## Collected Papers, Volumen2Robert Aumann's groundbreaking career in game theory has spanned over 35 years. These two volumes provide convenient access to all of his major research—from his doctoral dissertation in 1956 to papers as recent as January 1995. Threaded through all of Aumann's work (symbolized in his thesis on knots) is the study of relationships between different ideas, between different phenomena, and between ideas and phenomena. "When you look closely at one scientific idea," writes Aumann, "you find it hitched to all others. It is these hitches that I have tried to study." The papers are organized in several categories: general, knot theory, decision theory (utility and subjective probability), strategic games, coalitional games, and mathematical methods. Aumann has written an introduction to each of these groups that briefly describes the content and background of each paper, including the motivation and the research process, and relates it to other work in the collection and to work by others. There is also a citation index that allows readers to trace the considerable body of literature which cites Aumann's own work. |

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### Contenido

A Review of Rapoports FightsGames and Debates | 3 |

Von NeumannMorgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games | 5 |

An Interview | 6 |

Report of the Committee on Election Procedures for Fellows with M Bruno | 7 |

F Hahn and A Sen 8 Foreword to A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games | 8 |

A Study in GameTheoretic Modeling | 9 |

Knot Theory 10 Asphericity of Alternating Knots | 10 |

Utility and Subjective Probability 11 The Coefficients in an Allocation Problem with J B Kruskal | 11 |

Values of Markets with a Continuum of Traders | 223 |

Power and Taxes | 257 |

Power and Taxes in a MultiCommodity Economy | 285 |

An Example | 335 |

Voting for Public Goods | 359 |

Values of Markets with Satiation or Fixed Prices | 383 |

Economic Applications of the Shapley Value | 431 |

Endogenous Formation of Links between Players and | 447 |

Assigning Quantitative Values to Qualitative Factors in the Naval Electronics | 12 |

Problem with J B Kruskal 13 Subjective Programming | 13 |

A Correction 15 Measurable Utility and the Measurable Choice Theorem | 15 |

Linearity of Unrestrictedly Transferable Utilities | 16 |

A Definition of Subjective Probability with F J Anscombe | 17 |

Letter from Robert Aumann to Leonard Savage and Letter from Leonard | 18 |

A Discussion of Some Recent Comments | 19 |

Repeated 20 Acceptable Points in General Cooperative nPerson Games | 20 |

Acceptable Points in Games of Perfect Information | 21 |

LongTerm CompetitionA GameTheoretic Analysis with L S Shapley | 22 |

Survey of Repeated Games | 23 |

Cooperation and Bounded Recall with S Sorin | 24 |

Introduction to Some Thoughts on the Theory of Cooperative | 27 |

Some Thoughts on the Minimax Principle with M Maschler | 29 |

Irrationality in Game Theory | 55 |

The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games | 63 |

A Method of Computing the Kernel of nPerson Games | 91 |

Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures | 113 |

GameTheoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from | 135 |

Markets with a Continuum of Traders | 159 |

Disadvantageous Monopolies | 189 |

On the Rate of Convergence of the Core | 205 |

An Axiomatization of the NonTransferable Utility Value | 469 |

Some Difficulties with | 483 |

RothShafer Examples | 507 |

A Reply to Aumann | 523 |

62a NonSymmetric Cardinal Value Allocations by Allen Scafuri | 537 |

A Comment on Scafuri | 541 |

Recent Developments in the Theory of the Shapley Value | 551 |

The Shapley Value | 563 |

Spaces of Measurable Transformations | 577 |

On Choosing a Function at Random | 599 |

Integrals of SetValued Functions | 607 |

An Elementary Proof that Integration Preserves | 619 |

Random Measure Preserving Transformations | 639 |

Orderability | 645 |

BiConvexity and BiMartingales | 653 |

675 | |

712 | |

722 | |

Name Index | 759 |

767 | |

768 | |

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### Términos y frases comunes

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