Collected Papers, Volumen2MIT Press, 2000 - 792 páginas Robert Aumann's career in game theory has spanned over research - from his doctoral dissertation in 1956 to papers as recent as January 1995. Threaded through all of Aumann's work (symbolized in his thesis on knots) is the study of relationships between different ideas, between different phenomena, and between ideas and phenomena. "When you look closely at one scientific idea", writes Aumann, "you find it hitched to all others. It is these hitches that I have tried to study". The papers are organized in several categories: general, knot theory, decision theory (utility and subjective probability), strategic games, coalitional games, and mathematical methods. Aumann has written an introduction to each of these groups that briefly describes the content and background of each paper, including the motivation and the research process, and relates it to other work in the collection and to work by others. There is also a citation index that allows readers to trace the considerable body of literature which cites Aumann's own work. |
Contenido
38 | 3 |
CORE as a Macrocosm of GameTheoretic Research 19671987 | 5 |
An Interview | 6 |
Report of the Committee on Election Procedures for Fellows with M Bruno | 7 |
F Hahn and A Sen 8 Foreword to A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games | 8 |
A Study in GameTheoretic Modeling | 9 |
Knot Theory 10 Asphericity of Alternating Knots | 10 |
Utility and Subjective Probability 11 The Coefficients in an Allocation Problem with J B Kruskal | 11 |
42 | 59 |
43 | 91 |
44 | 109 |
45 | 135 |
51 | 217 |
52 | 257 |
53 | 283 |
54 | 333 |
Assigning Quantitative Values to Qualitative Factors in the Naval Electronics | 12 |
30 | 13 |
A Correction 15 Measurable Utility and the Measurable Choice Theorem | 15 |
Linearity of Unrestrictedly Transferable Utilities | 16 |
A Definition of Subjective Probability with F J Anscombe | 17 |
Letter from Robert Aumann to Leonard Savage and Letter from Leonard | 18 |
A Discussion of Some Recent Comments | 19 |
Repeated 20 Acceptable Points in General Cooperative nPerson Games | 20 |
Acceptable Points in Games of Perfect Information | 21 |
LongTerm CompetitionA GameTheoretic Analysis with L S Shapley | 22 |
Survey of Repeated Games | 23 |
Cooperation and Bounded Recall with S Sorin | 24 |
Rationality and Bounded Rationality | 25 |
Extensive 26 A Characterization of Game Structures of Perfect Information | 26 |
Almost Strictly Competitive Games | 27 |
Mixed and Behavior Strategies in Infinite Extensive Games | 28 |
Some Thoughts on the Minimax Principle with M Maschler | 29 |
Irrationality in Game Theory | 55 |
55 | 339 |
བརྣ | 358 |
57 | 382 |
5555 | 420 |
59 | 447 |
465 | 483 |
63 | 549 |
65 | 573 |
IX | 592 |
70 | 623 |
71 | 639 |
73 | 653 |
| 675 | |
| 677 | |
| 704 | |
| 726 | |
| 734 | |
Términos y frases comunes
agents assume assumption Aumann axioms bargaining set bi-convex Borel bounded cardinal cardinal utilities Chapter characteristic function coalition structure commodity compact competitive allocation competitive equilibrium concave condition continuum of traders convex cooperative games core corresponding defined definition denote differentiable dividend Econometrica economic endowment equal example exists finite follows game G(p Game Theory graph Harsanyi heavyweight Hence income indifference curves integrable intuitive kernel Lemma lightweight linear Math Mathematical measure monotonicity n-person game non-atomic nonnegative NTU game NTU value nucleolus Pareto optimal payoff vector players positive preferences price vector Princeton proof Proposition proved public goods game redistribution result satiation satisfying Section Shapley value side payments solution concept space strategies subset superadditive tax allocation Theory of Games tion trade sets transferable utility utility functions value allocation von Neumann-Morgenstern solution voting game weights yields