are both and each, or one or other of you, guilty of the said crimes, or of one or more of them, actors or actor, or art and part: In so far as you, the said William Edgar and John Keith, having, at Glasgow, and in the vicinity thereof, in the course of the months of November and December 1816, and of January and February 1817, wickedly, maliciously, and traitorously conspired and agreed, with other evil disposed persons, to break and disturb the public peace, to change, subvert, and overthrow the government, and to excite, move, and raise insurrection and rebellion, and especially to hold and attend secret meetings for the purpose of obtaining annual Parliaments and universal suffrage, by unlawful and violent means, did, then and there, both and each, or one or other of you, wickedly, maliciously, and traitorously administer, or cause to be administered, or did aid or assist at the administering, to a great number of persons, an oath or engagement, or an obligation in the nature of an oath, in the following terms, or to the following purport."-And then the words of the oath are recited." In awful presence of God, I, A B, do voluntarily swear, That I will persevere in my endeavouring to form a brotherhood of affection amongst Britons of every description, who are considered worthy of confidence; and that I will persevere in my endeavours to obtain for all the people in Great Britain and Ireland, not disqualified by crimes or insanity, the elective franchise, at the age of twenty-one, with free and equal representation, and annual Parliaments; and that I will support the same to the utmost of my power, either by moral or physical strength, as the case may require: And I do further swear, that neither hopes, fears, rewards, or punishments, shall induce me to inform on, or give evidence against, any member or members, collectively or individually, for any act or expression done or made, in or out, in this or similar societies, under the punishment of death, to be inflicted on me by any member or members of such societies. So help me God, and keep me stedfast." And it is said in the indictment, that this oath, or at least an oath of the same purport, was administered.

It is here set forth, that the prisoner at the bar was in the course of committing certain heinous crimes. These crimes, your Lordships will observe, are not laid as a substantive charge against the prisoner; and it is impossible that they should be so laid in this indictment, for a prisoner can be charged with nothing in the minor, but what amounts to the crime laid in the major proposition. It is said, that

the prisoner having committed those crimes, did administer the oath. But those crimes are not laid with a view to inflict punishment on him for them, though perhaps they are stated in modum probationis of another crime. It is incompetent in the minor proposition of the indictment to say that the prisoner is guilty of a felony not charged in the major, in order to punish him for that felony. The charge in this indictment is for administering an unlawful oath; and whatever facts connected with a separate crime are set forth in the minor only, they make no part of the charge against the prisoner at the bar. I trust I shall afterwards shew, though it is not at present the time to make inquiry into this, that however atrocious the crimes here affirmed to have been committed by the prisoner may be, as they are in themselves totally irrelevant to infer the crime with which he is really charged, so at the same time it is incompetent, according to the law of Scotland, to bring any proof of those crimes. This I shall postpone for after consideration, proceeding, in the mean time, to consider the oath which was administered, which is said to purport an obligation on the taker to commit treason.

The oath is in these words:" In awful presence of God, I, A B, do voluntarily swear, That I will persevere in my endeavouring to form a brotherhood of affection amongst Britons of every description, who are considered worthy of confidence; and that I will persevere in my endeavours to obtain for all the people in Great Britain and Ireland, not disqualified by crimes or insanity, the elective franchise, at the age of twenty-one, with free and equal representation, and annual Parliaments; and that I will support the same to the utmost of my power, either by moral or physical strength, as the case may require: And I do further swear, that neither hopes, fears, rewards, or punishments, shall induce me to inform on, or give evidence against, any member or members, collectively or individually, for any act or expression done or made, in or out, in this or similar societies, under the punishment of death, to be inflicted on me by any member or members of such societies. So help me God, and keep me stedfast."—Then it is said, “Which oath or obligation did thus purport or intend to bind the persons taking the same to commit treason, by effecting by physical force the subversion of the established government, laws, and constitution of this kingdom."

Here the prosecutor recites the oath, and says that it purports an obligation on the person taking it to commit

treason, by effecting by physical force the subversion of the established government, laws, and constitution of this kingdom. But it is not enough that the prosecutor says it has that purport. If, on considering the oath itself, your Lordships are of opinion, that it does not imply what the prosecutor alleges, his mere averment that it is an oath of a certain purport will not make it so; and he is not entitled to have that question sent to the Jury, for that would be taking from the Court the question as to the relevancy of the indictment.

Suppose in an indictment for perjury, the prosecutor, after alleging in general terms that this specific offence has been committed, proceeds in the minor proposition to give the deposition of the prisoner in detail, and afterwards to contrast it with what he alleges to be the truth, asserting that there is such a manifest discrepancy as necessarily implies the commission of the crime charged-still his mere assertion on this subject will not be sufficient; and if the Court shall be satisfied, on comparing the alleged truth with the alleged falsehood, that there is not an absolute contradiction between them; in other words, that what the prisoner has sworn may be reconciled with what the prosecutor says he ought to have sworn, you will not hold the indictment to be relevant, nor send the charge to a Jury to be tried. That being the case, if your Lordships, on reading this oath, be of opinion, that it does not purport what the public prosecutor says it purports, then I say this is an irrelevant libel. It is true that, besides the word " purporting," there is another word used here, "intending." What is the signification of the word intending I shall afterwards consider, and it is of material importance to this case; but let us see, in the first place, what is the signification of the term purport. This term, as every body knows, is applied to denote the meaning of words as gathered from the words themselves the meaning as expressed in contradistinction to the meaning which may be conjectured from extrinsic facts or circumstances. Look then at the words of the oath, and see if it purports what the prosecutor says it does. No man who reads it can say so. The words of the oath are, "I will persevere in my endeavouring to form a brotherhood of affection amongst Britons of every description, who are considered worthy of confidence." Nobody will pretend to say that there is an obligation to commit treason here. There is an obligation to form a brotherhood of affection. All the subjects of this country are brothers; and it is becoming that they should dwell together in

unity. This cannot purport any thing to be done that is improper. The oath then goes on, "That I will persevere in my endeavours to obtain for all the people of Great Britain and Ireland, not disqualified by crimes or insanity, the elective franchise, at the age of twenty-one, with free and equal representation, and annual Parliaments." There are few persons at present, who are qualified, either from their natural parts or information, to judge of subjects of this kind, who will be of opinion that either annual Parliaments or universal suffrage would be of advantage to the inhabitants of this country, or would conduce to any thing else than anarchy in the first instance, and despotism in the end. But although this is true, it is well known to your Lordships, that it is the privilege of every subject in this country, to form his own opinion on subjects of a political nature; and having formed his opinion, he may make use of lawful means to have such changes produced in the constitution or government of the country as he may think expedient. The Legislature has at different times altered the duration of Parliament and the mode of suffrage; and if any person believes that annual Parliaments and universal suffrage would be of benefit to the country, it is no crime to use lawful endeavours to obtain these objects, which can only be obtained lawfully by an act of the British Parliament itself; and you know, that petitions for such objects are daily presented to Parliament, and daily received.

It is said in the oath, "I will persevere" in these endeavours. If the endeavours are lawful, the persevering in them is no crime at all. It is not said in the oath, or in any part of the indictment, that the prisoner was engaged in unlawful projects for these purposes. It is said, indeed, in the indictment, that the persons who administered the oath were engaged in a treasonable conspiracy; but there is no specification of circumstances to evince the prisoner's accession to this conspiracy, nor is the offence of conspiracy any part of the substantive charge made against him in the indictment. That being the case, the oath or obligation to endeavour to obtain annual Parliaments and universal suffrage, is an obligation in itself perfectly innocent. Your Lordships will not say that these endeavours are unlawful, nor will you impute improper motives to the party in prosecuting them, for you are not authorized to make such an intendment. When a person promises to use every endeavour to accomplish an object, the generality of this expression will never extend it to unlawful endeavours,—it must

be construed with the common and necessary limitation, that he will use every endeavour which he may lawfully use. If this principle of construction were not adopted, the oath of Abjuration itself might be converted into an obligation to commit treason. "I do faithfully promise, to the utmost of my power, to support, maintain, and defend the succession of the Crown," purports, that I will support, maintain, and defend it by lawful means,-but not by unlawful means, not by felony, murder, or treason.

The oath in the indictment then goes on to say, "that I will support the same to the utmost of my power, either by moral or physical strength, as the case may require." Support what? Here is an ambiguity in the oath; and an ambiguity which shews how hazardous it is to admit constructive treasons reared upon words uttered by persons not critically acquainted with the imperfect instrument of language. Interpret this passage any way you chuse, it will not amount to any thing criminal. Even supposing that it binds the party taking the oath to obtain the objects which are specified in it by moral or physical force, what is the result? it is, that lawful objects are to be obtained by lawful measures. No person can be blamed for exerting his utmost efforts under that limitation. Or take the only other construction which can be put upon this clause of the oath, and suppose the party to swear, that he will support annual Parliaments and universal suffrage to the utmost of his power, when these objects shall have been obtained; that he will use his best endeavours to continue and perpetuate these imaginary blessings, when they shall once have been procured for the country. Is this an unlawful obligation? It certainly is not. If lawful objects are obtained in a lawful manner, then it is the duty of good subjects to support and continue them. So that whatever construction you put upon this clause of the oath, whether you suppose it to refer to enterprises for obtaining what does not already exist, or for supporting improvements after they shall be established by law, it is in either case perfectly innocent.-With regard to the terms "moral and physical strength," I may remark, a man may support what is lawful either by the one or the other, and yet be free from blame. The individuals attempting to procure annual Parliaments and universal suftrage, might employ their moral strength for that purpose by using arguments; or their physical strength, for instance, by being despatched with letters and messages, or going about to solicit Members of Parliament for their support. A person may erect hustings, and may keep off the rabble-he