Ramsey v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.

engages. In that case this court, speaking through Special Justice FANCHER, said:

"A person may do certain acts the result of which produces unforseen consequences resulting in what is termed an accident; yet it does not come within the terms of this contract. The policy does not insure against an injury that may be caused by a voluntary, natural, ordinary movement, executed exactly as was intended.

"Therefore, to determine the matter, we look, not to the result merely, but to the means producing the result. It is not sufficient that the injury be unusual and unexpected, but the cause itself must have been unexpected and accidental."

In that case Stone (the insured) had attended a football game on a cool day when the ground was damp and contracted a cold resulting in lumbago, and, after medical treatment and the debility resulting from a purgative which he had taken, and while lying in bed, had a paper brought, reached for it, and raised it suddenly above his head, when his strong blood pressure caused a rupture of the retina, destroying the sight of one eye. In that case the court further said:

"The movement of the hand suddenly to get the paper was executed exactly as intended. It was a simple and ordinary movement. The rushing of the blood with excessive pressure, rupturing the retina, was therefore caused by natural means. While the result was not foreseen, the causes producing that result were not accidental. It is well in line with the cases above cited sustaining the

Ramsey v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.

majority rule, which we adopt. This rule affords a reasonable interpretation of the contract."

Mr. Joyce, in his recent Work on Insurance, states the rule thus:

"In this connection it may be noted that the language of the policy may, it is held, warrant a distinction between accidental death and accidental means. Thus in case of an insurance against death from bodily injury caused by violent, accidental, external, and visible means, the court said: 'A person may do certain acts the result of which acts may produce unforeseen consequences, and may produce what is commonly called accidental death, but the means are exactly what the man intended to use, and did use, and was prepared to use. The means were not accidental, but the result might be accidental.' This distinction is more clearly apparent where the policy uses words intended to qualify or extend the rule as to proximate and remote cause, as where the provision is 'shall die from the effects of such injury.' Here the death need not be immediately caused by the injury, yet if the injury was immediately caused by the accident, and the death ensued as a natural consequence or effect of the injury, then the assurer is liable. So in an Iowa case a distinction is also made between an accidental cause and an accidental result between an agreement to pay the policy amount in case assured should meet with an accidental death, and in undertaking to pay said amount in case assured's death is produced by accidental means. In other words, the result may not have been intended nor anticipated, and

Ramsey v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.

may have been such that it could not have been foreseen. The voluntary and intentional act of the person suffering the unanticipated result may have been the immediate cause of the result. Nothing may have been done or have occurred which assured had not foreseen and planned, except the injury and the consequence resulting therefrom, and, again, the result which follows assured's act may not have been the usual result thereof, but may have been unusual and unexpected and still not be accidental, as where the act which produced such unexpected result was voluntary. The above applies where the policy provides for recovery in the event of death, but only where death results from bodily injuries effected solely by external, violent, and accidental means. The means which cause the injury only, and not the injury itself, are referred to by the clause of an accident policy providing that the insurer's liability shall attach only when the injury is through 'external, violent and accidental means.'"

In Corpus Juris, vol. 1, p. 430, it is said:

"Blood poisoning resulting from an accidental wound or abrasion is within the protection of an accident policy, but it is otherwise where the wound or abrasion is not an accidental injury within the meaning of the policy."

In Lehman v. Great Western Acci. Ass'n, 155 Iowa, 737, 133 N. W., 752, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.), 562, the court said:

"A conflict exists among the decisions as to what injuries are the result of accidental means within the contemplation of accident policies. It seems possible, how

143 Tenn.-4

Ramsey v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.

ever, to reconcile some of the cases upon the theory that injuries resulting from acts which were exactly what the insured intended, and which were unaccompanied by an unintentional or involuntary muscular effort, are not within the meaning of the provisions under consideration, while injuries are within these provisions where the insured's act bringing about the injury is accompanied by an unanticipated and unintentional movement or circumstance. A distinction is also drawn in some cases between 'accident' and 'accidental means'; the ground being that, while the result of an intentional act may be an 'accident,' the act itself, where intended, cannot constitute 'accidental means.'

In Rock v. Insurance Co., 172 Cal., 462, 156 Pac., 1029, L. R. A., 1916E, 1196, the court said:

"A differentiation is made, therefore, between the result to the insured and the means which is the operative cause in producing this result. It is not enough that death or injury should be unexpected or unforseen, but there must be some element of unexpectedness in the preceding act or occurrence which leads to the injury or death. Policies like the one before us have been before the courts in many cases, and the great weight of authority, we think, sustains the view which we have just expressed. Thus, in Clidero v. Scottish Acci. Ins. Co., 29 Scot. L. R., 303, Lord ADAM said: "The question, in the sense of this policy, is not whether death was the result of accident in the sense that it was a death which was not foreseen or anticipated. That is not the question. The

Ramsey v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.

question is, in the words of this policy, whether the means by which the injury was caused were accidental means. The death being accidental in the sense in which I have mentioned, and the means which led to the death as accidental, are, to my mind, two quite different things. A person may do certain acts, the result of which acts may produce unforeseen consequences, and may produce what is commonly called accidental death, but the means are exactly what the man intended to use, and did use, and was prepared to use. The means were not accidental, but the result might be accidental.'"

In Salinger v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 178 Ky., 369, 198 S. W., 1163, L. R. A., 1918C, 101, the court said:

"So, the question for decision is reduced to this proposition: Does an intentional exertion constitute 'accidental means' of injury within the provision of the policy? It may be treated as established by the great weight of authority that an injury is not produced by accidental means within the terms of an accident insurance policy, where it is the direct, though unexpected, result of an ordinary act in which the insured intentionally engages. The rule is stated as follows in 1 Cor. Jur., page 426: 'If a result is such as follows from ordinary means, employed voluntarily and in a not unusual or unexpected way, it cannot be called a result effected by accidental means.'"

In Smith v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 219 Mass., 147, 106 N. E., 607, L. R. A., 1915B, 872, the court said:

"But there was nothing accidental in the inhalation of this douche. The deceased did exactly what he intended