telegraph company the right to erect telegraph poles and wires in the streets without first making compensation to abutting owners. Cooper, J., says:

There is some conflict in the authorities, but the decided weight is to the effect that telegraph lines form no part of the equipment of a public street, but are foreign to its use, and that where the abutting owner is the owner of the fee to the center of the street he is entitled to additional compensation for the additional burden placed upon his land. Lewis Em. Dom., § 131, citing Telegraph Co. v. Barnett, 107 Ill. 507; Dusenbury v. Telegraph Co., 11 Abb. N. C. 440; Metropolitan Tel. Co. v. Colwell Lead Co., 50 N. Y. Super. Ct. 488; Tiffany v. Illuminating Co., 51 Id. 280; Broome v. Telegraph Co., 42 N. J. Eq. 141. Contra, Hewett v. Telegraph Co., 4 Mackey, 424; Pierce, v. Drew, 136 Mass. 75; Building Assn. v. Bell Tel. Co., 88 Mo. 258. Though the question was not involved in the decision of the case then before the court, Arnold, C. J., in Theobold v. Railway Co., 6 South. Rep. 230, stated, in delivering the opinion of the court, that there was no difference in right in cases where the owner of the abutting land owned the fee to the center of the street, and those in which the fee was in the public. To that declaration, and upon the authorities there cited, we now give the force of decision. It follows that it was not competent for the city of Vicksburg, by the action of its municipal authorities, to authorize the erection of the telegraph wires by the telegraph company, to the injury of appellant, without having first made compensation to him for the injury inflicted upon him. The authority granted by the municipality will protect the company in its interference with the rights of the public, which is represented by the local authorities; but it cannot operate to withdraw from the appellant his right of property, and confer it upon the company. That right is secured by constitutional provision, and can only be secured by the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and upon due compensation being first made.

ATTACHMENT-MONEY IN HANDS OF OFFICERS TAKEN FROM PRISONER.-The question in the case of Ex parte Hurn, 9 South. Rep. 515, decided by the Supreme Court of Alabama, is of novel interest. It is there held that money taken by an officer from the person of a prisoner arrested in good faith is subject to garnishment or attachment in the hands of the officer, under Code Ala. § 2950, permitting sequestered property to be garnished or attached while in the hands of the officer; but, in order to be valid, the levy must not be procured by fraud or trickery on the part of the creditor or officer, and the money or thing taken from the prisoner must be connected with the offense charged, or necessary as evidence on the trial; otherwise the officer has no right to take it from the prisoner, and, if taken, it cannot be attached.

From the long and very learned opinion of Coleman, J., we extract the following:

It is the law that the levy of an attachment procured by trickery, fraud, or trespass will be held to be invalid, and the officer who makes a levy by such means exposes himself to an action in damages. Wap. Attachm. 180. An officer cannot forcibly take property from the person of a defendant, and if a levy is effected by force, fraud, or violence of any kind, it is generally held void. 1 Wade, Attachm. § 130; Mack v. Parks, 8 Gray, 517; Folmar v. Copeland, 57 Ala. 588; Street v. Sinclair, 71 Ala. 110. In Drake on Attachment (section 506) it is said: "An officer, under criminal process against a person, arrested and took from him money and property found in his possession. The officer was summoned to answer as garnishee of the prisoner. It was held that the officer was exempt from garnishment." The text here quoted from Drake on Attachment refers to two decisions from Massachusetts; Robinson v. Howard, 7 Cush. 257, and Morris v. Penniman, 14 Gray, 220. An examination of these decisions shows that they were based upon a statute of the State which provided that no person should be adjudged a trustee "by reason of any money in his hands as a public officer, and for which he is accountable to the defendant as such officer." In another section of the Massachusetts Code it is declared that money collected by the sheriff by force of legal process in favor of the defendant in the trustee process could not be reached by trustee proceedings. These statutes have been brought forward, and may be found in the Massachusetts Statutes of 1882, (page 1055). The case of Zurcher v. Magee, 2 Ala. 253, is to the same effect as the Massachusetts decisions holding money in the hands of the sheriff, collected by him, to be" in the custody of the law. " Since the decision in 2 Ala., supra, was rendered, the law has been changed by statute, (Code 1886, § 2950,) and now money in the hands of the sheriff or other officer may be attached, and as was held in Pruitt v. Armstrong, 56 Ala. 310, the law as declared in 2 Ala. no longer prevails. The law as cited from Drake, supra, and the cases from Massachusetts, being based upon a statute of that State different from the statute of this State, cannot be regarded as authority upon the question.

The case of Closson v. Morrison, 47 N. H. 483, is very much in point. In that case the deputy-sheriff, having arrested the plaintiff on a complaint for larceny, searched him, and took from his person a watch and chain and money; and on the next day, while this money was in his possession, it was attached by the party who had made the criminal charge, and also by another creditor. The New Hampshire statute provides that "any officer who shall find any implement, article, or thing, kept, used, or designed to be used in violation of law, or in the commission of any offense, in the possession of or belonging to any person arrested, or liable to be arrested, for such offense or violation of law, shall bring such implement, article or thing before the justice or court having jurisdiction of the offense, who shall make such order respecting their custody or destruction as justice may require." The court held that a due regard for his own safety on the part of the officer, and also for the public safety, would justify a search and seizure of any deadly weapon he might find upon the prisoner, and hold them until he was discharged, or otherwise properly disposed of, and further held the sheriff might seize any money or other articles of value found upon the prisoner, by means of which, if

Co

left in his possession, he might procure his escape, or obtain tools or implements or weapons with which to effect his escape. The court further held that the validity of the attachment depended upon the bona fides or mala fides of the search and seizure of the property; that, if this was done in order to effect a levy, it would be invalid; but if done with a due regard to the public safety, and to secure the safety of the prisoner only then the separation of the property from the person of the defendant was lawful, and it would then be subject to attachment as property not found npon the person. Whether it was bona fide or not was a question for the jury, under all the evidence. In the case of Spalding v. Preston, 21 Vt. 9, the sheriff arrested one Russell on a charge of counterfeiting, and took from his person a lot of German silver, and held it under the order of the State attorney. He was sued by one Preston who claimed to be the owner of the property by purchase. The court (Redfield, J.) held that the sheriff was not liable for a trespass. Much ia said in this opinion not applicable to the case at bar, and is cited as an authority as to the right and duty of the sheriff to search and take from a prisoner property found on his person. In Waples on Attachment and Garnishment (page 181) the principle is laid down that, if the plaintiff in attachment is not an instigator or worker with the officer in obtaining an unauthorized and illegal levy, he ought not to lose the benefit of an attachment, and that the circumstances of each particular case must determine whether the official wrong-doing was such as to invalidate the levy. In the case of Gile v. Devens, 11 Cush. 61, 62, the court recognized the distinction in cases where unlawful means were used for the purpose of seizing the prop. erty, and the seizure was effected by those means, and in cases where the levy was in no way connected with or effected through the unlawful act of the officer. In Hitchcock v. Holmes, 43 Conn. 528, the court recognized the rule that a levy could not be effected by a trespass, but held that an officer with a writ of attachment in his possession, who was invited by a servant, not knowing the purpose of the officer in calling, to enter a dwelling-house was lawfully in, and authorized to make a levy upon such household goods as were liable to satisfy the attachment. And see Pomeroy v. Parmalee, 9 Iowa, 140; Reifsnyder v. Lee, 44 Iowa, 101. The principles of law declared in this case are directly applicable to the facts of the present case, but this decision seems to have been materially qualified by a later decision in the same. State in the case of Bank v. McLeod, reported in 65 Iowa, 665, 19 N. W. Rep. 329, and 22 N. W. Rep. 919.

TRADE-MARKS DESCRIPTIVE WORDS "CRAMP CURE."-One point in the case of L. H. Harris Drug Co. v. Stucky, 46 Fed. Rep. 624, decided by the United States Circuit Court, Western District of Pennsylvania, is of especial interest in the law of trade-marks. It is there held that the words "Cramp cure" are descriptive of the purpose and character of the medicine, and cannot, therefore, be appropriated as a trademark by the manufacturers of a remedy for the disease. Reed, J., says:

But conceding for the present that the words

"Cramp cure," are a portion of the trade-mark, as claimed by plaintiff, are they such words as can properly be claimed and used exclusively by the plaintiff as a trade-mark? "The object of a trademark is to indicate, either by its own meaning, or by association, the origin or ownership of the article to which it is applied. If it did not, it would serve no useful purpose, either to the manufacturer or the public; it would afford no protection to either against the sale of a spurious, in place of the genuine article." Manufacturing Co. v. Trainer, 101 U. S. 51. "No one can claim protection for the exclusive use of a trademark or trade-name, which would pratically give him a monopoly in the sale of any goods other than those produced or made by himself. If he could, the public would be injured, rather than protected, for competition would be destroyed. Nor can a generic name, or a name merely descriptive of an article of trade, of its qualities, ingredients, or characteristics, be employed as a trade-mark, and the exclusive use of it be entitled to protection." Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall.311; Lawrence Manuf'g Co. v. Tennessee Manuf'g Co., 138 U. S. 537, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 396. "The general proposition is well established that words which are merely descriptive of the character, qualities, or composition of an article, or of the place where it is manufactured or produced, cannot be monopolized as a trade-mark; and we think the words 'Iron Bitters' so far indicative of the ingredients, characteristics, and purposes of the plaintiff's preparation as to fall within the scope of the decisions." Chemical Co. v. Meyer, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625, 139 U. S. 540. "The general rule is against appropriating mere words as a trademark. An exception is of those indicating origin or ownership, having no reference to use. Words are but symbols. When they are used to signify a fact, or when, with what purpose soever used, they do signify a fact, which others may, by the use of them, express with equal truth, others may have an equal right to them for that purpose." Caswell v. Davis, 58 N. Y. 230. A mere general descriptson, by words in common use, of a kind of article, or of its nature or qualities, cannot, of itself, be the subject of a trade-mark. Gilman v. Hunnewell, 122 Mass. 148. And in that case the court held that the plaintiff could not have a trademark in the descriptive words "Cough remedy." "Cramp" is a common term, well understood to relate to a painful affection of the muscles, and frequently associated with acute disease of the stomach or bowels. Dr. Harris, in his statement filed when the trade-mark was registered, states that the description of goods on which he uses the trade-mark is a medicine for the cure of cramps. In Dunglison's Medical Dictionary, "Cramp" is defined as a "sudden, involuntary, and highly painful contraction of a muscle or muscles. It is most frequently experienced in the lower extremities, and is a common symptom of certain affections, as of colica pictonum and cholera morbus." "Cramp of the stomach" he defines as "a sudden, violent, and most painful affection of the stomach, with sense of constriction in the epigastrium." In a work entitled "Reference Hand-book of Medical Sciences," referred to by defendant's counsel, "cramp" is defined as "a term applied to a painful tonic muscular contraction, of some moments' or minutes' duration. As several of these painful contractions gen erally occur successively, the term 'cramps' is used to designate the disease." The Century Dictionary defines "cramps" as "an involuntary and painful contraction of a muscle; a variety of tonic spasm. Cramp is often associated with constriction and griping pains of the stomach or intestines." When Dr. Harris in

an

his statement described his medicine as intended for the cure of cramps, he evidently used the word "cramps" as a common and well-understood term, relating to a painful disease of the stomach or bowels. The words "Cramp cure" are therefore descriptive of the purpose and character of the medicine, and cannot, under the rulings, be exclusively appropriated by the manufacturer of a remedy for the disease.

DIVORCE-ADULTERY - CONNIVANCE.-The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts hold, in Wilson v. Wilson. 28 N. E. Rep. 167, that the fact that a husband suspects his wife of infidelity, and watches her for the purpose of obtaining proof, and stands by and sees her go with another man, is not sufficient to charge him with a connivance, although he in fact wishes her to commit adultery in order that he may secure a divorce, when he does not throw opportunities in her way. Morton, J., says:

We think, as matter of law, it cannot be said on this state of facts that the libelant was guilty of connivance. It is true that he could have prevented his wife from committing adultery, and did not. On the contrary, he wished she would, that he might have evidence on which he could get a divorce. But he did not make or aid in any way in making the opportunity. He did no overt act, unless keeping still was one, which it clearly was not. It was not a case where he supposed his wife was about to commit adultery for the first time, and where it would have been his duty to have given her the assistance which husband and wife are mutually expected to give to each other. It certainly cannot be held that a husband who sus. pects his wife of infidelity can take no means to ascertain the truth of his suspicions without being deemed guilty of connivance. "There is a manifest destinction," says the Court in Robbins v. Robbins (140 Mass. 531, 5. N. E. Rep., 837), "between the desire and intent of a husband that his wife, whom he believes to be chaste, should commit adultery, and his desire and intent to obtain evidence against his wife, whom he believes already to have committed adultery, and to persist in her adulterous practices whenever she has opportunity." Merely suffering, in a single case, a wife whom he already suspects of having been guilty of adultery, to avail herself to the full extent of an opportunity to indulge her adulterous disposition, which she has arranged without his knowledge, does not constitute connivance on the part of the husband, even though he hopes he may obtain proof which will entitle him to a divorce, and purposely refrains from warning her for that reason. He may properly watch his wife, whom he suspects of adultery, in order to obtain proof of that fact. He may do it with the hope and purpose of getting a divorce, if he obtains sufficient evidence. He must not, however, make opportunities for her, though he may leave her free to follow opportunites which she has herself made. He is not obliged to throw obstacles in her way, but he must not smooth her path to the adulterous bed (2 Bish. Mar. and Div., 5th ed., sec.9; Timmings v. Timmings, 3 Hagg. Ecc. 76; Stone v. Stone, 1 Robb. Ecc. 99-101; Phillips v. Phillips, 10 Jur., 829). The law does not compel a husband to remain always bound to a wife whom he suspects, and

it allows him, as it does other parties who think they are being wronged, reasonable scope in their efforts to discover whether the suspected party is or is not guilty, without themselves being adjudged guilty, of conniving at the crime which they are seeking to detect. Robbins v. Robbins, supra. In a libel for divorce for desertion, the willingness, or even the desire, of the deserted party to be deserted, so long as it is not expressed in conduct or acts to the other party, will not bar a divorce. Ford v. Ford, 143 Mass. 577, 10 N. E. Rep. 474. Of course, as the court says in that case, there is always the difficulty of believing that the desire or willingness did not manifest itself in conduct or acts expressive of it to the other party. But nothing of the sort appears here. In St. Paul v. St. Paul, L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 739, the court held that the neglect of the husband which would justify the court in withholding a decree in his favor, under a statute which provided that the court might do so where the husband was guilty of "such willful neglect or misconduct as * * conduced to the adultery," must be such neglect as conduced to his wife's fall, and not neglect conducing to any particular act of adultery subsequent to her fall. The case of Morrison v. Morrison, 136 Mass. 310, referred to by the libelee, differs from this. In that case the husband, after he had been cautioned to watch his wife, made opportunities for her and her suspected paramour to be together alone, witnessed without objection acts of considerable familiarity between them, said nothing whatever to his wife intimating any disapproval of her conduct, and in other ways acted in such a manner as to induce the adultery for which he was watching.

NUISANCE OBSTRUCTION OF LIGHT INJUNCTION.-In Hay v. Weber, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin hold that the owner of a building who occupies it as a store, cannot enjoin the erection of bay-windows on an adjoining building, extending eighteen. to twenty inches into the street, the damage which may result from the obstruction of the view being too remote and speculative to constitute the basis of a private action. The court says:

Under the settled law of this State, the defendant's ownership of the fee to lot 4, mentioned in the foregoing statement, extended to the center of Main street. Such title, however, was subject and subordinate to the right of the public to use the street for the ordinary purposes of travel. In other words, the primary object of a public street or sidewalk in a city is for public travel. Jochem v. Robinson, 66 Wis. 641, 29 N. W. Rep. 642. It is not to be inferred from this, however, that even the public have a right to require the municipality or abutting lot owner to keep the entire space, within the boundaries of a street, open, free, and safe for travel, but only such portions as have been used by the public for travel. Fitzgerald v. City of Berlin, 94 Wis. 207, 24 N. W. Rep. 879. When the defect or obstruction complained of is wholly outside of such portion so used by the public for travel, and not connected therewith so as to endanger the safety of such travel, there can be no recovery, notwithstanding the same was within the boundary lines of such street. Id.; Elliott, Roads & S. 455. It is undoubtedly true, as suggested

by the learned authors cited, that cities have a wide discretion in determining how much of a highway shall be devoted to the use of horses and vehicles, and how much shall be given to the sidewalks, trees, gutters, and the like. Elliott, Roads & S. 456. Such use is ordinarily regulated by municipal ordinances, as it is conceded was done in Oshkosh. When such use is so regulated, and the abutting owner uses the same in accordance, with such regulations he is not, in the absence of negligence, liable for accidents resulting from such use; and in such case the burden of proof is not upon him to show the necessity of such use. Denby v. Willar, 59 Wis. 240, 18 N. W. Rep. 169. This court has held that an abuttiug lot-owner may construct vaults or other areas under the sidewalk, with openings in the walk, if this is done in such a manner as not to interfere with or endanger public travel. Papworth v. City of Milwaukee, 64 Wis. 389, 25 N. W. Rep. 431. The same rule has been applied by other courts to a structure over a right of way. Sutton v. Groll, 42 N. J. Eq. 213, 5 Atl. Rep. 901; Atkins Bordman, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 457; Gerrish v. Shattuck, 132 Mass. 235. In the case at bar it is not the public, nor a traveler, nor the municipality, that is complaining of the structure in question, but an adjoining lotowner abutting upon the same street. True, the complaint alleges that such bay-windows would obstruct travel upon the sidewalk, but it appears from the affidavits, and is very obvious, that they would not unreasonably obstruct such travel. Besides this question is not here involved. The plaintiff makes no complaint of any injury sustained as a traveler. This being so he is in no position to vicariously redress such public wrongs by private action. We have recently held that, to maintain a private action for a public nuisance, the injury sustained by the plaintiff must be such as not merely differs in degree, but in kind from that which is sustained by the public. Zettel v. City of West Bend.

V.

MARRIAGE AS A CONSIDERATION FOR CONVEYANCE OF LAND.-In Cohen v. Knox, decided by the Supreme Court of California, it was held that a conveyance of land by a father to his daughter, as an inducement to her marriage, would not be set aside at the suit of his creditors, although he was actually insolvent at the time the deed was made, it appearing that the daughter had no knowledge of her father's financial condition. The court said:

This question has been very ably and elaborately discussed by counsel, and a multitude of authorities have been cited. We will not undertake here to review these authorities, but will merely state the conclusions to which they clearly lead. Where one party conveys land to another for a valuable and adequate consideration, the conveyance will be good against the creditors of the grantor, although the latter intended thereby to defraud his creditors, if the grantee had no knowledge of such intent, and was in no way a participant in the fraudulent purpose. Marriage is the highest and most valuable of considerations; and when a conveyance is made upon such consideration, the grantee, if guiltless of fraud herself, is in, at least, as firm and sure a position as if she had paid in money the full value of the property conveyed. It has even

been held that a voluntary conveyance to a daughter, intended as a settlement, and without present reference to her marriage, will become ex post facto valid against creditors and purchasers with only implied notice, if upon the credit of the conveyance a person has been induced to marry her. Marriage being in its nature permanent, and being the most important of all civil relations, the law will not lightly allow the inducements which have led it to be disturbed. And the dowry of a bride, without special proof, is presumed to be an inducement to her marriage. The law does not require a delicate investigation into the quantum of influence which her property has had with with her suitor. A few of the many authorities which establish the principles above stated are the following: (Bump, Fraud. Conv., pp. 305, 306, and cases cited: Wait, Fraud. Conv., sec. 212, and cases cited: Magniac v. Thompson, 7 Pet. 348; Prewit v. Wilson, 103 U. S. 22; Wood v. Jackson, 8 Wend. 9; Herring v. Wickham, 29 Grat. 633; Huston v. Cantril, 11 Leigh, 146, 155; Sterry v. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. 260, 271; Brown v. Carter, 5 Ves. 877, 878; Otis v. Spencer, 102 Ill. 622; Dugan v. Gittings, 43 Amer. Dec. 306.) The case at bar presents a clear field for the application of these principles. It has none of those peculiarities or complications of facts which often make it difficult to determine what rule of law applies. It is a plain case of a conveyance upon the express consideration of marriage, which was the direct and immediate inducement of the marriage, and made, not only without any knowledge of fraud by the grantee, but without any intent to defraud on the part of the grantor. The court was therefore right in uphold. ing the said conveyance against appellant, claiming as a creditor of Bray.

BICYCLE AND VELOCIPEDE LAW.

The United States treasury department had very little trouble in reaching the conclusion that bicycles and velocipedes are "carriages," for the purpose of assessing them with a tariff, and that new and unused bicycles were not personal effects, so as to escape the impost of duty. A recent lexicographer fails to define a bicycle, but describes it as "A modification of the two-wheeled velocipede, consisting essentially in a great increase in the relative size of the driving-wheel, by means of which the body of the rider is brought more nearly over the center of this wheel, and the action of the feet in moving the treadles becomes nearly that of walking." A velocipede is defined in a standard work as "any kind of carriage driven by the feet," and says that the word was

1 Adams' U. S. Tariff (ed. 1890), p. 99.

2 Century Dictionary. The kind of bicycle described in this recent work is going rapidly out of use, and there is no description of the one now supplanting it. The vehicle now most in use is not described in the above quotation.

formerly applied "to bicycles and tricycles."3 The same authority defines a tricycle as "A three-wheeled machine for traveling on the road." In Murray's New English Dictionary a bicycle is defined as "A machine for rapid riding, consisting of a saddle-seat surmounting two wheels, to which the rider communicates motion by means of treadles, a twowheeled velocipede."

In 1880 a man was summoned before the police court of Wandsworth, England, for riding a bicycle between sunset and sunrise without having a light attached to it. He pleaded that his machine was not a bicycle, but a velocipede; but the magistrate said that "if there were two wheels to the machine it was a bicycle."4

5

In Taylor v. Goodwin a question arose concerning a bicycle. A statute made it an offense to furiously drive a carriage on a highway. It appeared that the defendant had been riding a bicycle on a highway at a furious force on the occasion in question. It was objected before the magistrate that a bicycle was not within the provisions of the statute; but the objection was overruled, and the defendant convicted of the charge.

Upon an appeal his counsel argued that a "bicycle" is not a "carriage" within the meaning of the act, nor could it be said to be "driven" in the ordinary sense of the term. Bicycles were unknown when the act was passed. The act, it was argued, referred to carriages drawn by horses or other animals. A person is never said to "drive" a bicycle. The fact that a bicycle has wheels did not make it a carriage. A bath-chair or a wheelbarrow was not a carriage within the act. It was far too wide a construction to hold that every apparatus by which a man is carried was a "carriage." Wheeled skates would be a carriage under such a construction.

In opposition it was said that the words of the statute were "any sort of carriage." The person propelling the bicycle "drives" it. He guides the machine and regulates its force. Such a machine was clearly within the mischief of the act.

The court was of the opinion that the de

3 The Encyclopædia Dictionary.

4 This case has not been reported, because, supposedly, of its insignificance. Referred to in 25 Sol. J. p. 4.

54 Q. B. Div. 228, 48 L. J. M. C. 104, 40 L. T. Rep. 458, 27 W. R. 489.

The

cision of the magistrate was correct. words of the statute were, "if any person riding any horse or beast, or driving any sort of carriage, shall ride or drive the same furiously so as to endanger the life or limb of any passenger." "The expression used," said Justice Mellor, "are wide as possible. It may be that bicycles were unknown at the time when the act passed, but the legislature clearly desired to prohibit the use of any sort of carriage in a manner dangerous to the life or limb of any passenger. The question is, whether a bicycle is a carriage within the meaning of the act. I think the word 'carriage' is large enough to include a machine such as a bicycle which carries the person who gets upon it, and I think that such person may be said to 'drive' it. He guides as well as propels it, and may be said to drive it as an engineer is said to drive an engine. The furious driving of a bicycle is clearly within the meaning of the statute, and seems to me to be within the meaning of the words, giving them a reasonable construction."

6

The case of Williams v. Ellis, is another illustration of statutory construction. A local turnpike act enforced a toll "for every horse, mule or other beast drawing any coach, sociable, chariot, berlin, landau, visa-vis, phaeton, curricle," etc., etc., and "for every carriage of whatever description, and for whatever purpose, which shall be drawn or impelled, or set or kept in motion by steam or other power or agency, then being drawn by any horse or other beast, or beast of draught, 2s." It was sought to charge a bicyclist five shillings toll for passing over the turnpike; but the toll-keeper was convicted and fined for illegally taking toll.

The case of Taylor v. Goodwin was relied upon, but the court held that it was not applicable. "The present act," said the court, "begins with imposing a toll upon particular carriages which are described as, 'or other such carriage,' and then impose a further toll upon 'every carriage of whatever description, and for whatever purpose, impelled by steam or any other power not being that of horses.' The carriages here referred to must be carriage ejusdem genesis with the carriages previously specified. If a bicycle were held lia

65 Q. B. Div. 175, 49 L. J. M. C. 47, 42 L. T. 249, 28 W. R. 416, 44 J. P. 394.