somewhat more important. "Donatio," says Fleta, "est quædam institutio quæ ex mera liberalitate, nullo jure cogente, procedit, ut rem a vero ejus possessore ad alium transferatur. Dare autum est rem accipientis facere cum effectu alioquin inutilis erit donatio, cum irritari valeat et revocari." Lib. III, chap. 3. He then proceeds to discuss various kinds of gifts, and says: "Alia perfecta, et alia incepta et non perfecta; ut si donatio lecta fuerit et concessa et homagioum captum ac traditio nondem fuerit subsecuta." Loc. cit.; see also lib. III, chap. 15. In liber III, chapter 7, be discusses the necessar elements of donations, and, amongst other things, the effect of duress on a gift; and here the necessity of delivery is again clearly shown, because, according to Fleta, a promise made without duress followed by delivery under duress is not a valid gift. "Refert tamen," he says, "utrum metus præveniat donationem vel svbsequatur, quia si primo coactus, et per mentum compulsus promisero et postea gratis tradidero, talis metus non excusat; sed si gratis promisero et compulsus tradidero tunc excusat metus." Britton held substantially the same language. In citing him we shall prefer the translation of Mr. Nichols to the Norman French of the original. In his chapter on Gifts (lib. II, chap. 3), he gives a very clear description of the nature of a gift. "A gift," he says, "is an act whereby any thing is voluntarily transferred from the true possessor to another person, with the full intention that the thing shall not return to the donor, and with full intention on the part of the receiver to retain the thing entirely as his own without restoring it to the giver. For the gift cannot be properly made, if the thing given does not so belong to the receiver that the two rights, of property and of possession, are united in his person, so that the gift cannot be revoked by the donor, or made void by another, in whom the lawful property is vested." Pp. 220, 221. And again (lib. II, chap. 3): "Some gifts are complete where both rights unite in the purchaser; others are begun, and not completed; and such titles are bad, as in case of gifts granted whereof no livery of seizin follows." Pp. 225-226. Passages of similar import will be found in liber I, chapter 29, and liber II, chapter 8. The third writer of the age of Edward I. is one of a very different character from Fleta and Britton-we mean Horn, the author of the Mirror of Justices; he attacked the judges and the administration of the law in his days with a vehemence which it is to be hoped was undeserved. But though amongst the one hundred and fiftyfive abusions or abuses of the law which stirred his soul to wrath, some relate to seizin, yet he has nothing to say at variance with his contemporaries on the necessity of delivery; but on the contrary, expressly affirms that "the law requires but three things in contracts: 1. The agreement of the wills. 2. Satisfaction of the donor. 3 Delivery of the possession and gift." Chap. 5, § 1, par. 75. In the reign of Edward IV. a step seems to have been taken in the law relative to

gifts which resulted in this modification; that whereas under the old law a gift of chattels by deed was not good without the delivery of the chattels given, it was now held that the gift by deed was good and operative until dissented from by by the donee. Thus, in Michaelmas Term, 7 Edw. IV. p. 21, fol. 20, it was held by Choke and other justices. that if a man executed a deed of gift on his goods to me that this is good and effectual without delivery made to me, until I disagree to the gift and this ought to be in a court of record. In Hilary Term, 7 Edw. IV. pl. 14, fol. 29, it was alleged by counsel (Catesby and Pigot) that if a man give to me all his goods by a deed, although the deed was not delivered to the donee, nevertheless the gift is good, and if he chooses to take the goods he can justify this by the gift, although notice has not been given to him of the gift; and further, that if the donee commit felony before notice, etc., still the king will have the goods, and although notice may be material, nevertheless when he has notice, this would have relation to the time of the gift, etc. But the court said that such a gift is not good without notice, for a man cannot give his goods to me against my will. An earlier case in the same reign has been cited as bearing on the present question. In Michaelmas Term, 2 Edw. IV. pl. 26, fol. 25, a case arose on trespass of goods, in which Laicon was counsel for the defendant, and the court was engaged in considering the sufficiency of his pleas. In the course of the discussion Laicon put this question, "Suppose I give to you my goods, which are at Everwike, and before that you are seized of them, a stranger takes them away, have you not a wait of trespass against the stranger?" Which he then proceeds to answer: "Yes sir, for by the gift at once the property was in you and the possession by the writ is adjudged in you presently." Danby, the chief justice of the Common Pleas, seems to have assented, apparently on the ground that pleading to such a writ by way of justification would confess the possession of the plaintiff and the taking by the defendant (car la vous pled. vr. matter accord et justif et vous confess prisee hors de son poss.) But immediately after this discussion Laicon found his argument so hopeless (videns opinionem curiæ contra eum) that he seems to have amended his pleadings. This case seems to us of no authority on the point under investigation. What was said was not in discussion of what really passed by the gift, but only of the effect of pleading in preventing the denial of the plaintiff's possession. The question seems to an effectual gift of goods without possession, but there is nothing to show whether the parties to the discussion had in contemplation a gift by deed or not. The cases already referred to which occurred a few years later seem to show that the effect of a deed in passing the property without delivery of the chattel was claiming the attention of the lawyers of that day. Brooke, in his Abridgment ("Tres

pass." 303), cites this case of the 2 Edward IV. and seems to put it upon a somewhat different ground to the Year-Book itself. He says that Danby agreed in Laicon's argument, "for by the gift the property is in him, and then the law adjudges possession, which was not denied, and it seems to be the law, because goods are transitory whilst land is local." We can find no authority for these reasons in the entry which he professes to be abstracting. This case, as explained by Brooke seems to underlie the proposition asserted twice in the case of Hudson v. Hudson, Latch. 214, 263, discussed in 2 Wms. Saunders, 47, 6, a, to illustrate the right of an executor to sue in trover before actual possession. If, it was said, a man in London gives to me his goods in York and another take them I can bring trespass; for property, it was added, draws possession in chattels personal. The court were not considering what gift of chattels did carry the property but only illustrating the proposition that where the property has passed, as by will to the executor, there the law attracts to it possession. This would be perfectly illustrated by the case of chattels in York transferred by deed executed in London. The whole supposition that this case lends any countenance to the notion that chattels can pass without delivery seems to be derived from the silence of the case as to the way in which the gift was made; and this point was not material to the matter under consideration by the court. Moreover, where a legal result could only be produced by a deed our elder law-writers were, we believe less apt to mention the deed than their less technical descendants. One other case in the the reign of Edward IV. must be mentioned. In Michaelmas Term, 21 Edw. IV. pl. 27, fol. 55, it was said by Brian, J., that in detinue of chattels it was a good plea to say that the plaintiff after the bailment gave them to the defendant ane then he could have his law-quod fuit concessum. The case appears to go only to this, that if A, after bailing a chattel to B, then gives it to B, B might defend himself by his suit in an action of detinue. If good law, it seems to establish that delivery first and gift after ward is as effectual as a gift first and delivery afterward. One case in the reign of Henry VII perhaps requires consideration (Hilary Term, 21 Hen. VII. pl. 30, fol. 18). The question seems to have been whether the use of land was presently transferred by a bargain and sale, and in the course of the report the following passage occurs: "If I give to a man my cow or my horse, he may take the one or the other at his election; and the cause is that immediately by the gift the property is in him, and that of the one or the other at his will; but if the case were that I will give to him a horse or a cow in future time, then he cannot take either the one or the other, for then it is in my election to choose which of them I will give him." The case is interesting as the first one which we have found which emphasizes the distinction in gifts between words in the present and in the future tense. But the

passage we have cited appears to have no real weight of authority. It is only part of the argument of the attorney-general, and the argument does not appear tenable; for surely it is open to question whether the gift, even a grant for valuable consideration, of one or other of two things at the election of the donee or grantee, can pass the property in one or other or both of these things immediately and before the election of the grantee. It is further to be observed that the question before the court turned on the doctrine of election; and whether the supposed gift was to be by deed or not is a point on which the report is silent. This silence is the only reason why the passage has been thought by some persons relevant to the present inquiry. It was in the reigns of the early Tudors that the action on the case on indebitatus assumpsit obtained a firm foothold in our law; and the effect of it seems to have been to give a greatly increased importance to merely consensual contracts. It was probably a natural result of this that, in time, the question whether and when property passed by the contract came to depend, in cases in which there was a value consideration, upon the mind and consent of the parties, and that it was thus gradually established that, in the case of bargain and sale of personal chattels, the property passed according to that mind and intention, and a new exception was thus made to the necessity of delivery. This doctrine that property may pass by contract before delivery appears to be comparatively modern. It may, as has been suggested, owe its origin to a doctrine of the civil law that the property was at the risk of the purchaser before it passed from the vendor; but at any rate the point was thought open to argument as late as Elizabeth's reign. See Plowd, 11 b, and see a learned note, 2 Man. & Ry. 566. Flower's Case (which seems to have been decided in 39 Elizabeth [see p. 59] appears to show that the necessity of delivery was then upheld by the court. The case is thus stated by Noy (p. 67): "A borrowed £100 of B and at the day brought it in a bag and cast it upon the table before B, and B said to A, being his nephew, I will not have it, take it you and carry it home again with you. And by the courts that is a good gift by parol, being cast upon the table. For then it was in the possession of B, and A might well wage his law. By the court, otherwise it had been, if A had only offered it to B, for then it was chose in action only, and could not be given without a writing." The court seems to have held that delivery was necessary, but that by the casting of the money on the table it came into the possession of the uncle, and that the nephew taking the money in his uncle's presence and by his direction there was an actual delivery by the uncle to the nephew -so that the nephew might wage his law, i. e., might conscientiously swear that he was not indebted to his uncle. See the case discussed in Douglas v. Douglas ubi sup. In Jenkins' Centuries (3d century case IX) it is said: A gift of anything without a consideration

*

is good; but it is revocable before the delivery to donee of the thing given. Donario perficitur possessione accipientis. This is one of the rules of law❞— a statement made with little reference to the other matters treated of in the case. We know of no other authority exactly to the same effect as this, nor is it stated as having the authority of any judicial decision. Blackstone's discussion of the subject of gifts of chattels is perhaps not so precise as might be desired; but his language does not seem to essentially to differ from the earlier authorities: "A true and proper gift or grant is," he says: "always accompanied with delivery of possession and takes effect immediately. But if the gift does not take effect by delivery of immediate possession, it is then not properly a gift, but a contract; and this man cannot be compelled to perform." Book 2, chap. 30. In 1818, the year Irons v. Smallpiece, ubi sup., was decided, the then master of the rolls, Sir Thomas Plummer, in Hooper v. Goodwin, 1 Sw.485, said: "A gift at law or in equity supposes some act to pass the property: in donations inter vivos ** * if the subject is capable of delivery.” These are, so far as we can find, all the relevant authorities before the decision in Irons v. Smallpiece, though they are not all the authorities that have been cited as relevant. But several that have been relied upon appears to us to have no real bearing on the point at issue. Thus, in Wortes v. Clifton, Roll. 61; Mich., 12 James I, Coke arguendo uses as an illustration of the difference between the civil law and ours-that in the civil law a gift is not good without tradition-but that it is otherwise in our law. Here, for aught that appears, the gift which the learned counsel referred to as good without delivery is a gift by deed. In like manner several authorities which affirm that a gift of chattles may be good without deed and are silent as to delivery (Perkins' Profitable Book "Grant," 57; 2 Shep. Touchs. 227; Comyn dig. "Biens," D. 2) have been cited as if they likewise asserted that a gift was good without delivery—a proposition which they do not affirm, or, as we think, imply. This review of the authorities leads us to conclude that according to the old law, no gift or grant of a chattel was effectual to pass it, whether by parol or by deed, and whether with or without consideration, unless accompanied by delivery; that on that law two exceptions have been grafted, one in the case of deeds, and the other in that of contracts of sale where the intention of the parties is that the property shall pass before delivery; but that, as regards gifts by parol, the old law was in force when Irons v. Smallpiece was decided; that that case therefore correctly declared the existing law; and that it has not been overruled by the decision of Pollock, B, in 1883, or the subsequent case before Cave, J. We are therefore unable in the present case to accept the law on this point as enunciated by Lopes, L. J., in deference to the two latest decisions. But assuming delivery to

be necessary in the case of the gift of an ordinary chattel, two questions would remain for consideration in the present case; the first, whether the undivided fourth part of the horse admits of delivery, or whether on the other hand it is to be regarded as incorporeal and incapable of tradition the other, whether the letter written by Benzon to Yates was either a constructive delivery of this undivided fourth part of the horse, or an act perfecting the gift of this incorporeal part so far as the nature of the subject-matter of the gift admits. On these points we do not think it needful to express any decided opinion because in our judgment what took place between Benzon and Cochrane before Benzon executed the bill of sale to Cochrane constituted the latter a trustee for Moore of one-fourth of the horse Kilworth. Another objection to Cochrane's title was based on the bill of sale, which bore date the 26th of July, 1888, and stated the consideration as a sum of £7,575, then owing by Benzon to Cochrane and of the further sum of £2,425, then paid by Cochrane to Benzon, making togther & sum of £10,000; whereas in fact at the date of the bill of sale Benzon was only indebted to Cochrane on two promissory notes then current and payable respectively in August and September, and for sums amounting together to £3,300. It is said that by an agreement arrived at at the time that this £8,300 due in futuro was to be taken as between the parties as represented by the sum of £7,575; but if so, this agreement should in our opinion have been stated in the bill of sale, and we are therefore of opinion that the document was void as not truly stating the consideration for which it was given. For these reasons we are of opinion that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.

NOTE. The opinion in the principal case contains a careful and thorough review of the English authorities upon the subject of parol gifts of chattels and the necessity of delivery in order to complete the gift, and the writer proposes in this note to review the American authorities upon the same subject.

There is less apparent conflict among the American cases upon this subject than there seems to be among the English cases. The general rule is well settled that to constitute a valid parol gift of chattels there must be actual or constructive delivery, so as to confer the right of enjoyment in præsenti. As said by Mr. Schouler, "The general rule is to require the utmost delivery of which the thing is capable." The delivery need not be simultaneous with the words of

1 Bennett v. Cook, 27 Cent. L. J. 90, and note 92; Gano v. Fisk, Cent. L. J. 299, and note; "The Recent Law of Gifts," 28 Cent. L. J. 400; "Gifts Inter Vivos," 19 Cent. L. J. 422; Sanborn v. Goodline, 28 N. H. 48, 59 Am. Dec. 398; Dole v. Lincoln, 31 Me. 428; Young v. Young, 80 N. Y. 422, 36 Am. Rep. 634; Brantley v. Cameron, 78 Ala. 72; Nolen v. Harden, 43 Ark. 307, 51 Am. Rep. 563; Taylor v. Staples, 8 R. I. 170; Spencer v. Vance, 57 Mo. 427; Vogel v. Gast, 20 Mo. App. 104; Brewer v. Harvey, 72 N. Car. 176; Schick v. Grote, 7 Atl. Rep. 852; Smith v. Ferguson, 90 Ind. 229; Bedell v. Carll, 33 N. Y. 581; Coleman v. Parker, 114 Mass. 330.

22 Sch. Pers. Prop. § 75. See also Woodruff v. Cook, 25 Barb. 505; Hatch v. Atkinson, 56 Me. 324; 3 Wait Act. & Def. 505.

the gift, but may either precede or follow them. Nor is it necessary that the delivery should be made directly to the donee, for it may be made to a third person for him. It was, however, held in a recent case by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin that when an agent has been instructed to collect certain rents belonging to his principal and pay them to another, who has no notice of the instruction, and the rents when collected are not paid to him, the property in the money does not pass to such third person. Where the donee is already in possession, manual or visible delivery is not generally required. So, where the chattels or things given are so bulky or so situated that they cannot well be moved or taken in hand, actual manual delivery may be dispensed with.7 Delivery may also be made, in certain cases, symbolically, as by turning over to the donee the key of a chest or warehouse where the goods are situated.8

Illustrative cases showing what has been held suffi cient to constitute a delivery within the general rule will be found in the note to the case of Bennett v. Cook, reported in a former volume of this JOURNAL.9 There are other cases, however, which are so close to the border line that they seem to infringe upon the general rule requiring delivery, if, indeed they do not violate it. The rest of this note will be devoted to a consideration of those cases. Where one in his own house in the presence of witnesses, gave his son a carriage which was at the time locked up in a building on the same farm, it was held that the delivery was sufficient to complete the gift. So, when a father procured a certain brand with which he branded cattle in the name of his child, under circumstances showing an intention to give them to the child, the gift was held valid. In another case a father, intending to make his son a gift, executed and delivered to him a receipt for a portion of a debt secured by mortage against the son, this was held a valid gift, although no indorsement was ever made upon the mortgage.12 A slave owner gave to her sister a negro girl, saying to the girl, in the sister's presence, "There is your mistress; you must be a good girl and obedient to her," and this was held a sufficient delivery.13 It is held by the Supreme Court of Michigan that an executed gift of furniture from a mother to a son

3 Carradine v. Carradine, 58 Miss. 286, 38 Am. Rep. 287. 4 Devol v. Dye, 123 Ind. 322; Beals v. Cooley, 59 Cal. 665; Hill v. Stevenson, 53 Me. 364, 18 Am. Rep. 231; Meriwether v. Morrison, 78 Ky. 572; Gilman v. McArdle, 99 N. Y. 451.

5 Wells v. Collins, 74 Wis. 341, 43 N. W. Rep. 160. See also Sessions v. Moseley, 4 Cush. 87; Dickeschild v. Ex. change Bank, 28 W. Va. 340. Compare Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134.

6 Tenbrook v. Brown, 17 Ind. 410; Wing v. Merchant, 57 Me. 383; Ross v. Draper, 55 Vt. 404, 45 Am. Rep. 624, and note; Bennett v. Cook, 27 Cent. L. J. 90, and note. 7 Nolen v. Harden, 43 Ark. 307, 51 Am. Rep. 563, 564; Boyan v. Finlay, 19 La. Ann. 94; Allen v. Cowan, 23 N. Y. 502; Kellogg v. Adams, 51 Wis. 138; Tierney v. Corbett, 2 Mackey (D. C.), 264.

8 Marsh v. Fuller, 18 N. H. 360; Noble v. Smith, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 52; Hunter v. Hnuter, 19 Barb. 631; Stephenson v. King, 81 Ky. 425, 50 Am. Rep. 172. Contra Hatch v. Atkinson, 56 Me. 324, 96 Am. Dec. 364.

9 Bennett v. Cook, 27 Cent. L. J. 90, note on page 92. 10 Fletcher v. Fletcher, 55 Vt. 325. See also Ross v. Draper, 55 Vt. 404, 45 Am. Rep. 624. See also Poullaín v. Poullain (Ga.), 4 S. E. Rep. 81.

11 Hillebrant v. Brewer, 6 Tex. 45.

12 Carpenter v. Soule, 88 N. Y. 251, 42 Am. Rep. 248. Compare Brunn v. Schuett, 59 Wis. 260.

13 Waring v. Edmunds, 11 Md. 424.

may be inferred from evidence of declarations of such an intent on her part, and the remaining of the son in her house where the furniture was placed until her death.14 Other courts have made similar rulings under like circumstances.15 But it was held in Iowa, where a piano, which had been given to the plaintiff by her grandmother, remained in the house of the latter, that, although the plaintiff used it, the gift was not accompanied by such delivery as would enable the plaintiff to maintain an action of replevin for the piano after it had passed into the hands of a third person.16 In Louisiana it is held, under a peculiar provision of the civil code of that State, that a donation inter vivos, duly accepted by the donee, need not be accompanied by actual delivery.17 In Connecticut, in a case where a wealthy and childless widow desposited a sum of money in her own name as trustee for the child of a friend, and soon afterwards told the child's parents of her act and spoke of the money as belonging to him, although she afterwards drew out the money for her own use, and died leaving a will in which no mention was made of the child or the desposit, it was held that the deposit was a completed gift and that the depositor could not revoke it.18 The presumption of a gift between husband and wife or parent and chlid is said to be stronger than between strangers.19 And after the gift is completed by delivery it is not necessary that the donee should retain possession of the property,20 although in case of a gift causa mortis, it has been held that if the property again comes into the possession of the donor the presumption is that the gift was revoked.21

W. F. ELLIOTT.

14 Harris v. Hopkins, 43 Mich. 272, 38 Am. Rep. 180. 15 Allen v. Cowan, 23 N. Y. 502; Ross v. Draper, 55 Vt. 404, 45 Am. Rep. 624.

16 Willey v. Backus, 52 Ia. 401.

17 Rauxet v. Rauxet, 38 La. Ann. 669.

18 Minor v. Rogers, 40 Conn. 512, 16 Am. Rep. 69. For other cases of gifts by depositing money, opening accounts, etc., in the name of or as trustee for another. See Millspaugh v. Putnam 16 Abbott's Pr. 380; Gardner v. Merritt, 32 Md. 78; Howard v. Savings Bank, 40 Vt. 597; Hill v. Stevenson, 63 Me. 364; Eastman v. Woronoso Savings Bank, 136 Mass. 208; Alger v. North End Savings Bank, 146 Mass. 418; Smith v. Bank (N. H.), 9 Atl. Rep. 792. Compare Burton v. Bridgeport Savings Bank, 52 Conn. 398; Brabrook v. Boston, etc. Bank, 104 Mass. 228; Taylor v. Henry, 48 Md. 550; Curry v. Powers, 70 N. Y. 212; Schick v. Grote, 47 N. J. Eq. 352. See also note to Bennett v. Cook, 27 Cent. L. J. 90, 92.

19 McClure v. Lancaster, 24 S. Car. 273, 58 Am. Rep. 259. See also Love v. Francis, 5 West. Rep. 758; Brown v. Brown, 40 Hun, 418; Nichols v. Edwards, 16 Pick. 62; Hollowell v. Skinner. 4 Ired. (N. Car.) L. 165; Betts v. Francis, 30 N. J. L. 152; Cerney v. Pawlot, 66 Wis. 262; Martrich v. Linfield, 21 Pick. 325; Harris v. Hopkins, 43 Mich. 272, 38 Am. Rep. 180; Kellogg v. Adams, 51 Wis. 138, 37 Am. Rep. 815.

20 Whitford v. Horn, 18 Kan. 455; Ector v. Welch, 29 Ga. 554; Ivey v. Owens, 28 Ala. 641.

21 Cutting v. Gilman, 41 N. H. 147; Emery v. Clough, 63 N. H. 552. See also McCord v. McCord, 77 Mo. 166.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FRAUD ON ITS CIVIL SIDE. By Melville M. Bigelow, Ph.D., Harvard. Volume II. Boston: Little, Brown & Company. 1890.

The present volume is the second of a series of which the first volume, which appeared in 1888, treated of

can

constructive fraud, deceit etc. The volume now at hand is in effect a new edition of a smaller work by Mr. Bigelow, published in 1877. While the first volume treats of the subject of deceit or what Mr. Bigelow practically calls "deception," the volume now at hand treats of what he terms "circumvention." He divides fraud on its civil side into two parts. In the one, the person defrauded and the person defrauding have been dealing with each other; that part is "deception" or actual deceit. In the other they have not been dealing with each other and that part he calls "circumvention" which is practically the subject of this book. He says in the preface that under the head of circumvention, all except special cases turning upon peculiar statutes or upon peculiar circumstances may be summed up in the statement that personal intention to defraud is necessary only when the party complaining of fraud, canno 1make out his case by any external act or conduct. the transaction is innocent on the external facts which brought it into existence and constitute it, nothing, it is obvious, can be done unless the complaining party prove that it was founded in personal intention to defraud. Whether the definition of the subject of fraud, as given by Mr. Bigelow, is or is not correct and whether the subject is logically susceptible of division into the two classes as divided by him matters little, provided the treatment of each subject is complete and satisfactory. The first chapter of the book will engross the reader's attention on account of the novel treatment of the subject of what constitutes circumvention, the sum and substance of which is, that fraud consists in endeavor to alter rights by deception touching motives or by circumvention not touching motives. Deception here consists in endeavor to alter rights by creating wrongfully a false impression upon one's mind in a matter in which the one deceived is a party with the wrong-doer. Circumvention consists in endeavor to alter rights by wrongfully evading the law in a matter in which the person to be wronged is not a party. Under the head of circumvention is treated, first, the evasion of law under the statutes of Elizabeth; second, evasion of law by preference, bankruptcy laws; third, evasion of process; fourth, evasion of law in other ways. Beyond the novelty of its treatment the book will be found of great interest as comprehending the distinctive law and decisions upon the subject of fraud on its civil side. In reading it one cannot but be struck with the completeness of the work and the tendency of the author to enter into the discussion of cases and questions minutely and discriminatingly.

THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW, Compiled under the Editorial Supervision of John Houston Merrill, Late Editor of the American and English Railroad Cases, and the American and English Corporation Cases. Vols. XII. and XIII. Northport, Long Island, N. Y.: Edward Thompson Company, Law Publishers. 1890.

Each volume of this series, as it comes to us, gives additional evidence of its thoroughness and accuracy. Volume 12 contains nearly two hundred pages upon the subjects of judgments and judicial sales-almost a law book in itself, a well considered paper on the subject of jurisdiction, a thorough review of the authorities and the law upon the subjects of justice of the peace, landlord and tenant, larceny, and lease. Volume 13 treats very fully upon the subject of legacies and devises, libel and slander, license, lease, life insurance, limitation of actions, lis pendens, livery stable keepers, logs and lumber, lost papers, and lot

teries. As we have frequently remarked, the series is Invaluable to the practitioner, especially those with. out access to a large law library; and even with a large law library at hand the ability, on a moment's notice, to gather the authorities upon questions suddenly presented serves to demonstrate the general value of the series.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

THE AMERICAN STATE REPORTS, Containing the Cases of General Value and Authority, Subsequent to Those Contained in the "American Decisions" and the "American Reports," Decided in the Courts of Last Resort of the Several States, Selected, Reported, and Annotated By A. C. Freeman and the Associate Editors of the "American Decisions." Vol. 15. San Francisco: Bancroft-Whitney Company, Law Publishers and Law Booksellers. 1890.

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, Its History and Influence in Our Constitutional System. By Westel W. Willoughby, Fellow in History, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1890.

THE GREEN BAG, a Useless but Entertaining Magazine for Lawyers, Edited by Horace W. Fuller. Vol. II, Covering the Year 1890. Boston Book Company, Boston, Mass

THE AMERICAN DIGEST, Annual, (1890.) Being Vol. 4, of the United States Digest, Third Series Annual, also, the Complete Digest for 1890. A Digest of all the Decision of the United States Supreme Court, all the United States Circuit and District Courts, the Courts of Last Resort of all the States and Territories, and the Intermediate Courts of New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois and Missouri, the U. S. Court of Claims, Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, etc., as Reported in the National Reporter System and Elsewhere, from January 1, to September 1, 1890. With Note of English Cases, Memoranda, of Statutes, Annotations in Legal Periodicals, etc., a Table of the cases Digested, and a Table of Cases Overruled, Criticised, Followed, Distinguished, etc., During the Year. References to the "State Reports" Given by an Improved Method of Topical Citation. Prepared and Edited by the Editorial Staff of the National Reporter System. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., New York; Digest Publishing Co., 1890.