functions of the government to which he was deputed, yet that government resolved to see in him, only the representative of a Republick, to which it was sincerely attached, gave him the same warm and cordial reception which he had experienced from its citizens, without a single exception, from Charleston to Philadelphia. The then situation of France deserves to be remembered.

While the recollection adds, citizen minister, to the glory with which your nation is encircled, it establishes the sincerity of the United States.

The most formidable combination the world had ever seen, threatened the extermination of this Republick. Austria, Germany, Prussia, Britain, Spain, Holland and Sardinia; were in arms against France, and Russia was leagued in the coalition. Nor was this all. The Republick, distracted by internal divisions, contained numerous enemies within its own bosom, and a considerable portion of its proper force was arrayed against itself. In such a state of things, the most sanguine might fear, and the most . ardent hesitate. Confident in their strength, and relying on success, the coalesced powers sought to arm in their cause, the residue of the world, and deemed it criminal to acknowledge the sovereignty of the Republick. The nations of Europe, even those who had not entered into the contest, were either themselves unwilling to acknowledge this sovereignty, or were deterred by fear from doing so. Had the partialities of America been against France, this example would have been followed. According to the rules of ordinary calculation, the measure would have been safe, and consequently a government, feeling the attachments now so unjustly attributed to that of the United States, would have indicated those attachments by its adoption. Far from pursuing such a system the United States, unawed by the strength of the coalition, received with open arms the minister of this Republick, acknowledged with enthusiasm the government which had deputed him, overlooked his extraordinary attacks on their sovereignty, and manifested a cordial friendship for his nation and a sincere wish for its success.

Scarcely were the first ceremonies of his reception over, when Mr. Genet displayed a disposition to usurp and exercise within the United States, the choicest and most important duties and powers of sovereignty. He

claimed the privileges of arming and embodying the citi zens of America within their own territory, to carry on from thence expeditions against nations with whom they were at peace, of fitting out and equipping, within their limits, privateers, to cruise on a commerce destined for their ports; of erecting within their jurisdiction, an independent judiciary, and of arraigning their government at the bar of the people. The undersigned will not ask in what manner France would have treated any foreign minister, who should have dared so to conduct himself towards this Republick? But in what manner would the American government have treated such a minister, if the representative of a nation it viewed with coldness, or even indifference? In what manner would it have treated him, had he been the representative of any other nation than France? No man acquainted with that government can doubt how these inquiries ought to be answered. From the minister of France alone could this extraordinary conduct be borne with temper. To have continued to bear it, without perceiving and feeling its extreme impropriety, would have been to have merited the contempt as well of France as of the other powers of the earth. The government of the United States did feel it; but far from transferring to his nation that resentment, which such conduct could not fail to excite, it distinguished strongly between the government and its minister, and the representations it made were in the language of a friend afflicted, but not irritated, by the injuries it complained of. The recall of that minister was received with universal joy, as a confirmation that his whole system of conduct was attributable only to himself; and not even the publication of his prirate instructions could persuade the American government to ascribe any part of it to this Republick.

At the same time the exertions of the United States to pay up the arrearages of their debt to France, which had been unavoidably permitted to accumulate, their disinterested and liberal advances to the sufferers of St. Domingo, thrown suddenly upon them, without provisions or money, whose recommendation was, that they were Frenchmen and unfortunate; the perseverance with which they apologized for and ascribed any occasional injuries they sustained to the force of circumstances; the interest

which they continued openly to take in all the fortunes of this Republick, manifested partialities of a very different sort from those which have been so unjustly attributed to them.

At this period too, a great principle was brought into discussion, the dispassionate consideration of which is essential to the fair estimate of the charges made by France against the government of the United States. The property of French citizens was taken by British cruisers and ships of war, out of American bottoms, and the American government submitted to the practice. The propriety of submitting to it, depends entirely on the naked right of the captors, under the existing circumstances of the case, to exercise such a power. The circumstances were these: In the treaty of commerce made between France and the United States in February, 1778, it was stipulated in substance, that neither party should take out of the vessels of the other, the goods of its enemy, but the character of the bottom should be imparted to its cargo. With England the United States had made no stipulation on the subject.

It follows then that the rights of England, being neither diminished or increased by compact, remained precisely in their natural state, and were to be ascertained by some pre-existing acknowledged principle.

This principle is to be searched for in the law of nations. That law forms, independent of compact, a rule of action by which the sovereignties of the civilized world consent to be governed. It prescribes what one nation may do without giving just cause of war, and what, of consequence, another may and ought to permit, without being considered as having sacrificed its honour, its dignity or its independence.

What then is the doctrine of the law of nations on this subject? Do neutral bottoms, of right and independent of particular compact, protect hostile goods? The question is to be considered on its mere right, uninfluenced by the wishes or the interests of a neutral or belligerent power.

It is a general rule, that war gives to a belligerent power a right to seize and confiscate the goods of his enemy. However humanity may deplore the application of this principle, there is perhaps no one to which man has more universally assented, or to which jurists have more uni

formly agreed. Its theory and its practice have unhappily been maintained in all ages. This right then may be exercised on the goods of an enemy wherever found, unless opposed by some superior right. It yields by common consent to the superior right of a neutral nation to protect, by virtue of its sovereignty, the goods of either of the belligerent powers, found within its jurisdiction. But can this right of protection, admitted to be possessed by every government within its own limits, in virtue of its absolute sovereignty, be communicated to a vessel navigating the high seas?

It is supposed that it cannot be so communicated; because the ocean being common to all nations, no absolute sovereignty can be acquired in it: the rights of all are equal, and must necessarily check, limit and restrain each other. The superior right therefore of absolute sovereignty, to protect all property within its own territory, ceases to be superior, when the property is no longer within its own territory, and may be encountered by the opposing acknowledged right of a belligerent power, to seize and confiscate the goods of his enemy. If the belligerent permits the neutral to attempt without hazard to himself, thus to serve and aid his enemy, yet he does not relinquish the right of defeating that attempt whenever it shall be in his power to defeat it. Thus it is admitted that an armed vessel may stop and search at sea a neutral bottom, and may take out goods, which are contraband of war, without giving cause of offence, or being supposed in any degree to infringe neutral rights. But this practice could not be permitted within the rivers, harbours or other places of a neutral, where its sovereignty was complete. It follows then that the full right of affording protection to all property whatever, within its own territory, which is inherent. in every government, is not transferred to a vessel navigating the high seas. The right of a belligerent over the goods of his enemy within his reach, is as complete, as his right over contraband of war; and it seems a position not easily to be refuted, that a situation that will not protect the one, will not protect the other. A neutral bottom then does not of right, in cases where no compact exists, protect from his enemy the goods of a belligerent power.

To this reasoning, the practice of nations has conformed, and the common understanding of mankind seems to

have assented. Vattel, B. 3. Sect. 115, says positively, "that effects belonging to an enemy, found on board a neutral ship are seizable by the rights of war."

Vattel is believed to be supported by the most approved writers on the same subject. It is deemed unnecessary to multiply citations to this point; because France herself is supposed to have decided it. In her maritime ordonnance of the year 1744, which is considered as having been in force in 1778, enemy goods in neutral bottoms, generally, are declared liable to seizure and confiscation. From the operation of this rule are excepted the vessels of Denmark, and the United Provinces, to whom special treaties secured the exception. In the ordonnance too of the 26th July, 1778, the first article of which is considered as forbidding the cruisers of France to stop and bring into port neutral vessels, having on board the goods of an enemy, a power is reserved to revoke the privilege granted to neutrals by that article, if the enemy should not grant the same privilege within six months from the publication of that regulation. This clearly indicates a conviction, that the exemption from the capture of the goods of an enemy, which should be found on board the vessel of a neutral power, not having stipulated such exemption by treaty, was a privilege granted by the ordonnance, and that the mere revocation of the ordonnance would abolish the privilege, and restore the ancient rule. It will not be contended that France has continued in a long course of practice and of legislation opposed to her own opinion of the law of nations. It must then be considered as the opinion of France, that under that law neutral bottoms afford no protection to the goods of an enemy. This principle, thus admitted to have been established, is supposed by some to have been changed by the armed neutrality. A new law of nations, it is contended, was introduced, by that confederation. But who were the parties to that federation, and what was its object? The northern maritime powers of Europe united to protect by force, in their own bottoms, during the then existing war, the goods of either and of all the belligerent powers. The compact in its own nature was confined with respect to its objects and its duration. It did not purport to change nor could it change permanently and universally the rights of nations not becoming parties to it. It did indeed hold forth the