smooth surface of a decent life." The fact, too, that every moral judgment is a judgment of moral worth enables us clearly to draw the line between the judgments of conscience and of prudence. The moral judgment is insight, prudence is foresight: conscience is given, prudence is found.

This brings us to the most valuable part of Dr. Martineau's constructive work, where we must leave him, without following him into the detailed classification of the springs of action.

Conscience speaks with authority. This truth has shown itself in our very conception of duty. For

"Without objective conditions, the idea of duty involves a contradiction, and its phraseology passes into an unmeaning figure of speech. Nothing can be binding to us that is not higher than we; and to speak of one part of self imposing obligation on another part—of one impulse or affection playing, as it were, the god to another-is to trifle with the real significance of the sentiments that speak within us. Conscience does not frame the law, it simply reveals the law that holds us; and to make everything of the disclosure and nothing of the thing disclosed is to affirm and to deny the revelation in the same breath."

But

"The predicate 'higher than I' takes me yet a step beyond; for what am I? A person, higher than whom no 'thing' assuredly, no mere phenomenon, can be; but only another Person, greater and higher and of deeper insight.

. . If it be true that over a free and living person nothing short of a free and living person can have higher authority, then is it certain that a ‘subjective' conscience is impossible.

The faculty is more than part and parcel of myself; it is the communion of God's life and guiding love entering and abiding with an apprehensive capacity in myself." "The real, eternal objective will of God seems to me to construe very faithfully the sense of authority attaching to our moral nature they are in us, but not of us; not ours, but God's."

We have now found the key to Dr. Martineau's classification of ethical theories. It is really a dichotomous division based on the recognition or non-recognition of the truth of personality and the fundamental doctrine of obligation. In the ancient world "the notion of personality was held very indistinctly and with great fluctuation," while, with the exception of Bishop Butler and some writers of the Scottish school, "it is difficult to find any class of recent moralists who have declined to betray their science to the physiologist on the one hand, or the ontologist on the other." Whether personality and freedom are merged in metaphysic, immanental or transcendental, or in physiology, as with Comte and Spencer, or are lost in the false psychology of the hedonist or rational or æsthetic schools, makes little difference. They are only subdivisions of the negative arm of the dichotomy.

But those who, like Dr. Martineau, allow the moral consciousness to speak for itself, must make the transition, as he does, from morals to metaphysics and theology,-must ask, What metaphysic will furnish an adequate basis and justification for

the indispensable postulates of ethical doctrine? If morality demands freedom and an objective moral law, we have passed out of psychology into metaphysics and we must go farther. If the law is moral-can appeal to me as a moral being-it must be the appeal of a personality to my personality. Therefore, says Dr. Martineau, morality implies theism. And here he leaves us to face the difficulties of the Parmenides and the criticism of Herbert Spencer, that a Personal Infinite is a contradiction in terms. We are compelled, then, to make a further step, and ask, Is theism any longer a tenable metaphysic? Must it not declare itself Christian on pain of lapsing into pantheism? If so, the doctrine of the Trinity becomes the true and only safeguard of that theism which is the postulate of the moral consciousness.

This final chapter on the metaphysic of morals Dr. Martineau has not written, but he has given us a noble introduction to it.

VI.

PROLEGOMENA TO ETHICS.1

was who had been Students of philohis two or three

THE publication of a work on moral philosophy by Professor Green will be welcomed by many besides those who have been brought directly within the sphere of his influence. People generally knew little of him. When his unexpected and almost sudden death in March, 1882, called forth the noble testimonies to his life and work of those who knew him well, many were astonished to find how great a man he taken away from among us. sophy had, of course, read review articles, and above all his introduction to Hume. Oxford men were familiar with his earnest, thoughtful face, and they knew that he was "a philosopher," and that the article in the North British on the "Philosophy of Aristotle," must be read by any one who hoped for high honours in "the schools." But it was a comparatively small number of men who really appreciated him, and the publication of the "Prolegomena to Ethics," after

1 Prolegomena to Ethics. By T. H. Green, M.A., LL.D.

his death, seems specially appropriate in the case of one who lived so little for himself and so entirely for the great truths with which he dealt. The greater part of the book, as the editor, Mr. A. C. Bradley, tells us, had been used in professorial lectures, Mr. Green having been appointed Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy in 1877; and about a quarter of the whole appeared in Mind in the first half of the year in which Mr. Green died. Mr. Bradley is responsible for the arrangement into books and chapters, the manuscript having been written in paragraphs, and we also owe to the editor a most excellent table of contents which serves as a full and true analysis of the book itself. The short preface of the editor ends with a sentence worth quoting, as showing how Professor Green affected those who had the privilege of being much with him and being able to appreciate him. After acknowledging his debt to Mrs. Green, Professor Caird, and Mr. R. L. Nettleship, Mr. Bradley concludes:

"But it would seem to me, and to those who have helped me, out of place to express any gratitude for work given to a book which, more than any writing of Mr. Green's yet published, may enable the public outside Oxford to understand not only the philosophical enthusiasm which his teaching inspired; but the reverence and love which are felt for him by all who knew him well."

If the theology of the Catholic Church had less in common than it has with the metaphysics of Professor Green, English Churchmen would still owe