cuperative power, that redeeming and regenerating spirit, by which the constitution is to be purified and redintegrated when extravagant abuse has cankered it.

In addition to the example of a treaty of peace, which I have just been considering, let me put another, of which none of us can question the reality. The President may exercise the power of pardoning, save only in the case of impeachments. The power of pardoning is not communicated by words more precise or comprehensive than the power to make treaties. But to what does it amount? Is not every pardon, pro hac vice, a repeal of the penal law against which it gives protection? Does it not ride over the law, resist its command and extinguish its effect? Does it not even control the combined force of judicature and legislation? Yet, have we ever heard that your legislative rights were an exception out of the prerogative of mercy? Who has ever pretended that this faculty cannot, if regularly exerted, wrestle with the strongest of your statutes? I may be told, that the pardoning power necessarily imports a control over the penal code, if it be exercised in the form of a pardon. I answer, the power to make treaties equally imports a power to put out of the way such parts of the civil code as interfere with its operation, if that power be exerted in the form of a treaty. There is no difference in their essence. You legislate, in both cases, subject to the power. And this instance furnishes another answer, as I have already intimated, to the predictions of abuse, with which, on this occasion, it has been endeavored to appal us. The pardoning power is in the President alone. He is not even checked by the necessity of senatorial concurrence. He may, by his single fiat, extract the sting from your proudest enactments, and save from their vengeance a convicted offender.

Sir, you have my general notions upon the bill before you. They have no claim to novelty. I imbibed them from some of the heroes and sages who survived the storm of that contest to which America was sum

moned in her cradle. I imbibed them from the father of his country. My understanding approved them with the full concurrence of my heart, when I was much younger than I am now; and I feel no disposition to discard them now that age and feebleness are about to overtake me. I could say moremuch more upon this question; but I want health and strength. It is, perhaps, fortunate for the House that I do: as it prevents me from fatiguing them as much as I fatigue myself.

SPEECH OF JOHN C. CALHOUN,

ON

PROPOSING TO SET APART AND PLEDGE AS A
FOR INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT THE

PERMANENT FUND

BONUS OF THE NATIONAL BANK, AND THE UNITED STATES' SHARE OF ITS DIVIDENDS ;

DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

STATES, FEBRUARY 4, 1817.

OF THE UNITED

MR. CHAIRMAN,

It seems to be the fate of some measures to be praised, but not adopted. Such I fear will be the fate of that on which we are now deliberating. From the indisposition, manifested by the House to go into committee on the bill, there is not much prospect of its success; yet it seems to me, when I reflect how favorable is the present moment, and how confessedly important a good system of roads and canals is to our country, I may reasonably be very sanguine of success. At peace with all the world; abounding in pecuniary means; and, what is of the most importance, and at what I rejoice as most favorable to the country, party and sectional feelings, immerged in a liberal and enlightened regard to the general concerns of the nation-such, are the favorable circumstances under which we are now deliberating. Thus situated, to what can we direct our resources and attention more important than internal improvements? What can add more to the wealth, the strength, and the political prosperity of our country? The manner, in which facility and cheapness of intercourse adds to the wealth of a nation, has been so often and ably discussed by writers on political economy, that I presume the House to be perfectly acquainted with the subject. It is sufficient to observe, that every branch of national indus

try, agricultural, manufacturing and commercial, is greatly stimulated and rendered by it more productive. The result is, that it tends to diffuse universal opulence. It gives to the interior the advantages possessed by the parts most eligibly situated for trade. It makes the country price, whether in the sale of raw products, or in the purchase of the articles for consumption, approximate to that of the commercial towns. În fact, if we look into the nature of wealth we will find, that nothing can be more favorable to its growth, than good roads and canals. An article, to command a price, must not only be useful, but must be the subject of demand; and the better the means of commercial intercourse, the larger is the sphere of demand. The truth of these positions, is obvious, and has been tested by all countries where the experiment has been made. It has particularly been strikingly exemplified in England, and if the result there, in a country so limited and so similar in its products, has been to produce a most uncommon state of opulence, what may we not expect from the same cause in our country, abounding as it does in the greatest variety of products. and presenting the greatest facility for improvement? Let it not be said that internal improvement may be wholly left to the enterprize of the states and of individuals. I know, that much may justly be expected to be done by them; but in a country so new, and so extensive as ours, there is room enough, for all the general and state governments and individuals, in which to exert their resources. But But many of the improvements contemplated, are on too great a scale for the resources of the states or individuals; and many of such a nature, that the rival jealousy of the states, if left alone, might prevent. They require the resources and the general superintendence of this government to effect and complete them. But there are higher and more powerful considerations why Congress ought to take charge of this subject. If we were only to consider the pecuniary advantages of a good system of roads and canals; it might indeed admit of some doubt

whether they ought not to be left wholly to individual exertions; but when we come to consider how intimately the strength and political prosperity of the republic are connected with this subject, we find the most urgent reasons why we should apply our resources to them. In many respects, no country of equal population and wealth, possesses equal materials of power with ours. The people, in muscular power, in hardy and enterprizing habits, and in lofty and gallant courage, are surpassed by none. In one respect, and, in my opinion, in one only, are we materially weak. We occupy a surface prodigiously great in proportion to our numbers. The common strength is brought to bear with great difficulty on the point that may be menaced by an enemy. It is our duty, then, as far as in the nature of things it can be effected, to counteract this weakness. Good roads and canals, judiciously laid out, are the proper remedy. In the recent war, how much did we suffer for the want of them? Besides the tardiness and the consequential inefficacy of our military movements, to what an increased expense was the country put for the article of transportation alone? In the event of another war, the saving in this particular, would go far towards indemnifying us for the expense of constructing the means of transportation. It is not, however, in this respect only, that roads and canals add to the strength of the country. Our power of raising revenue, in war particularly, depends mainly on them. In peace, our revenue depends principally on the imports. In war, this source, in a great measure, fails, and internal taxes, to a great amount, become necessary. Unless the means of commercial intercourse are rendered much more perfect than they now are, we shall never be able, in war, to raise the necessary supplies. If taxes are collected in kind; if, for instance, the farmer and mechanic paid in their surplus produce, then the difficulty would not exist; as in no country on earth, is there so great a surplus, in proportion to its population, as in ours. But such a system of taxes is impos