Williamson Co. v. Turnpike Co. In Railroad v. Memphis, 126 Tenn., 267, 148 S. W., 662, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.), 828, Ann. Cas., 1913E, 153, following a long line of precedents, it was held that whether the taking is for a public use, and whether the statute authorizing the taking for such a use provides a sufficient and adequate procedure for the ascertainment of the fair value of the property to be taken, and payment in cash or sufficient security, are judicial questions confided to the courts; but all other incidents of the taking are political questions for the determination of the sovereign, and not judicial questions for the determination of the courts. It was not essential, therefore, that in providing for the condemnation of turnpikes by counties the legis lature should have prescribed each element of property, corporeal and incorporeal, entering into and constituting the property of a turnpike. If compensation is provided for, and a tribunal is erected by resort to which compensation can be secured, the constitutional requirement, so far as the legislature is concerned in exercising the right of eminent domain, is satisfied, but what such compensation shall be and what elements of property shall be taken into consideration in fixing compensation are essentially judicial questions. We understand all of the authorities so to hold. It therefore follows that, construing chapter 74, Acts of 1917, and chapter 114, Acts of 1917, as being in pari materia, power and authority were conferred on Williamson county to exercise the right of eminent domain under section 5 of chapter 74, Acts of 1917, and that the Williamson Co. v. Turnpike Co. determination of what value the franchises and other incorporeal properties, if any, of the turnpike company are will be questions to be determined by the court trying the case. The turnpike company, however, insists that, even if these acts confer the right of eminent domain on the various counties of the State, nevertheless its property is not subject to condemnation, and in support of this contention it cites the familiar principle of law that, where property has been dedicated to a public use, it cannot be taken for another and inconsistent use, unless the power so to take it is conferred expressly or by necessary implication. The legal principle involved is elementary and must be conceded. Railroad v. Mayor and Aldermen of Union City, 137 Tenn., 491, 194 S. W., 512; 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain, section 361, p. 1001, and cases there cited. Having held that chapter 114, Acts of 1917, authorizes counties to condemn turnpikes as quasi-public corporations, it inevitably results that the above-cited principle of law cannot stand in the way of the county's assertion of its authority in the case at bar. We are therefore of the opinion that under the various acts of Tennessee above referred to, Williamson county, acting, as the petition shows it was, at the direction of the State Highway Department, in instituting this condemnation proceeding, was authorized to condemn all of the easements, roadbed, franchises, and other properties of the Franklin & Spring Hill Turnpike Company. Williamson Co. v. Turnpike Co. The turnpike company makes the insistence that no provision is made for ascertaining and paying to it the compensation to which it is entitled for the taking of its properties under the exercise of the right of eminent domain. Having held that the acts heretofore considered authorize the condemnation of all of its properties, it follows that under section 5, chapter 74, Acts of 1917, proper provision is made for the payment of compensation incident to such condemnation. That section in part provides as follows: "All judgments rendered and other expenses necessarily incurred in such condemnation proceedings shall be paid out of the general funds of the county, in which the expenses are incurred and standing to the credit of the trus tee, on the warrant or voucher of the county judge or chairman drawn under the direction of the secretary of the department." It has been heretofore held by this court in State Highway Department v. Mitchell's Heirs, 142 Tenn., 58, 216 S. W., 336, that, where the general funds of the county of a state are subject to satisfaction of the landowner's claim, the legislature may with propriety permit entry upon the property designated without prepayment or bond, and that section 5, chapter 74, Acts of 1917, as well as section 9, chapter 149, Acts of 1919, pledging the general funds of the county as compensation in condemnation suits for highway purposes, make adequate provision for compensation under Constitution, article 1, section 21. As above stated, whatever constituent elements of property, as franchises or other incorporeal property, may en Williamson Co. v. Turnpike Co. ter into the value of the defendant turnpike company, these must be compensated for, and indeed it is agreed that they will be. The conclusion reached by this court is that an act providing for the condemnation of a turnpike'as such does not, in order to be constitutional and valid, have to prescribe in detail each element of property entering into the value of a turnpike as a going concern, but in the absence of such a declaration by the legislature it is the imperative duty of the court to see that such compensation is made for every element of value which the property sought to be condemned may possess. Railroad v. Memphis, 126 Tenn., 267, 148 S. W., 662, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.), 828, Ann. Cas., 1913E, 153; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. U. S., 148 U. S., 312, 13 Sup. Ct., 622, 37 L. Ed. 463. The fallacy in the argument of counsel for defendant in error, in our opinion, consists in assuming that, when the legislature provides for the condemnation of a quasipublic corporation, as a turnpike, it must specify in the act of condemnation every element of value constituting the property of such corporation, and for its failure so to do the act is unconstitutional and void. This, we are satisfied, under the authorities, is a mistaken view, and no case has been cited or found by us which supports it. Again, the turnpike company contends that its property cannot be condemned under any of the acts above referred to, because it was not specifically and eo nomine referred to in such acts, and seemingly reliance is placed on Rail Williamson Co. v. Turnpike Co. road v. Memphis and Railroad v. Mayor and Aldermen of Union City, supra, to support this view. Again, we think counsel is mistaken in his assumption. If the act authorizing the power of eminent domain provides for the condemnation of property theretofore devoted to a public use, it does not have to specify such property by description, name, or other individual characteristic, but may delegate to a public agency the right to select such property, so devoted to a public use, as in the discretion of such agency will tend to promote and subserve the purposes of the act. The turnpike company contends that the petition does not aver that there is any necessity for taking its property, and that consequently it is fatally defective, as such averment is jurisdictional. Section 5, chapter 74, Acts of 1917, authorizes and empowers the State Highway Department to designate the road or roads to be constructed, repaired, or maintained by the use of the funds provided for by said act and to lay out and to locate all such roads. The petition avers that the turnpike of the defendant in error has been selected by the State Highway Department as a link in the state and national highway to be known as the "Jackson Highway," and that this suit is brought by the county for the purpose of securing this link by condemnation. As the State of Tennessee has delegated to the State Highway Department, in the exercise of its discretion, the power to determine what roads shall be taken as parts of |