislature had the power to do, as was ruled by this court in Nance v. Piano Co., 128 Tenn., 1, 155 S. W., 1172, Ann. Cas., 1913D, 834. In that case this court said:

"The suggestion in briefs that the common law as it existed at the time of the adoption of our Constitution was transfixed by that event into a rigid and inflexible system of laws, which could not be changed by the Legislature, is one that is not entitled to serious consideration.

"The only relation which the system of laws in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution has to the construction of that instrument is to furnish a definition

Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co.

and proper interpretation of terms used in the Constitution with reference to the system of laws. The 'law of the land,' as used in the Constitution, did not embrace as a fixed and immovable system the common law in existence at the time. It had reference to the common and statute law then existing in this State, but this does not mean that it is not competent for the Legislature to alter, change, or abolish the system of law in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and it may do so, unless it is prohibited from so doing by the Constitution of this State or of the United States. Prescott v. Duncan, 148 S. W., 229; Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Company, 103 Tenn., 421.

It is next said that the act violates section 8 of article` 1 and section 21 of article 1 of our State Constitution. Section 8 of article 1 is as follows:

"That no man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land."

Section 21 of article 1 reads:

"No man's particular services shall be demanded, or property taken, or applied to public use, without the consent of his representatives, or without just compensation. being made therefor."

It is insisted that the act violates the foregoing provisions of our State Constitution, because it deprives the plaintiff of a property right, and takes the same without just compensation being made therefor.

Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co.

Section 21 of the act reads as follows: "Be it further enacted, that this act shall have no retroactive effect, and shall not apply to actions for accidental injury or death, occurring prior to the passage of this act, but claims for damages with respect thereto shall be redressed by the law as it stood prior to the enactment of this statute."

An employee has no property right in the common-law rules of liability applicable to relation of employer and employee prior to the occurrence of an injury, within the meaning of and as protected by the above-quoted sections of the Constitution. Nance v. Piano Co., supra; Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co., 103 Tenn., 421, 53 S. W., 955, 56 L. R. A., 316; New York Central Railroad Co. v. White, supra; Middleton v. Light Co., supra.

In the case of New York Central Railroad Co. v. White, supra, the constitutionality of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State of New York was involved. court, speaking through Mr. Justice PITNEY, said:

The

"The close relation of the rules governing responsibility as between employer and employee to the fundamental rights of liberty and property is of course recognized. But these rules, as guides of conduct, are not beyond alteration by legislation in the public interest. No person has a vested interest in any rule of law entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit. Munn v. Ill., 94 U. S., 113.

"The common law bases the employer's liability for injuries to the employee upon the ground of negligence; but negligence is merely the disregard of some duty imposed by law; and the nature and extent of the duty may be

Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co.

modified by legislation with corresponding change in the test of negligence. Indeed, liability may be imposed for the consequences of a failure to comply with a statutory duty, irrespective of negligence in the ordinary sense; safety appliance acts being a familiar instance."

It is next insisted that the act violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution, because it deprives the plaintiff of his property without due process of law..

This question was settled adversely to the contention of the plaintiff in New York Central Railroad Co. v. White, supra, and the Case of Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammar, 250 U. S., 400, 39 Sup. Ct., 553, 63 L. Ed., 1058.

It is next said that the act is unconstitutional, in that it undertakes to make an election for and a binding contract upon a minor employee, when, by reason of such minority, he is unable to make such election or contract.

In the caption to the act it is set forth as being one of the purposes of the act "to make minors sui juris for cer tain purposes."

In section 2, subsec. b, of the act, it is provided: “Employees' shall include every person, including a minor, in the service of an employer,

under any contract

of hire, apprenticeship, written or implied."

The second paragraph of section 7 of the act is as follows: "Whenever payment is made to any person eighteen (18) years of age or over the written receipt of such person shall acquit the employer.”

In section 31, subsec. 4, it is provided: "In case of physical or mental incapacity, other than minority, of the

injured person,

Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co.

the period of limitation in any such case shall be extended for one year from the date when such incapacity ceases."

We are of the opinion that the plaintiff is not in a position to challenge the act upon the ground that it undertakes to make an election for a minor employee, because it is not shown that plaintiff is a minor; in fact, we do not understand that it is claimed that he is a minor, and therefore has no interest in the provisions of the act relating to minors.

However, we think there is no question as to the power of the Legislature to endow minors with the right to make contracts otherwise lawful, and after he has been so endowed he becomes, for the purpose of the act, an adult, or, at least, on the same plane. It was expressly so ruled in the case of Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis., 327, 133 N. W., 209, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.), 489.

And it was expressly held in the case of Young v. Sterling Leather Works, 91 N. J. Law, 289, 102 Atl., 395, in which case the validity of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State of New Jersey was challenged, that a minor has no such vested right in his disability recognized by the common law as to prevent the Legislature from constitutionally removing such disability with respect to future contracts, and that it had the power to change the age at which the minor is privileged to exercise legal rights which should be binding on him.

It is next said that the act is unconstitutional because it violates section 7 of article 6 of our State Constitution. This section of the Constitution is as follows: