court decided on authority of Robinson's case, 131 Mass. 376, that it had no authority to admit to practice on motion, a woman who presented a certificate of admission to the courts of Washington Territory. In Re Hall, 50 Conn. 131, it was held that, under a statute (Rev. 1875, p. 44, § 29), providing that the superior court "may admit as attorneys such persons as are qualified therefor agreeably to the rules established by the judges of said court," a woman could be legally admitted to practice. The statute in question has come down from 1750, and has been essentially in its present form since 1821. The court holds that the fact that in the revision of 1875 no words of limitation were inserted, but the word "persons" which would include them was used, although at that time women had already begun to occupy a greatly enlarged field of industry and some professional and even public positions, indicated a legislative purpose not to exclude them.

We believe that our English brethren have never imitated our liberality in this matter, although aspiring lady candidates have not been wanting for the examination for solicitors, and for admission as students to the Inns of Court. 14 Gr. L. T. 3, 16 Can. L. J. 161. Nearly twenty years ago this journal in commenting upon the discussion aroused by the admission to practice by the Circuit Court of Rock County, Wis., of Miss Goodell, of Janesville, took substantially the same view of such applications which the courts have finally reached. 1 Cent. L. J. 487. It was there said: "But, seriously, is not this a pretty small thing to make such a flutter about? If any woman of good moral character and qualified by the requisite study, desires to attempt to make a livelihood at the practice of the law, where is the man that is ungenerous enough to object? We may be divided in opinion as to whether that is her proper place, and whether she will succeed; but if that is not her proper place, a few failures on the part of those who attempt to succeed in it will put an end to the whole matter. We think that in some respects mankind and womankind are governed too much; that there is too much repression on the part of those who govern against those who are governed. If any woman thinks she can succeed at law, medicine or divinity, we believe in giving her the fullest liberty to attempt it. Whether that is her proper place is her business and not ours." That such was the prevailing opinion of the times is evident from the fact adverted to in the principal case, that each of the adverse decisions cited was speedily fol. lowed by a statute opening the doors of the profession to women. Stat. Mass. 1882, ch. 139; Rev. St. Ill. ch. 13, § 1; Act Cong. Feby. 15, 1879, 20 U. S. St. 292; Rev. St. Wis. § 2586. The doubt expressed as to the success of women as lawyers has been justified by the event. In many walks in life usually appropriated to men, women have been quite successful. But though for many years women, when qualified, have been freely licensed as lawyers in many States, instances of even moderate success in actual practice at the bar, if not wanting altogether, are certainly not sufficient in number to indicate any special aptitude of mind and physique for arduous labors of the profession. Their want of success is most probably due to a lack of the necessary physical vigor. And as the labor requisite for success at the bar grows greater rather than less, it is more than doubtful whether the world will ever see a really eminent female lawyer.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

APPEARANCE BY COUNSEL BEFORE SOCIETY COMMITTEE. An interesting point came up some time ago as to whether a member of a club, society or association, on being notified to answer charges preferred against him, which, if true, would lead to expulsion, could appear before the trial committee with counsel. The member in question was reinstated by a writ of mandamus on the ground that the charges were indefinite and insufficient. The point, however, as to his right to appear with counsel is, in the opinion of his attorney, still an open one, though the judge in granting the writ seemed to think that no such right existed, as it is statutory or constitutional. In speaking with the attorney in the case, he said: "It is in entire accord with the principles of fairness and justice that no person should be compelled to try a matter so serious to his standing and interests without the aid of trained counsel. In 9 L. A. (Ex.) 194, it is said that no man shall be condemned to consequences resulting from alleged misconduct unheard and without having the opportunity of making his defense. This rule is not confined to the conduct of strictly legal tribunals, but is applicable to every tribunal or body of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences to individuals.' (See also 79 N. Y. 588.) If, then, a man is entitled to a just and fair opportunity to make his defense, why is he not entitled to the aid and assistance of counsel in directing and shaping his defense? I have been unable to find a single case where the accused party was refused the right to appear with counsel to aid him in his defense. In the case of Gebhard v. New York Club, 21 Abb., N. C. 248-252, Hon. Geo. C. Barrett, in his decision, said: 'I may say, however, that my impression favors the plaintiff's contention in this regard, and I should deeply regret to learn that the assistance of counsel has been denied to any man struggling against an accusation involving not only his interests, but his honor, by a respectable and enlightened body of American gentlemen.' The right to appear by counsel has existed, in principle, since life began, and in England for three centuries and upwards; in fact the higher the human race has progressed in civilization, the clearer and stronger has that right appeared and the more firmly has it been held and asserted. The constitution of this State, therefore, when it said that parties might appear by counsel did not bring into existence a new principle, but simply and officially recognized what already existed and which the people then enjoyed.”—Counsellor.

ENGLISH MISREPRESENTATIONS.-For cool premeditated insolence, the English take the lead among nationalities. There is a society in London known as the Howard Association, which meets and reports upon prison systems in that and other parts of the world. The native insolence even shows itself in these reports. As to every country blame is unsparingly distributed, and apparently without the least examination of facts or care for truth. Witness the following from the annual report for 1890: "The American prisons are all, with a solitary exception (at Philadelphia), conducted on the corrupting gangsystem. Their inmates are either kept idle, or are worked on the 'penny-wise and pound-foolish' plan of associated labor. The dietaries and other features of United States jails also tend to increase criminality. In Indiana, recently, a long-sentenced criminal was permitted to keep a stall in the State prison and sell goods to visitors. When his earnings amounted to

$2,000, he eloped with a young lady friend of the gov. enor's. Democratic 'liberty' is carried to such an extreme that arrested murderers, by means of appeals and other legal delays, usually secure a period of from one to two years between their capture and their final disposal. The result is that many of them escape conviction altogether; and only one in twenty-five or thirty, even of those convicted is legally executed. In short, the honest citizen, in the United States, is victimized by the so called 'law,' and by the prison laxity. The results are appalling."

BOOK REVIEWS.

JONES ON CORPORATE BONDS AND MORTGAGES. This work is in fact a new edition, with a new name, being the second edition of "Railroad Securities" which appeared in 1879. In explanation of this change of name the author says: "A charge has been made in the title in order more accurately to indicate the scope of the work; for while a large proportion of the cases cited and commented upon relate to the bonds and mortgages of railroad corporations, all cases relating to other corporate bonds and mortgages have been sought for, cited and commented upon with equal diligence. The work is, in fact, a continuation of the author's work on 'Mortgages of Real Property' and applies the general principles of the law to all mortgages made by corporations." The subject of the work is of modern and constantly growing interest. It treats of the powers of corporations to mortgage their property and franchises, form and construction of corporate mortgages the property covered by railroad mortgages, mortgages of after-acquired property, legal nature of rolling stock of railroads, mortgage bonds of corporations, promissory notes and unsecured bonds of corporations, interest and interest coupons, contracts of guaranty and indorsement, the duties and rights of mortgage trustees, payment and redemption, remedies and jurisdiction of courts for enforcement of corporate securities, foreclosure proceedings under corporate mortgages, the appointment and jurisdiction of receivers, the rights and liabilities of a receiver, receiver's debts and certificates, debts of mortgage trustees in possession, the priority of railroad mortgages not affected by equities arising subsequently, schemes for reorganization affecting the pri 'ority of mortgages, foreclosure sales under corporate mortgages, rights of purchasers at foreclosure sales under corporate mortgages, proceedings in bankruptcy and insolvency against railroad companies.

The complete character of the work may be seen from the above statement of its contents. The text is admirably concise and clear and the citation of authorities exhaustive and accurate.

HUMORS OF THE LAW.

Magistrate "You say you stole the ham because you were hungry. A man can't eat a whole ham, can he?"

Prisoner "Very much to my regret, your Honor, I had not a knife with me; otherwise I should only have taken a slice."-Fliegende Blaetter.

The Court: "Would you believe this man on oath?" Paddy O'Rally: "Not unless he swore he wor lyin', yer honor."-Life.

1. ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL-Substitution of Transferee. Where plaintiff in ejectment, pending the action transfers her interest in the land, and then dies, a motion by her assignee, on notice to defendant alone, to be substituted as plaintiff, should be denied for want of notice to the heirs or devisees of the deceased plaintiff. -Smith v. Harrington, Wyo., 27 Pac. Rep. 803.

2. APPEAL-Not Taken in Time.-The running of the 10 days within which an appeal must be taken under Act Cal. March 16, 1889, in a proceeding to determine the validity of the organization of an irrigation district, and orders for the issuance of bonds, is not affected by the fact that appellants had no notice of the entry of the judgment, since the statute does not require such notice.-Palmdale Irrigation Dist. v. Rathke, Cal., 27 Pac. Rep. 783.

Evidence purport

3. APPEAL-Record-Evidence. ing to have been given on the trial of a case, and certifled to by the official stenographer and by the clerk of the district court to be true and correct, and attached to a transcript brought to the supreme court, forms no part of the record, and cannot be considered unless it is preserved either by a bill of exceptions or case made.-Hopkins v. Hopkins, Kan., 27 Pac. Rep. 822.

4. ATTACHMENT-Evidence. -Under Comp. Laws N. M. § 1923, providing that an attachment may be issued where a debtor is about fraudulently to convey or assign, conceal or dispose of, his property so as to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, it is not a sufficient ground for an attachment that a debtor is about to make an assignment of property, the effect of which will be to delay creditors, where the delay will not be unreasonable, and the debtor is acting in good faith.Torlina v. Trorlicht, N. Mex., 27 Pac. Rep. 794.

5. BENEVOLENT SOCIETIES Rights to Benefits. -A mutual benefit soclety cannot, by amending its by-laws, reduce the amount per week which it has already become liable to pay a member.-Becker v. Berlin Ben. Soc., Penn., 22 Atl. Rep. 699.

6. COUNTY BOARD- Contracts.-Where a contract is entered into between two members of the board of county commissioners on the one side and an individual on the other side, outside of their county, and without any previous authority having been given by the board, and such contract has never been ratified by the board, held, that it is void.- Willis v. Webb, Kan., 27 Pac. Rep. 825.

7. COUNTY BOARD- Contract with Attorney.-A contract made by the board of county commissioners, for the county, with attorneys at law, for their services as such, which services are such as the law requires the county attorney to perform, is ultra vires and vold.— Waters v. Trovillo, Kan., 27 Pac. Rep. 822.

8. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE- Character of Witness. While evidence of a witness' bad character for veracity is admissible, such inquiry must be confined to the character of such witness for truth and veracity.-State v. Eberline, Kan., 27 Pac. Rep. 839. 9. CRIMINAL PRACTICE- Forgery Order of School Trustees.-Pol. Code Cal. § 1543, subd. 3, relating to the duties of the county superintendent of schools, provides that "no requistion shall be drawn up on the or

--

der of the board of trustees against the county fund of any district, except for teachers' salaries, unless such order is accompanied by an itemized bill:" Held that, in a prosecution for the forgery of such an order, it was unnecessary to allege or prove the accompaniment of an itemized bill.-People v. Bibby, Cal., 27 Pac. Rep. 781.

10. DEED Oil well Machinery. — Plaintiff's testator executed a deed in fee-simple covering his entire interest in certain land, and in all the buildings, improvements, and appurtenances thereto. The grantee at the same time, and as part of the same transaction, executed a bond conditioned for the payment of a stated sum after the grantor's death, and for certain proportions of the hay, fruit, and pasture of the land during his life. It also permitted him to operate his oll-wells on the premises without let or hindrance, and to remove at any time, at his own pleasure, any buildings and machinery at the said wells. After removing some of the machinery, the grantor died. The machinery that remained at the other wells was essential to their operation, and was part of the realty. No right of removal was vested in the grantor's executors, or in his heirs or assigns: Held, that the privilege was purely personal, and died with the grantor.-Shields v. Delo, Penn., 22 Atl. Rep. 701.

11. DEED-Ratification of Invalid Delivery.-Where the grantee has surreptitiously obtained possession of a deed duly acknowledged, but never lawfully delivered, such possession and invalid delivery may be ratified by the subsequent acts of the grantor, which show a clear recognition and acquiescence in the grantee's title to the land conveyed by such deed: Held, that the evi dence and special findings of fact in this case show that the grantor ratified the act of the grantee in taking into his possession the deed of June 30, 1876, and that the conclusion of law, as found by the district court, that the grantor did not ratify such possession, is not warranted by the evidence and the special findings of fact.-McNulty v. McMulty, Kan., 27 Pac. Rep. 819.

12. DRUGGISTS-Certificate of Competency.-Act Pa. May 24, 1887, § 6 (P. L. 189), which prohibits any one from engaging "as manager" in the business of an apothe cary or pharmacist without having a certificate of competency and qualification from the State pharmaceutical examining board, does not apply to the owner of a drug store, who employs a duly certified pharmacist to carry on the store as manager.-Commonwealth v. Johnson, Penn., 22 Atl. Rep. 703.

13. ELECTIONS-Registration of Voters.-A slight departure from some directory provision of the act relat ing to the registration of voters in cities, without any fraudulent intent on the part of the officer, and which in its nature and effect cannot injure any one, or operate to interfere with or defeat the purpose of the act, is not punishable as a felony, or within the penalty described in section 15 of the act.-State v. Bush, Kan., 27 Pac. Rep. 834.

14. ELECTIONS AND VOTERS-Legality of Ballots.-The fact that on the back of a ballot, otherwise regular, is a faint type impression of the face of a similar ticket, caused by there having been too much ink on the type, or there is a small piece of red sealing wax, or a stain, as from a drop of oil, does not, in absence of evidence of unlawful intent in causing the impression, make the ballot illegal, within the meaning of Pol. Code Cal. §§ 1206, 1207, which provide that a ballot must be rejected if it bears on the outside any impression, device, color, or thing "designed" to distinguish it from other legal ballots, or "intended" to designate or impart knowledge of the person who voted it.—Rutledge v. Crawford, Cal., 27 Pac. Rep. 779.

15. EMINENT DOMAIN-Elements of Damage.-Plaintiff watered his cattle on the farm of another, across the highway from his own farm. He had, however, no right to the water, or of access thereto, that was not common to the public: Held that, in estimating the damage arising from the taking of a strip of plaintiff's land for the construction of a railroad, interference with plaintiff's access to the watering place was not an ele

ment of damages.-Gorgas v. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., Penn., 22 Atl. Rep. 715.

16. EMINENT DOMAIN-Evidence.-Upon the trial of an appeal from the award of commissioners appointed to condemn a right way for a railroad company along a highway, it is not error for the trial court to instruct the jury that they are not to take into consideration any benefits which might accrue to the plaintiff by reason of any change in the location of such public highway.-Chicago, etc. R. Co v. Woodward, Kan., 27 Pac. Rep. 836.

17. EVIDENCE-Deposition Taken in Another Suit.Where a husband and wife were each injured on a ferry. boat at the same time and by the same cause, the dep. osition of the husband, taken in an action by the wife against the ferry company for the injury to herself, in which he was plaintiff only by reason of being her hus. band, is not admissible in an action by the wife as his administratrix against the company for the injury to him.-Fearn v. West Jersey Ferry Co., Penn., 22 Atl. Rep.

708.

18. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-Agreement not to be Per formed in One Year.-An agreement to render services as a servant girl for another for $100 per year, the services to commence at the date of such agreement, is not within the statute of frauds, (section 6, ch. 43, par. 3166, Gen. St. 1889), as the agreement might have been per. formed within one year.-Aiken v. Nogle, Kan., 27 Pac. Rep. 825.

19. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-Interest in Water-right.An agreement for an undivided interest in a ditch and water right is within Code Civil Proc. Cal. §§ 1971, 1973, declaring that no estate or interest in real estate, other than leaseholds for a year, can be created except by conveyance in writing, and that no agreements other than those which are to be performed within a year can be proved except by some note or memorandum in writing.-Hayes v. Fine, Cal., 27 Pac. Rep. 772.

20. GOOD WILL-Sale.-G & Co., a Paris firm, sold out to plaintiffs their business and good-will in New York, where they had a branch, and authorized plaintiffs to style themselves "G & Co., K & Co., successors:" Held, that the successors of G & Co., in Paris had the right to establish a branch in New York, and advertise as "G & Co., B, V & Co., successors," though they could not hold themselves out as the successors of the business bought by plaintiffs.-Knoedler v. Boussod, U. S. C. C. (N. Y.), 47 Fed. Rep. 465.

21. HOMESTEAD RIGHT OF HUSBAND.-Under Rev. St. Wyo. § 2780, which vests every householder, "being the head of a family," with a homestead right, a husband who, with his family, lives on the wife's land, loses his homestead right therein by permitting his wife and family to separate from him, followed by a divorce in her favor, though he continues to occupy the land, since he is neither the owner of the land, nor the head of a family.- Arp v. Jacobs, Wyo., 27 Pac. Rep. 800.

22. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Gift of Interest.-A bond given by defendant to plaintiffs in trust for defendant's wife provided that payment of interest to the wife should be equivalent to a payment to plaintiffs: Held, that the wife had sole control of the interest, and that the giving up of all claim thereto by her would relieve defendant from liability therefor.- Galt v. Smith, Penn., 22 Atl. Rep. 713.

23. INTOXICATING LIQUORS-Criminal Prosecution.-A count for maintaining a nuisance, under section 13 of the prohibitory law, may be joined in an information with one or more counts charging illegal sales of intox. icating liquors under section 7 of the same law.-State v. McLaughlin, Kan., 27 Pac. Rep. 840.

24. JUDGMENT-Scire Facias-Limitation.-Rev. St. Mo. §§ 6013, 6020, providing that executions may issue upon a judgment at any time within 10 years after its rendition, and that scire facias may be sued out at any time within 10 years to revive a judgment, but that none shall thereafter issue, cannot be construed to authorize scire facias after the time limited, even though a writ

had previously been issued within the time, and returned nulla bona.-Stewart v. Justices of St. Clair County Court, U. S. C. C. (Mo.), 47 Fed. Rep. 482.

25. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Setting Aside Decree.An action to set aside, on the ground of fraud, a decree annulling a deed of trust as fraudulent against the grantor's creditors, if not brought within three years (the statutory period) after rendition of the decree, is barred, and the complaint is demurrable, where plaintiff merely avers that he had no notice of the fraud until after rendition of the decree, without alleging that he discovered the fraud within three years before commencing the suit.-Watkins v. Bryant, Cal., 27 Pac. Rep. 775.

26. MASTER ANd Servant-Wrongful Discharge.-The president and directors of a corporation have the power to bind it by a contract hiring an employee for a year at a fixed yearly salary; and, where such employee is wrongfully discharged during the year, the corporation is liable to him for the salary for his unexpired term of service.-Hand v. Clearfield Consolidated Coal Co., Penn., 22 Atl. Rep. 709.

27. MORTGAGE-Foreclosure. - In an action to foreclose a mortgage based on service by publication only, the affidavit to obtain the same alleged that personal service could not be made upon the defendant within the State, and "that this is an action brought for the recovery of real property under a mortgage situated in said county of Lyon," and it was contended that the affidavit did not sufficiently state the nature of the action: Held, that it is imperfect in this respect, but not so defective as to render a judgment based thereon null and void or subject to a collateral attack.-Shippen v. Kimball, Kan., 27 Pac. Rep. 813.

28. MORTGAGE - Payment and Release.-Plaintiff applied to a trust company for a loan to be secured by a mortgage, and the company procured it from defend. ant. Defendant sent the money to the trust company, but, plaintiff's title not being good, the company refused to pay it over to him, but afterwards paid part of it. The company's business was to negotiate loans for eastern parties, one of whom was defendant, and it collected the interest on loans made for defendant: Held, that the trust company was defendant's agent in making the loan.- Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Jones, Colo., 27 Pac. Rep. 807.

29. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-Defective Streets-Dedication. An incorporated town may be held liable for damages occasioned by a defective street, provided there has been a dedication of the street to public use, and an acceptance of such use by the proper authori ties. Evidence that a street through the main business part of a town is a public thoroughfare, generally traveled, and that the municipal officers having voluntarily assumed to keep the same in repair, is sufficient prima facie to warrant a finding that the street has been duly dedicated and accepted as a public highway.Town of Salida v. McKinna, Colo., 27 Pac. Rep. 810.

30. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-Establishment of Street Grades.-Under Const. Pa. 1873, art. 16, § 8, giving a right of compensation for property injured, but not actually taken, in the construction or enlargement of municipal works, there is no right of action for the establishment on a city plan of a street grade, but the right of action is for the actual cutting of the street to correspond with the grade so established, and therefore the statute begins to run only from such time.-Ogden v. City of Philadelphia, Penn., 22 Atl. Rep. 694.

31. NEGLIGENCE-Driving in Street.-In an action for personal injuries sustained by a child four years old being run over in a public street by one of defendant's teams, evidence showing that defendant's driver was asleep when the accident happened; that the team and wagon were moving down grade at a rapid gait; and that the child, when first discovered, was between the forelegs of the horses, is sufficient to warrant the court in submitting to the jury the question whether defendant's negligence caused the injuries.-Summers v. Bergner & Engel Brewing Co., Penn., 22 Atl. Rep. 707.

33. PUBLIC LAND - Swamp Lands Purchase.-Pol. Code Cal. § 3445, provides that persons desiring to purchase swamp lands which have been segregated by authority of the United States, but which have not been sectionized by the same authority, must apply to the county surveyor to have the desired lands surveyed, and that a certificate of such survey must be attached to the affidavit of purchase: Held, that an application for purchase, not accompanied by such certificate, is invalid.-Maddux v. Brown, Cal., 27 Pac. Rep. 771.

34. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Street Railway Companies. -Where the act incorporating a street railway company provides that it shall be subject to a certain ordinance requiring all passenger railway companies to be at the expense of all necessary paving, repairing, and repaving on any street occupied by it, this condition will, as far as the streets occupied by such company are concerned, be binding on a company formed by the merger of the first and other companies.- City of Philadelphia v. Ridge Ave. Pass. Ry. Co., Penn., 22 Atl. Rep. 695. 35. REPLEVIN-Order of Delivery.-An order of the district court vacating an order of delivery issued in an action of replevin is immediately reviewable in the supreme court; the aggrieved party is not required to await the final determination of the cause in the dis trict court.-Carr v. Huffman, Kan., 27 Pac. Rep. 827.

36. TAXATION-Mortgages and Judgments.-Act Pa. 1879, provides "that all mortgages, money owing by solvent debtors, whether by promissory note, penal or single bill, bond or judgment, also all articles of agreement and accounts bearing interest"" shall be, and are hereby, made taxable, etc. Act. 1889, contains a similar enumeration, but reduces the rate of taxation: and sections 7, 8, which require a record of mortgages and judgments to be certified and filed in the commissioners' office, provide that a daily record shall be kept "of every mortgage or article of agreement given to secure the payment of money," and "of every single bill, bond, judgment, or other instrument securing a debt" so filed as aforesaid: Held, that mortgages and judgments owing by solvent debtors are taxable whether they bear interest or not.County of Perry v. Troutman, Penn., 22 Atl. Rep. 705.

37. TAX TITLES.- A tax sale of unseated or unimproved land as seated or improved is void, and passes no title to the purchaser.-Holloway v. Jones, Penn., 22 Atl. Rep. 710.

38. TRIAL-Stipulation.-Where parties appear, and by stipulation submit their controversy to a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof, they cannot afterwards be heard to question the authority of such tribunal.-Edwards v. Smith, Colo., 27 Pac. Rep. 809.

39. WITNESS-Transactions with Decedent.-In an ac. tion against a limited company for rent on an oral lease, it appeared that plaintiff's grantor had leased part of the premises to company which defendant had succeeded, assuming all its liabilities, and that plaintiff had from time to time leased other parts to it. Defendant's liability depended on whether the lettings were from year to year, as claimed by plaintiff, or from month to month, as claimed by defendant: Held, that a member of the defendant company, who was a member of the company to which the original lease was made, was incompetent to testify to conversations with the original lessor, since deceased, for the purpose of showing that the lease was from month to month.— Arrott Steam-power Mills Co. v. Way Manuf'g Co., Penn., 22 Atl. Rep. 699.

The Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, DECEMBER 4, 1891.

We join with many friends of the American Bar Association in the fervent hope that that eminent organization has for the last time gone through the farce of bestowing medals for "services in advancing the science of jurisprudence or the administration of justice." The practice is not only school-boyish in character and beneath the dignity of the men who compose the American Bar Association, but the giving of such a trinket reflects no additional luster or renown upon the donee. An additional objection may be found in the proceedings of the association at Boston, wherein the report of the committee awarding the medal to the Earl of Selborne was vigorously fought by the friends of David Dudley Field, who felt that the medal should be awarded to him. The storm was however calmed by the awarding of a medal to each of them.

Although the Earl of Selborne is little known, even to the members of the bar in this country, he has undoubtedly rendered services in the direction of law reform which well entitled him to the recognition of the association. As Sir Roundell Palmer he was long known not only as the leader of the chancery bar of England, but as the successful advocate, in the House of Commons, of important measures of law reform, and as a distinguished member of the Commissions on the condition of the law of marriage, on a digest of the laws, on the re-organization of the system of judicature, and on the subjects of naturalization, extradition, and neutrality. He was one of the counsel in the Geneva arbitration, between Great Britain and the United States, in 1871. Twice, while a member of the House of Commons, he proposed, though unsuccessfully, a bill for establishing a university for instruction in jurisprudence. During his first term of office as Lord High Chancellor, he brought forward and carried through the Judicature Act of 1873, by which Great Britain abandoned that system of pleading and procedure which had VOL. 33 No. 23.

been the growth of a thousand years, and substituted for it substantially those methods which had been previously adopted and approved in so many of our American States.

It is a matter of surprise, however, that the committee should have felt it necessary to go to England for one upon whom to confer the honor, when in our own country was a man who has been recognized and known in both countries as the greatest living law reformerDavid Dudley Field. Indeed, a late Lord Chancellor of England so pronounced him, and at a banquet given to Mr. Field in England, Lord Sherbrooke, Chancellor of the Exchequer, said of him that he "would go down to posterity with this glory-that he had not only essentially served one of the greatest countries in the States of America, but that he had also provided a cheap and satisfactory code of law for every colony that bore the English name." It is conceded that the English Judicature Act is the outgrowth of the New York Code, which was substantially the work of Mr. Field, and, as is well known, that system which had for its design the obliteration of the distinction between the forms of action and between legal and equitable suits, has been adopted from New York by many of the States.

are

We

inclined to think that the committee made as much of a mistake in the awarding, as the association in the offering of the medal.

The recent English case of Whitwood Chemical Co. v. Hardman, is an illustration of the rule that a court of equity will not at tempt to enforce the specific performance of a contract for personal service. In this case the defendant had agreed to give, during a specified term, "the whole of his time to the company's business." There was no negative stipulation that he would not during that time engage in any other business or occupation. The action was brought to compel the specific performance of the agreement, and the plaintiffs claimed an injunction to restrain the defendant from setting up any business or entering into any agreement, or making any engagement with any person or company other than the plaintiffs by which the defendant would cease to devote his whole time to the plaintiffs' business, etc.; and the present decision is upon a motion for an in