upon reflection thought better of it, or whatever else might have been his motive, he sent back 50, and kept 5, among whom was the ship's boatswain.

Captain Loring proposed to give up a number of American seamen, who, he said, were in his fleet, if captain Phillips would give him English subjects for them. Captain Phillips refused this offer, and the American seamen were not delivered to him. Before any of the men were returned, he sent a message to captain Phillips to let him know if he, or one of his officers, would go on board of him, and point out who were Americans and who were not, he would return all the Americans; but this was declined also. After we got on board of the Baltimore, he sent a letter to captain Phillips, which he showed to us, in which the commodore " demanded" that he would give up all the British subjects on board the Baltimore. To this captain Phillips replied that he could not know any of his men as British subjects, nor could he, as commander of a ship in the service of the United States, voluntarily give up any of his men; but if he thought fit to send an officer on board, with orders to take any number of his men, he should not oppose it. In this answer captain Phillips mentioned he should lay before the Executive of the United States a full account of the occurrences of the day. Shortly after sending this reply, the squadron set sail and left the Baltimore. Commodore Loring was very polite to us,. and was so to captain Phillips when he went on board; but captain Phillips complained of indecent behaviour

from the inferior officers.

LEWIS TREZEVANT.
WM. TIMMONS.

G. C. Morton, Esq. V. Consul of U. S. at Havana.

CIRCULAR.

To the Commanders of Armed Vessels in the Service of the United States, given at the Navy Department, December 29, 1798.

SIR,It is the positive command of the President, that on no pretence whatever, you permit the publick vessel of war under your command to be detained, or searched, nor any of the officers or men belonging to her, to be taken

from her, by the ships or vessels of any foreign nation, so long as you are in a capacity to repel such outrage on the honour of the American flag. If force should be exerted to compel your submission, you are to resist that force to the utmost of your power, and when overpowered by superior force, you are to strike your flag, and thus yield your vessel as well as your men; but never your men without your vessel.

You will remember, however, that your demeanour be respectful and friendly to the vessels and people of all nations in amity with the United States; and that you avoid as carefully the commission of, as the submission to, insult or injury.

I have the honour to be, &c.

BEN. STODDERT.

MESSAGE

FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO CONGRESS. JAN. 18, 1799.

THE Communication relative to our affairs with France, alluded to in my address to both houses, at the opening of the session, is contained in the sheets which accompany this. A report of the Secretary of State, containing some observations on them, will be sent to Congress on Monday. JOHN ADAMS.

Letter from the Secretary of State to Mr. Gerry, dated June 25, 1798.

SIR,-By the instructions dated the 23d of March, which, agreeably to the President's directions, I addressed to generals Pinckney and Marshall and yourself, and of which six sets were transmitted, one by a despatch boat sent on purpose, and some of which doubtless reachyou during the last month, you will have seen that it was expected that all of you would have left France long before those instructions could arrive, and which were transmitted rather from abundant caution than necessity, 20

ed

VOL. IV.

seeing no probability or hope existed that you would ac complish the object of your mission. The respect due to yourselves and to your country irresistibly required that you should turn your backs to a government that treated both with contempt; a contempt not diminished, but ag gravated by the flattering but insidious distinction in your favour, in disparagement of men of such respectable ta lents, untainted honour and pure patriotism, as generals Pinckney and Marshall, and in whom their government and their country reposed entire confidence; and espe cially when the real object of that distinction was to ena ble the French government, trampling on the authority and dignity of our own, to designate an envoy with whom they would condescend to negotiate. It is therefore to be regretted that you did not concur with your colleagues in demanding passports to quit the territories of the French Republick, some time before they left Paris.

General Marshall has arrived and delivered to the President your letter of April 16th, with its enclosures; all which were, on the 21st instant, laid before Congress, accompanied by a message in which the President declares the negotiation at an end, and that "he will never send another minister to France without assurances that he will be received, respected and honoured, as the representative of a great, free, powerful and independent nation."

It is presumed, that you will consider the instructions of the 23d of March, before mentioned, as an effectual recall; lest however, by any possibility, those instructions should not have reached you, and you should still be in France, I am directed by the President to transmit to you this letter, and to inform you, that you are to consider it as a positive letter of recall.

I am respectfully, sir, &c.

TIMOTHY PICKERING.

MR. GERRY'S COMMUNICATIONS.

Nantasket Road, October 1, 1798.

SIR,-I have the honour to inform you of my arrival here this morning, in the brigantine Sophia, captain Geddes, from Havre, but last from Portsmouth in Great Bri tain; and to enclose copies of my letters to yourself of the

12th and 13th of May last, No. 1 and 2; of the correspondence between Mr. Talleyrand, the French minister of foreign affairs and myself, numbered according to the respective dates from 3 to 28 inclusively; of an arrete enclosed in his last letter, No. 29; of my letter to Mr. Hautval and his answer, No. 30 and 31; of my letter to Mr. King, our minister at London, and an extract to doctor Taswell, the bearer thereof, No. 32 and 33; also the substance of a conference with the Dutch minister, a day or two before I left Paris, No. 34; and an anonymous publication, "on the President's communication" of our despatches, said to have issued from the French office of foreign affairs, No. 35.

When I left the United States in August, 1797, the citizens in general appeared to be earnestly desirous of a reconciliation with France, on terms consistent with the honour, interest, and welfare of the two republicks; these, being free from claims and controversies in regard to territory, boundaries, and many matters which embroil states; and from competitions relative to their productions, manufactures, and commerce, had a mutual and manifest inte rest in the renewal of their commercial and friendly intercourse with each other. Nature seemed to have entitled the United States, in their remote situation to the peaceable pursuit of their industry, by means whereof, in its various branches, their wealth and power were rapidly increasing; and to an exemption from the conflicts of Europe; which, involving them, would check their population, drain their resources, and ensure their poverty. On a candid investigation then of the causes of the unhapру differences between the two governments, on a disposition to correct errours, to which all governments are more or less liable, and on their mutual resolution to reciprocate justice, the success of the mission was conceived to depend; and as this temper marked the plan of pacification adopted by the government of the United States, there was a rational prospect of success.

Soon after our arrival at Paris, the scene was changed, and the hope of a reconciliation being diminished, the necessity of harmony in the United States was proportiona. bly increased, as the only mean for preserving their welfare and independence at home, their rights, and respectability abroad. In case of a war, there was every

reason to believe, that they would be able to defend themselves against any nation, or coalition that could be formed against them; whilst their citizens should consider the government, chosen by themselves, as the pole star of their salvation; should rally round its standard, when raised for their defence; should rise superior to foreign intrigues, always expert in fomenting divisions, and often aided by popular elections, legislative debates, and clashing opinions and interests; and should promote unanimity, by toleration amongst themselves. Nevertheless, the critical state of our affairs required, that France should not be furnished with pretexts, for charging the American government, or ministers, with neglect of means for obtaining a reconciliation.

When the minister of foreign affairs, in October last, unauthorized by the executive directory, as Mr. Y. had informed the envoys, to have any communications with them, had expressed a desire to see them in their private capacities, I was opposed to a compliance, individually; not from considerations of etiquette, which had no weight in my mind, but because it would infer on me, a separate agency in matters wherein I was but jointly authorized: to prevent however the imputation of a failure of the negotiation, then daily expected, to the United States, I submitted to the measure, was unsuccessful in my attempts to make it general, and was thereby subjected to a series of embarrassments.

The particular attentions of the minister to me, lest they should be invidious, were in every instance but two declined; and in one of these I yielded to importunity: preferences I viewed as a source of division.

The second conference which I held with the minister, being on the 17th of December, and his propositions to the envoys, were published with their despatches. Their answer, which was unanimously in the negative, was delivered by me to his secretary. Mr. Y. had expected it, and expressed a surprise that the secretary had applied for it.

On the fourth of February, the minister by order of the executive directory, proposed that I should treat separately the circumstances thereof, and of my refusal, are generally detailed in the correspondence enclosed,