Tennessee Cent. R. Co. v. Vanhoy. operation of the car by him, to an invited guest, if he fails to exercise care reasonably commensurate with the nature and hazard attending such mode of travel, not unreasonably to expose the guest to danger and injury by increasing such hazard. In the case last cited the court said: "This rule has been extended by many cases to one not a common carrier, who voluntarily undertakes to transport another, and makes such voluntary carrier responsible for injury to the person transported resulting from negligence, whether the service was for a compensation or was gratuitous"-citing Harvey v. Deep River Logging Co., 49 Or., 583, 90 Pac., 501, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.), 131; Wagner v. Missouri P. R. Co., 97 Mo., 512, 10 S. W., 486, 3 L. R. A., 156; 2 Shearm. & Redf. Neg. (4 Ed.), section 491; Beech, Contrib. Neg. (3 Ed.), section 165; Wilton v. Middlesex R. Co., 107 Mass., 108, 9 Am. Rep., 11. Huddy, Automobiles (2 Ed.), p. 117, section 18, declares: "One who voluntarily accepts an invitation to ride as a guest in an automobile does not relinquish his right of protection from personal injury caused by carelessness, and it should be understood by owners of motor vehicles that they assume quite a serious responsibility when they invite others to ride with them," etc. In Jacobs v. Jacobs, 141 La., 272, 74 South., 992, L. R. A., 1917F, 253, it was held that, although an invited guest of the driver of an automobile, being a mere licensee, is not entitled to the consideration due by a carrier to a passenger for hire, he was nevertheless entitled to the benefit of 143 Tenn.-22 Tennessee Cent. R. Co. v. Vanhoy. the provisions of the Civil Code that any act of negligence or imprudence that causes injury or loss to another obliges him who was at fault to pay for the injury or loss. In Turnpike Company v. Yates, 108 Tenn., 428, 67 S. W. 69, it was held by this court that where a person, while riding in the carriage of another by invitation, is injured by the negligence of a third party, he may recover against the latter, notwithstanding the negligence of the owner of the carriage in driving his team may have contributed to the injury, where the injured person is without fault and had no authority over the driver. To the same effect is the rule announced in Knoxville Railway & Light Co. v. Vangilder, 132 Tenn., 489, 178 S. W., 1117, L. R. A., 1916A, 11. In that case the court said: "Of course, if an adult, who while riding in a vehicle driven by another sees, or ought by due diligence to see, a danger not obvious to the driver, or who sees that the driver is incompetent or careless, or is not taking proper precautions, it is his duty to give some warning of danger, and a failure to do so is negligence. Ordinarily, however, a driver is intrusted with caring for the safety of a carriage and its occupants, and unless the danger is obvious, or is known to the passenger, he may rely upon the assumption that the driver will exercise proper care and caution" citing Shultz v. Old Colony St. R. Co., 193 Mass., 309, 79 N. E., 873, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.), 597, 118 Am. St. Rep. 502, 9 Ann. Cas., 402; Colorado, etc., R. Co. v. Thomas, 33 Tennessee Cent. R. Co. v. Vanhoy. Colo., 517, 81 Pac., 801, 70 L. R. A., 681, 3 Ann. Cas., 700. In that case the court further said: "We think this rule that the rider should exercise diligence when proper to do so would also devolve upon the wife riding with her husband. If the wife should see a danger not apparent to the husband, or observe that he was about to run into danger, it would be her duty to notify him, or else she would be chargeable with neglect of her own safety, which in some cases might bar her right of recovery for injuries received. "But in the present case there was nothing that the wife could have done in the emergency presented which would have altered the situation, trusting as she was to her husband's guiding the car in safety, and we think that his negligence cannot be imputed to her under these circumstances." In the case of Hurt v. Y. & M. V. R. Co., 140 Tenn., 623, 205 S. W., 437, in commenting upon the rule announced in the Vangilder Case, supra, this court said: "That was a case of husband and wife who met with an accident while the wife was riding with her husband in an automobile driven by him. The husband was negligent, and his right of recovery was held to be barred by his negligence, but the wife was allowed to recover because she was guilty of no negligence, and the negligence of the husband was not imputed to her. There may be a difference between the case of husband and wife, as in the one just cited, and the case of host and guest, as in the case under discussion; but the difference is slight and the Tennessee Cent. R. Co. v. Vanhoy. principle should be the same. The guest is under the same duty to look out for his own safety as he would be if traveling alone." The court, however, held in that case that where the question of the guest's contributory negligence is debatable, or is one about which reasonable minds might differ, it is one to be determined by the jury. The question of whether or not a passenger or a guest who is injured while riding in an automobile was in the exercise of due care is generally held to be one for the jury. Clarke v. Connecticut Co., 83 Conn., 219, 76 Atl., 523; Corley v. Railroad, 90 Kan., 70, 133 Pac., 555, Ann. Cas., 1915B, 764; Cladbourne v. Springfield St. R. Co., 199 Mass., 574, 85 N. E., 737; Wilson v. Electric R. Co., 52 Wash., 522, 101 Pac., 50, 132 Am. St. Rep., 1044. We are of the opinion that we would not be warranted in holding, as a matter of law, that Mrs. Vanhoy was guilty of negligence that proximately contributed to her death. She had never ridden in an automobile but a few times previous to the collision which resulted in her death, and was unfamiliar with the operation of automobiles. She was sitting on the rear seat of the automobile. There were two persons on the seat in front of her. There was another sitting on the right-hand front door. Mrs. Vanhoy being seated on the right-hand side of the rear seat, the people in front of her necessarily obstructed her view of the railroad track. It is not shown that she knew that the automobile was approaching the track of the railroad company; but, if she did know this, it does not Tennessee Cent. R. Co. v. Vanhoy. appear that she had any reason to think that the driver, who is shown to have been an experienced driver, would not exercise due care in driving the automobile upon the track, or that he would not take the necessary precautions to avoid danger and injury to those riding with him. He was in a much better position to see the track and observe the approach of the train than Mrs. Vanhoy. He owned and controlled the automobile. Mrs. Vanhoy had the right to rely, to some extent at least, on the driver looking out for her safety. It appears that she could not see the approach of the train until the automobile was within ten or fifteen feet of the track, while the driver could see it when the automobile was withing twenty or twenty-five feet of the track. The charge is not made a part of the record, but we must presume that the trial judge gave a correct charge, and left the question of the contributory negligence of Mrs. Vanhoy to the jury, as well as the negligence of Mr. Hitshew, the driver, giving them proper instructions. The jury must have found that Mr. Hitshew was guilty of actionable negligence, and that Mrs. Vanhoy, was not guilty of any negligence. We think the jury's finding is conclusive upon this question. As to the defendants' contention that the verdict of the jury is excessive: We do not think this contention is well grounded. Mrs. Vanhoy was twenty-one years of age, and a woman in good health. She was plaintiff's housekeeper, and performed all the duties incident to housekeeping. She had |