Hale v. Sovereign Camp W. O. W. of frequent application to insurance contracts. Insurance Co. v. Sorrels, 60 Tenn. (1 Baxt.), 352, 25 Am. Rep., 780; Insurance Co. v. Hancock, 106 Tenn., 513, 62 S. W., 145, 52 L. R. A., 665; Insurance Co. v. Whitaker, 112 Tenn., 151, 79 S. W., 119, 64 L. R. A., 451, 105 Am. St. Rep., 916; Insurance Co. v. Fallow, 110 Tenn., 720, 77 S. W., 937. In Bennett v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 107 Tenn., 371, 64 S. W., 758, it is said, quoting Mr. Joyce: "A medical examiner is an agent with limited powers, but, nevertheless, his acts in and about the business entrusted to his care are binding within the scope of his authority, and, to this extent, the general rules of agency are applicable to him as to other special agents." In Knights of Pythias v. Cogbill, 99 Tenn., 28, 41 S. W. 340, the knowledge of the local medical examiner of a fraternal benefit society was held to be imputable to the society in a case where the true facts concerning the physical condition were stated to the local examiner, and the examiner inserted false statements in the report of his examination made to the society. In this case it was held to be immaterial that the application recited that the local physician should be treated as the agent of the applicant. While there is some authority to the contrary, the rule above stated, as to the knowledge of a local physician being the knowedge of his principal, the assurer, is almost everywhere accepted. Joyce on Insurance (2d Ed.), seetions 2721, 474a; Cooley's Briefs on Insurance, vol. 3, pp. 2552, 2561; note 107 Am. St. Rep. 108. Hale v. Sovereign Camp W. O. W. Under these authorities, where the applicant for insurance truthfully answers the questions propounded to him by the local physician of an insurance company or a fraternal benefit society issuing insurance, and the physician inserts false statements in the blank furnished him and makes a false report to his principal, and a policy issues, the assurer is held to be estopped from relying on such false report. This is for the reason that the agent of the assurer employed to procure this information was truthfully advised by the assured. Such knowledge having been acquired by the special agent in the execution of the special authority he possessed, this knowledge will be ascribed to the principal. The principal therefore, having knowledge of the truth, will not be permitted to rely on the fraud of its agent for which the assured was in no way responsible. In the case before us, if it appeared that Dr. Carroll was responsible for the false answers contained in the report of the examination of deceased, under our decisions it would follow necessarily, nothing else appearing, that defendant here would be estopped from resisting this demand. It does not appear, however, from this record, who is responsible for the bogus application forwarded to the sovereign camp of defendant society. Dr. Carroll testifies that he wrote out a truthful report of the facts disclosed by the examination of deceased, and that he truthfully recorded the answers made in this examination by the Hale v. Sovereign Camp W. O. W. deceased. Clark, the local clerk, says that he had nothing to do with the preparation of the second and third pages of the application before us and that he mailed the application to the sovereign camp just as it was returned to him by Riggs and without any alteration. Riggs denies that he had anything to do with the preparation of this application at all, and as heretofore noted, denies that he took it to Dr. Carroll or returned it to Clark. All these parties were introduced as the complainant's witnesses. The deposition of Riggs was taken by defendant, but not used by it, and the complainant read this deposition. The proof shows that the only apparent benefit that accrued to any of these local men by reason of the acceptance of deceased's application was the fee of $1 coming to Riggs for obtaining deceased as a member of the camp and perhaps a similar fee to Clark. It is urged by defendant that neither of these men would have undertaken such a hazardous thing as the forging of this document for the sum of $1, leaving everything else out of consideration. The defendant insists that the only party benefited by this fraud was the deceased or his brother. It is argued that the proof acquits the local agents of the defendant of wrongdoing, and that, deceased being the beneficiary thereof, we should presume that he was responsible for the fraud. There is nothing, however, to indicate that deceased had anything whatever to do with the fraud perpetrated. The record shows that he was a man worth between $50,000 and $60,000. He and his brother were part Hale v. Sovereign Camp W. O. W. ners the brother being the beneficiary of the policy-and the brother was worth something more than deceased. We have heretofore spoken of the high character which the record shows deceased to have had. An agent of one of the insurance companies by which the deceased was formerly rejected proved that deceased was very careful in his statements about his physical condition, and was particular to see that his application for insurance contained nothing but the truth. We cannot, therefore, presume that a man of the character of deceased to whom this small policy would mean little, and would mean less to his beneficiary, would undertake such fraud in the absence of any circumstances hinting at such participation. The deceased does not appear to have been particularly anxious to obtain insurance, the asseverations of defendant to the contrary notwithstanding. He seems to have been solicited for insurance several times and to have been interested in obtaining insurance, but there is nothing on the record tending to show that he would have gone to any extraordinary lengths to obtain insurance. Under the by-laws of the defendant society, it was the duty of the clerk of the local camp to attend to all the correspondence of the camp. According to the proof, it seems that it was the duty of such clerk to forward to the sovereign camp applications along with a remittance from the applicant. --> In the case before us the clerk of the local camp negligently sent on a bogus application. It may be that the local physician negligently furnished to the clerk a bogus Hale v. Sovereign Camp W. O. W. application. If therefore we acquit the local agents of all actual fraud in framing up the bogus application, the fact remains that they were guilty of negligence in the duties specially committed to their care by the rules and regulations of defendant. The deceased had nothing to do and was not concerned with the forwarding of this application after he signed it. We see no difference in the application of the rule of law heretofore discussed in a case where the local agents have been guilty of negligence and in a case where they have been guilty of actual fraud. The basis of the liability of the assurer in such cases is the knowledge of the special agent acquired within the particular line of his duties with which knowledge the principal is charged. It can make no difference whether the general officers of the assurer are misled inadvertently or intentionally by the local agent. 3 Cooley's Briefs on Insurance, p. 2555. The defendant relies on statements contained on the first page of the application, duly signed by the deceased, to the effect that the application "consisting of two pages, to each of which I have attached my signature, the examining physician's report and all the provisions of the constitution and laws of the society, now in force or that may hereafter be adopted, shall constitute the basis for and form a part of any beneficiary certificate that may be issued;" and another statement to the effect that "I hereby certify, agree and warrant that all the statements, representations and answers in this application |