pears to me that these oppressions must result from this part of the plan. It is at least doubtful, and where there is even a possibility of such evils, they ought to be guarded against. There are to be a number of places fitted out for arsenals and dock-yards in the different states. Unless you sell to Congress such places as are proper for these, within your state, you will not be consistent after adop tion; it results therefore clearly that you are to give into their hands, all such places as are fit for strong holds. When you have these fortifications and garrisons within your state, your legislature will have no power over them, though they see the most dangerous insults offered to the people daily. They are also to have magazines in each state; these depositories for arms, though within the state, will be free from the control of its legislature. Are we at last brought to such a humiliating and debasing degradation, that we cannot be trusted with arms for our own defence? There is a wide difference between having our arms in our own possession and under our own direction, and having them under the management of Congress? If our defence be the real object of having those arms, in whose hands can they be trusted with more propriety, or equal safety to us, as in our own? If our legislature be unworthy of legislating for every foot in this state, they are unworthy of saying another word. The clause which says that Congress shall" provide for arming, organizing and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers," seemed to put the states in the power of Congress. I wished to be informed, if Congress neglected to discipline them, whether the states were not precluded from doing it. Not being favored with a particular answer, I am confirmed in my opinion, that the states have not the power of disciplining them, without recurring to the doctrine of constructive, im plied powers. If by implication the states may discipline them, by implication also Congress may officer them; because, in a partition of power, each has a right to come in for part; and because implication is to operate in favor of Congress on all occasions, where their object is the extension of power, as well as in favor of the states. We have not one fourth of the arms that would be sufficient to defend ourselves. The power of arming the militia, and the means of purchasing arms, are taken from the states by the para-* mount powers of Congress. If Congress will not arm them, they will not be armed at all. There have been no instances shown of a voluntary cession of power, sufficient to induce me to grant the most dangerous powers: a possibility of their future relinquishment will not persuade me to yield such powers. Congress, by the power of taxation, by that of raising an army, and by their control over the militia, have the sword in one hand and the purse in the other. Shall we be safe without either? Congress have an unlimited power over both: they are entirely given up by us. Let him candidly tell me, where and when did freedom exist, when the sword and purse were given up by the people? Unless a miracle in human affairs interposed, no nation ever retained its liberty after the loss of the sword and purse. Can you prove by any argumentative deduction, that it is possible to be safe without retaining one of these? If you give them up, you are gone. Give us at least a plausible apology why Congress should keep their proceedings in secret. They have the power of keeping them secret as long as they please; for the provision for a periodical publication is too inexplicit and ambiguous to avail any thing. The expression, from time to time, as I have more than once observed, admits of any extension. They may carry on the most wicked and pernicious of schemes under the dark veil of secrecy. The liberties of a people never were nor ever will be secure, when the transac tions of their rulers may be concealed from them. The most iniquitous plots may be carried on against their liberty and happiness. I am not an advocate for divulging indiscriminately all the operations of government, though the practice of our ancestors in some degree justifies it. Such transactions as relate to military operations, or affairs of great consequence, the immediate promulgation of which might defeat the interests of the community, I would not wish to be published, till the end which required their secrecy should have been effected. But to cover, with the veil of secrecy, the common routine of business, is an abomination in the eyes of every intelligent man, and every friend to his country. [Mr. Henry then, in a very animated manner, expatiated on the evil and pernicious tendency of keeping secret the common proceedings of government, and said, that it was contrary to the practice of other free nations. The people of England, he asserted, had gained immortal honor, by the manly boldness wherewith they divulged to all the world their political disquisitions and operations; and that such a conduct inspired other nations with respect. He illustrated his arguments by several quotations.] He then continued: I appeal to this convention, if it would not be better for America to take off the veil of secrecy. Look at us-hear our transactions. If this had been the language of the federal convention, what would have been the result? Such a constitution would not have come out to your utter astonishment, conceding such dangerous powers, and recommending secrecy in the future transactions of government. I believe it would have given more general satisfaction, if the proceedings of that convention had not been concealed from the public eye. This constitution authorizes the same conduct. There is not an English feature in it. The transactions of Congress may be concealed a century from the public consistently with the constitution. This, sir, is a laudable imitation of the transactions of the Spanish treaty. We have not forgotten with what a thick veil of secrecy those transactions were covered. We are told that this government, collectively taken, is without an example; that it is national in this part. and federal in that part, &c. We may be amused, if we please, by a treatise of political anatomy. In the brain it is national: the stamina are federal-some limbs are federal, others national. The senators are voted for by the state legislatures; so far it is federal. Individuals choose the members of the first branch; here it is national. It is federal in conferring general powers, but national in retaining them. It is not to be supported by the states-the pockets of individuals are to be searched for its maintenance. What signifies it to me, that you have the most curious anatomical description of it in its creation? To all the common purposes of legislation it is a great consolidation of government. You are not to have the right to legislate in any but trivial cases: you are not to touch private contracts: you are not to have the right of having arms in your own defence: you cannot be trusted with dealing out justice between man and man. What shall the states have to do?-Take care of the poor, repair and make highways, erect bridges, and so on and so on. Abolish the state legislatures at once. What purposes should they be continued for? Our legislature will indeed be a ludicrous spectacle-one hundred and eighty men marching in solemn, farcical procession, exhibiting a mournful proof of the lost liberty of their country, without the power of restoring it. But, sir, we have the consolation, that it is a mixed government; that is, it may work sorely on your neck, but you will have some comfort by saying, that it was a federal government in its origin. I beg gentlemen to consider; lay aside your prejudices-is this a federal government? Is it not a consolidated government for every purpose almost? Is the government of Virginia a state government, after this government is adopted? I grant that it is a republican government; but for what purposes? For such trivial, domestic considerations, as render it unworthy the name of a legislature. I shall take leave of this political anatomy by observing, that it is the most extraordinary that ever entered into the imagination of man. If our political diseases demand a cure, this is an unheard of medicine. The honorable member, I am convinced, wanted a name for it. Were your health in danger, would you take new medicine? I need not make use of these exclamations; for every member in this committee must be alarmed at making new and unusual experiments in government. Let us have national credit and a national treasury in case of You never can want national resources in time of war, if the war be a national one, if it be necessary, and this necessity be obvious to the meanest capacity. The utmost exertions will be used by the people of America in that case. A republic has this advantage over a monarchy, that its wars are generally founded on more just grounds. A republic can never enter into a war, unless it be a national war, unless it be approved of, or desired by the whole community. Did ever a republic fail to use the utmost resources of the community when a war was necessary? I call for an example. I call also for an example, when a republic has been engaged in a war contrary to the wishes of its people. There are thousands of examples where the ambition of its prince has precipitated a nation into the most destructive war. No nation ever withheld power when its object was just and right. I will hazard an observation; I find fault with the paper before you, because the same power that declares war, has the ability to carry it on. Is it so in England? The king declares war: the house of commons gives the means of carrying it on. This is a strong check on the king. He will enter into no war that is unnecessary; for the commons, having the power of withholding |