Collected Papers, Volumen2

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MIT Press, 2000 - 792 páginas
Robert Aumann's groundbreaking career in game theory has spanned over 35 years. These two volumes provide convenient access to all of his major research—from his doctoral dissertation in 1956 to papers as recent as January 1995. Threaded through all of Aumann's work (symbolized in his thesis on knots) is the study of relationships between different ideas, between different phenomena, and between ideas and phenomena. "When you look closely at one scientific idea," writes Aumann, "you find it hitched to all others. It is these hitches that I have tried to study."

The papers are organized in several categories: general, knot theory, decision theory (utility and subjective probability), strategic games, coalitional games, and mathematical methods. Aumann has written an introduction to each of these groups that briefly describes the content and background of each paper, including the motivation and the research process, and relates it to other work in the collection and to work by others. There is also a citation index that allows readers to trace the considerable body of literature which cites Aumann's own work.
 

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Contenido

A Review of Rapoports FightsGames and Debates
3
Von NeumannMorgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games
5
An Interview
6
Report of the Committee on Election Procedures for Fellows with M Bruno
7
F Hahn and A Sen 8 Foreword to A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games
8
A Study in GameTheoretic Modeling
9
Knot Theory 10 Asphericity of Alternating Knots
10
Utility and Subjective Probability 11 The Coefficients in an Allocation Problem with J B Kruskal
11
Values of Markets with a Continuum of Traders
223
Power and Taxes
257
Power and Taxes in a MultiCommodity Economy
285
An Example
335
Voting for Public Goods
359
Values of Markets with Satiation or Fixed Prices
383
Economic Applications of the Shapley Value
431
Endogenous Formation of Links between Players and
447

Assigning Quantitative Values to Qualitative Factors in the Naval Electronics
12
Problem with J B Kruskal 13 Subjective Programming
13
A Correction 15 Measurable Utility and the Measurable Choice Theorem
15
Linearity of Unrestrictedly Transferable Utilities
16
A Definition of Subjective Probability with F J Anscombe
17
Letter from Robert Aumann to Leonard Savage and Letter from Leonard
18
A Discussion of Some Recent Comments
19
Repeated 20 Acceptable Points in General Cooperative nPerson Games
20
Acceptable Points in Games of Perfect Information
21
LongTerm CompetitionA GameTheoretic Analysis with L S Shapley
22
Survey of Repeated Games
23
Cooperation and Bounded Recall with S Sorin
24
Introduction to Some Thoughts on the Theory of Cooperative
27
Some Thoughts on the Minimax Principle with M Maschler
29
Irrationality in Game Theory
55
The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games
63
A Method of Computing the Kernel of nPerson Games
91
Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures
113
GameTheoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from
135
Markets with a Continuum of Traders
159
Disadvantageous Monopolies
189
On the Rate of Convergence of the Core
205
An Axiomatization of the NonTransferable Utility Value
469
Some Difficulties with
483
RothShafer Examples
507
A Reply to Aumann
523
62a NonSymmetric Cardinal Value Allocations by Allen Scafuri
537
A Comment on Scafuri
541
Recent Developments in the Theory of the Shapley Value
551
The Shapley Value
563
Spaces of Measurable Transformations
577
On Choosing a Function at Random
599
Integrals of SetValued Functions
607
An Elementary Proof that Integration Preserves
619
Random Measure Preserving Transformations
639
Orderability
645
BiConvexity and BiMartingales
653
Author Index
675
Rationality and Bounded Rationality
712
Extensive
722
Name Index
759
Subject Index
767
A Characterization of Game Structures of Perfect Information 27 Almost Strictly Competitive Games 28 Mixed and Behavior Strategies in Infinite Ex...
768
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