explain what is called the "infusio animae" as the establishing of a new relation between the creature and the creator. This theory is discussed in Duns Scotus, who points out the new difficulties which rise out of the phrase, "nova relatio," especially the possibility of "mutatio" in both the related terms, of which God is one. But even this phrase, a new relation," implies all that creatianism implies, so far as that it is something which evolution cannot explain, which makes man different, not in degree, but in kind, from all the lower creation. What is this but saying that when we talk of "creatio equi" and "creatio hominis" the word "created" has a different meaning? In one case God creates by a process which science can follow; in the other, science is baffled. Haeckel's embryological researches have in no way affected the problem, for whether we talk of a "soul" or a "nova relatio," it cannot be put under the microscope;1 and if we believe in a soul" or a "nova relatio," we believe in a break in the process of

terminology, if the same name is given to the Creator and the created, it is not used univocally, but "eminenter" of God.

For the "new relation" doctrine see Baden Powell, Unity of Worlds, Essay ii. § ii. p. 247. "The difference is not in physical nature, but in investing that nature with a new and higher application. The continuity with the material world remains the same, but a new relation is developed in it, and it claims kindred with ethereal matter and with celestial light."

1 "Physical science as such has nothing to do with the soul of man, which is hyperphysical" (Mivart, loc. cit., p. 285).

evolution infinitely greater than that which separates organic from inorganic. The existence of a "nova relatio" is creatianism, for it implies that man is a new and distinct order of being, and this implies a creative act which cannot be reduced to evolution. And here, again, while all traducianism is a form of creation, there is such a thing as creatianism which cannot be expressed in terms of traducianism.

I have tried to keep carefully to the terms of my paper, "Creation and Creatianism," but, at the same time, I cannot but feel that our judgment in this matter determines other questions. St. Athanasius, in his treatise "De Incarnatione," keeps closely together creation and re-creation, 'Aváyêŋ yàp iμãs λέγοντας περὶ τῆς εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐπιφανείας τοῦ Σωτῆρος, λέγειν καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀρχῆς (ch. iv.), because false views about creation, or indistinct language about creation, logically issues in false or hazy views about the Incarnation. If we can explain creation in terms of evolution, I cannot see why we cannot so explain the Incarnation. The materials for such a process are already to our hand. We have only got to read an Alexandrian, instead of a Palestinian, meaning into the doctrine of the AOгO in St. John's Gospel. We have more than one Neo-Platonic catch-word in the Epistle to the Hebrews. John Scotus Erigena has worked it all out for us. The nothing out of

G

which the Church believes the world to have been created is God's own incomprehensible essence.1 In creation God passes through the primordiales causae into the world of invisible and visible creatures. Our life is God's life. We are in the image of God. The Incarnation differs from creation only in degree. The "processio" of God into the world has its correlated" reversio" when He returns unto Himself. It is much more intelligible than Hegel, quite as philosophical and much more ingenious, because Scotus Erigena contrived to use theological terms, and could claim a good deal of authority from the writings of orthodox theologians. Now, however, we are told that "this religious dogma" of the Incarnation "is only another way of saying that the antithesis of subjective and objective is given to us as already overcome, and that on us lies the obligation of participating in this redemption by laying aside our immediate subjectivity, putting off the old Adam, and learning to know God as our true and essential self." The pantheistic conception is as certain as in Erigena, but we have not gained much in clearness of expression. The Atonement, according to this last theory, ceases to mean man's reconciliation with God, for the Incarnation is simply the revelation that there is really no enmity to be reconciled.

1 De Divis. Nat., iii. 9.

2

*

2 Hegel's Logic, 194.

V.

TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY.1

A GROWING interest in moral philosophy is one of the signs of the times, and those who are content with a superficial explanation of new phenomena might plausibly argue that it is due to the fact that the age of supernaturalism has passed away. A people, it may be said, which has outgrown metaphysics and theology is driven to seek aid from the natural and the human. And this is a thoroughly satisfactory explanation, so long as we shut our eyes to the facts of the case. But the moment we fairly face them we find that those who try to write on ethics, as a science independent of metaphysics and theology, invariably fail to stir up anything but a languid enthusiasm ; while those who really are influencing thought and life are more and more fearlessly connecting their ethics with the belief in God. We refrain from - mentioning representatives of the former class, but Types of Ethical Theory, by James Martineau, D.D., LL.D. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

among the latter we find the great names of Professor T. H. Green and Dr. Martineau.

Of course, we do not mean to assert that, with these writers, their ethical system is a mere dépendance of their theology, or that their theology is that of the Catholic Church. It is their greatness that they have vindicated for moral science its rightful basis in human life, even when that life is lived apart from the revelation of Jesus Christ; and have nevertheless seen that its full explanation and justification lies in that which is superhuman.

It is their weakness, if we may say so, that their implied theology, the doctrine of an eternal Consciousness in the one case, and of a God Who is personal and moral, and yet an undifferentiated Unit in the other, involves intellectual difficulties greater far than those which beset the doctrine of the Trinity. Yet, for all this, the present generation will owe it to Professor Green and Dr. Martineau that moral philosophy has been raised to a position, in which it awaits its transformation, and, at the same time, its true development, in the light of the Incarnation.

In the main controversies of morals, then, Christianity claims and welcomes the work of such men. John Stuart Mill, no doubt, by a noble inconsistency did much to undermine the foundations on which his own theory rested. But it still remained for men like Professor Green and Dr.