that the policy shall be void if the premium is not paid within ten days after notice, and it appears that it was the habit of the association to receive payment from the assured, if made within sixty days from the date of the notice, and the certificate remained uncanceled at the death of the assured, it was held that the company was estopped from claiming forfeiture." Where a member has paid sixteen premiums during the time of his membership, seven of which are paid from three to fourteen days subsequent to the time specified, and the last of which is paid fourteen days thereafter, the company is estopped from insisting upon a forfeiture. 45 But where the practice of the company is not to accept overdue payments without full inquiry into the assured's health the company may properly refuse an overdue premium when the assured is in bad health. 46 The question

of waiver is sometimes to be submitted to the jury; however, this should not be done if there is but a mere spark of evidence upon which to base it.48 In a recent Illinois case, defendant was a voluntary beneficial association composed of subordinate lodges. The constitution for the government of subordinate lodges provided that the manner of suspensions for the non-payment of dues and assessments should be detailed in the bylaws of every lodge. The subordinate lodge of which deceased was a member had never adopted a suspension by-law, but it claimed the right to suspend on the ground of custom. The court declared the suspension

44 Odd Fellows' Mut. Aid Ass'n v. Sweetser (Md.), 19 N. E. Rep. 722.

45 Cotton State Life Ins. Co. v. Lester, 62 Ga. 247. See Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co. v. Garmany, 74 Ga. 51; Appleton v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 59 N. H. 541; Thompson v. St. Louis Mut. Ins. Co., 52 Mo. 469, 2 Ins. L. J. 422; Hodsdon v. Guardians' Life Ins. Co., 97 Mass. 144; Currier v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 53 N. H. 538; Heaton v. Manhattan Fire Ins. Co., 7 R. I. 502; Hoffman v. Supreme Council American Legion of Honor, 35 Cal. 252; 2 Herman on Estoppel, § 1214; Buckbee v. U. S. Ins. Co., 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 541; Stylow v. Association, 69 Wis. 224, 19 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 33.

46 Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Girard Life Ins. Co., 100 Pa. St. 172: Nat. Mut. B. Ass'n v. Miller, 85 Ky. 88, 2 S. W. Rep. 900; Crossman v. Mass. Ben. Ass'n, 143 Mass. 435, 9 N. E. Rep. 753.

47 Odd Fellows', etc. Ass'n v. Sweetser (Ind.), 19 N. E. Rep. 722; Crawford County, etc. Co. v. Cochran, 88 Pa. St. 230; Mut. Ins. Co. v. French, 30 Ohio St. 240; United Brethren, etc. Society v. Schwartz (Pa.), 13 Atl. Rep. 769.

48 Elliott v. Lycoming, etc. Co., 66 Pa. St. 22, 26.

illegal; that the constitutional provision was imperative, requiring the lodge to adopt a uniform rule respecting the subject of suspension, and, in the absence of which, the power to pronounce a sentence of suspension could not be exercised. The court also held that the right to suspend on the ground of custom could only be exercised, if it could be exercised at all (which the court denied in the case at bar), where it had been well established, certain, uniform, and operated upon all members alike.49 St. Louis.

EUGENE MCQUILLIN.

49 District Grand Lodge, etc. v. Cohn, 20 Ill. App. (Bradwell) 335.

HIGHWAY-STREET RAILWAY-NUISANCE -

INJUNCTION.

VAN HORNE V. NEWARK PASS. RY. CO.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey, June 1, 1891.

1. Highway-Additional Burden- Street Railway is Not.-A horse-railway in a public street is not an additional servitude, even though the abutter owns the fee to the center of the highway.

2. Street Railway-Nuisance-Injunction.—Where a horse-railway is laid in a highway without authority, it is a public nuisance, but injunction will not lie at the suit of an abutting land owner who suffers no special injury.

MCGILL, Ch.: The complainant, who is the owner of a lot of land abutting on Main street, in the City of Orange, seeks, by injunction, to restrain the defendant from extending its horse-railway through Main street, in front of his land. He insists that he is the owner of the fee of the land in Main street, in front of and adjoining his lot, to the center of the highway; that the defendant is without legislative authority to construct and operate the railway in that street; and that the construction and operation of such railway, over his land in the street, will be an invasion of his property rights which this court will stay by injunction. The defendant does not deny the complainant's ownership of the fee of the land in question, but disputes the insistment that it has not sufficient legislative authority to extend its railway as proposed, and denies that this court will interfere by injunction, even if it should conclude that no authority to extend the railway exists. The conclusion I have reached precludes the necessity of examining the question as to the defendant's authority to extend its road. I will assume, for my present purpose, that it does not possess such authority. The complainant's right to the land in the street is best described in the language of Mr. Justice Depue in his opinion in the case of Improvement Co. v. Hoboken, 36 N. J. Law, 540, in the court of errors and appeals,

where he says: "With respect to lands over which streets have been laid, the ownership, for all substantial purposes, is in the public. Nothing remains in the original proprietor but the naked fee, which, on the assertion of the public right, is divested of all beneficial interest." In Halsey v. Railway Co. (N. J.), 20 Atl. Rep. 859, Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet said: "Lands taken for streets are taken for all time, and, if taken upon compensation, compensation is made to the owner once for all. His compensation is awarded upon the basis that he is to be deprived perpetually of his lands. The lands are acquired for the purpose of providing a means of free passage, common to all the people, and consequently may be rightfully used in any way that will subserve that purpose. By the taking the public acquire a right of free passage over every part of the land, not only by the means in use when the lands were taken, but by such other means as the improvements of age and new wants arising out of an increase in population or an enlargement of business may render necessary." It is subject to the servitude thus described that the complainant owns the land now about to be invaded. In Railroad Co. v. Newark, 10 N. J. Eq. 358, Chancellor Williamson, speaking of the burden of a railroad in a highway, says: "The easement of the highway is in the public, although the fee is technically in the adjacent owner. It is the easement only which is appropriated, and no right or title of the owner interfered with." Following this case is that of Hinchman v. Railroad Co., 17 N. J. Eq. 75, in which Chancellor Green described the burden of horse-railroads upon highways as follows: "They are ordinarily, as in this case, required to be laid level with the surface of the street, in conformity with existing grades. No excavations or embankments to affect the land are authorized or permitted. The use of the road is nearly identical with that of the ordinary highway. The motive power is the same. The noise and jarring of the street by the cars is not greater, and ordinarily less, than that produced by omnibuses and other vehicles in ordinary use. Admit that the nature of the use, as respects the traveling public, is somewhat variant, but how does it prejudice the landholder? Is his property taken? Are his rights as land-holder affected? Does it interfere with the use of his property any more than an ordinary highway?" It is now established beyond question in this State that a horse-railway does not impose a servitude additional to the public easement upon the land in a highway. Hinchman v. Railroad Co., supra; Jersey City & B. R. Co. v. Hoboken H. R. Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 61; Railroad Co. v. Paterson, 24 N. J. Eq. 158; State v. Laverack, 34 N. J. Law, 201; Stoudinger v. Newark, 28 N. J. Eq. 187; Halsey v. Railway Co. (N. J.), 20 Atl. Rep. 859. A notable authority, here in point, is the case of Citizens' Coach Co. v. Camden Horse R. Co., 33 N. J. Eq. 267, where Mr. Justice Magie, in pronouncing the opinion of the

court of errors and appeals, distinguishes the burden imposed by a horse-railroad upon a highway from the burden imposed by a steam-railway. Now, if a horse-railway is laid in a highway without legislative authority, what is the situation? The easement of the public, without the public's consent, is interfered with. Nothing is taken from the owner of the fee. The act is simply the creation of a public nuisance. The remedy against such a nuisance is by indictment, or, in a proper case, by suit in equity, instituted by the attorney-general. It is only where a private person suffers substantial injury from a public nuisance, differing from that suffered by the public at large, special to him and irreparable by suit for damages, that he may invoke the restraining power of this court. Van Wegenen v. Cooney, 45 N. J. Eq. 24, 16 Atl. Rep. 689, and cases there cited. The complainant in the case considered does not show that he will suffer special injury from the extension of the defendant's railway, as proposed. His position is not as strong as that of the complainant in Zabriskie v. Railroad Co., 13 N. J. Eq. 314. In that case Zabriskie was the owner of four vacant lots abutting on the southerly side of Grand street, in Jersey City. The Jersey City & Bergen Railroad Company had authority to build its horse-railway in the center of that street, but, instead of so doing, constructed it upon the southerty side of the street, so near the curb that it did not leave room for wagons to load and unload from the complainant's property, or for the complainant to place building materials when he should erect houses upon his property, as he presently proposed to do. An injunction was refused because the complainant did not show a present special injury. The chancellor thought, however, that the objections urged would show special injury by the running of cars, when the complainant should make use of his lots. In Hogencamp v. Railroad Co., 17 N. J. Eq. 83, a horse-railway was constructed, by authority of law, in a street built over land in which the fee was in the complainant. The complainant's property, abutting on the street, was occupied for business purposes, part as a manufactory and store, as part as an express office. He alleged that he would be specially injured in that the space between the track and the curb-stone would be so limited that it would not allow sufficient space for ordinary freight and express wagons to stand lengthwise across the street when loading and unloading, as they had been accustomed to do. Chancellor Green denied an injunction, remarking that the complainant's allegation of special injury would be material and significant if the railway had been constructed without authority, and had been a public nuisance. It has been insisted for the complainant, and with much confidence, that the present case is within Broome v. Telephone Co., 42 N. J. Eq. 143,7 Atl. Rep. 851, where telephone poles were set up without authority of law upon the complainant's land in a highway, and Chan

cellor Runyon issued a mandatory injunction for their removal, because their erection was an unwarrantable invasion of the complainant's property rights. The distinction between the two cases lies in the fact that in the present case the horse-railway does not burden the land with an additional servitude, while, in the case of Broome, the telephone poles were held to add a servitude beyond that for which the land had been condemned. Chancellor Runyon said: "It is enough to say, on that head, that it does not appear that the road board had any power to authorize ary one to set up poles on the land of the highway, and thus subject the land to an additional servitude besides that for which it was condemned." The reason why the erection of telephone poles is regarded as imposing an additional servitude upon land in a highway is well stated by Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet in Halsey v. Railway Co., supra. The order to show cause must be discharged, with costs.

NOTE. It is now well settled, in accordance with the decision in the principal case, that the construction of an ordinary horse-railway in a public street is not the imposition of an additional burden for which the abutting land owner is entitled to additional compensation. Elliott on Roads and Streets, 558; Cooley's Const. Lim. 556; Eichels v. Evansville, etc. Co., 78 Ind. 261; Elliott v. Fair Haven, etc. Co., 32 Conn. 579; Hiss v. Baltimore, etc. Co., 52 Md. 242; s. c., 36 Am. Rep. 371; Carson v. Central, etc. Co., 35 Cal. 325; Atty.-General v. Metropolitan, etc. Co., 125 Mass. 515; s. c., 28 Am. Rep. 264; Hobart v. Milwaukee, etc. Co., 27 Wis. 194; S. C., 9 Am. Rep. 461; Cincinnati, etc. Co. v. Cumminsville, 14 Ohio St. 523; Texas, etc. Co. v. Rosedale, 64 Tex. 80; Savanah, etc. Co. v. Mayor, 45 Ga. 602; Brown v. Duplessis, 14 La. Ann. 842; Randall v. Jacksonville, etc. Co., 19 Fla. 409; s. C., 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 184; note to Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. McGinnis, 4 Cent. L. J. 11, 14, and New Jersey cases cited in the principal opinion. Contra: Craig v. Rochester, etc. Co., 39 N. Y. 404; People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188. But where a street railway is so constructed and operated as to constitute a nuisance and a special injury to an abutter he may maintain an action for damages even though the fee of the street is in the city. Mahady v. Bushwick R. R. Co., 91 N. Y. 148; s. C., 43 Am. Rep. 661; Carli v. Stillwater, etc. Co., 28 Minn. 373; s. C., 41 Am. Rep. 290. And where a street railway is of such a nature and so constructed as to materially impair the rights of the abutter, as by depriving him of his right of access or materially interfering therewith, it ought, upon principle, to be considered as an additional burden. This is the doctrine of the New York Elevated Railway cases and others of a similar character. As shown by Mr. Curtis in a leading article in this JOURNAL upon the rights of abutters, an abutting land owner has a right of access to his premises, distinct from his rights in the street as a member of the general public, and this right is regarded as property, for the taking or destruction of which he is entitled to compensation. An Abutter's Rights in a Street, 24 Cent. L. J. 51. The legislature itself cannot deprive an abutter of this right without providing for compensation. Transylvania University v. Lexington, 3 B. Mon. (Ky.), 25; s. C., 38 Am. Dec. 173; Common Council v. Croas, 7 Ind. 9; Rensselaer v. Leopold, 106 Ind. 30; City of Indianapolis v. Kings

bury, 101 Ind. 200, 201; Rigney v. Chicago, 102 Ill. 64; In re N. Y. Elevated R. R. Co., 36 Hun, 427; Street Ry. v. Cumminsville, 14 Ohio St. 523; Lackland v. North Mo. R. R. Co., 31 Mo. 180; Abendroth v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 122 N. Y. 1; Theobald v. Louisville, etc. R. R. Co., 66 Miss. 279; s. C., 14 Am. St. Rep. 564; Moose v. Carson, 104 N. Car. 431; s. c., 17 Am. St. Rep. 681; Elliott on Roads and Streets, 526; and other authorities cited in 24 Cent. Law Jour. 51, 52. In New York and some of the other States an additional easement in the light and air over a street is also recognized in favor of the abutter, and it is said that "above the surface there can be no lawful obstruction to the access of light and air, to the detriment of the abutting owner." Story v. N. Y. Elevated Ry. Co., 90 N. Y. 122, 146; Adams v. Chicago, etc. Co., 39 Minn. 286; s. c., 12 Am. St. Rep. 644; Fifth Nat. Bank v. N. Y. Elevated Ry. Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 114; Lahr v. Metropolitan Elevated R. R. Co., 104 N. Y. 268; Kane v. Metropolitan Elevated R. R. Co., 26 N. E. Rep. 278; Dill v. School Board (N. J.), 32 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 70.

The general principles above stated are fairly well settled, but the application of steam and electricity as a motive power to ordinary street railways having their rails even with the surface of the street has given rise to a new question of considerable difficulty. It is also a question of increasing importance, and different courts have given a different answer. Is such a use of a street an additional burden for which the abutting property owner is entitled to compensation? In view of the novelty of the question and the conflict among the authorities, it may not be amiss to review the cases upon this subject at some length. At the present time the weight of authority seems to be in favor of the negative. In the case of Lockhart v. Craig St. Ry. Co., 21 Atl. Rep. 26; s. c., 32 Cent. Law Jour. 240, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the construction of an electric railway and the erection of poles and wires in a street is not the imposition of an additional burden for which the adjoining owner is entitled to compensation, and that injunction will not lie to restrain its operation upon the ground that the legislature has provided no means for assessing or securing compensation to the adjoining owners. The court says: "It may now be taken as settled that the owners' rights of abutting property are subject to the paramount right of the public, and the rights of the public are not limited to a mere right of way, but extend to all beneficial legitimate street uses, as the public may from time to time require. The use of streets for sewers, tunneling, public cisterns, gaspipes, water-pipes, and other improvements necessary for the comfort and convenience of the citizens of cities and towns, so long as they do not substantially interfere with the use of the streets as such, appears to be under legislative and municipal control. "The court concludes by saying that the use of poles, wires and other necessary appliances for an electric railway is not any greater interference with the rights of the adjoining property owner than the use of streets for fire-plugs, horse-troughs, and lamp-posts. A similar view was taken by the New Jersey court in the case of Halsey v. Ry. Co., 20 Atl. Rep. 859; s. c, 32 Cent. Law Jour. 179, and also by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. Taggart v. Ry. Co., 19 Atl. Rep. 326. So, it has been held by several other courts that street railways operated by steam motors are not additional servitudes and that their use does not, therefore, constitute a "taking" for which the abutter is entitled to compensation, but that they are merely a new and improved means of using the street as a highway,

which must have been contemplated when the street was dedicated or condemned. Williams v. City Ry. 'Co., 41 Fed. Rep. 556; Briggs v. Lewiston (Me.), 10 Atl. Rep. 47; Newell v. Ry. Co., 35 Minn. 112; s. C., 59 Am. Rep. 303; s. c., 27 N. W. Rep. 889. The cases holding that the erection of telegraph and telephone poles and wires is not an additional burden also lend support to this doctrine. See Julia Building Ass'n v. Bell Tel. Co., 88 Mo. 258; Pierce v. Drew, 136 Mass. 75; s. C., 49 Am. Rep. 7. And in New York it is held that there is no difference between a railroad operated by horse power and one operated by steam, where the Hatter is not exclusive in its nature. Fobes v. Rome, etc. R. R. Co., 121 N. Y. 505. This is also the conclu. sion reached by the writer of the note to Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. McGinnis, 4 Cent. Law Jour. 11, 14, in which it is said that the only difference is in degree and not in kind.

On the other hand it was held by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in a recent case, that a street railway whose cars used for carrying passengers only are propelled by a dummy steam engine, is an additional burden or servitude, and the owner of the fee in the street is entitled to compensation as for a taking of his property for public use, notwithstanding the railway was constructed by authority of law. Street Ry. Co. v. Doyle, 88 Tenn. 747; s. c., 17 Am. St. Rep. 933. No case is cited by the court in support of its opinion, and the writer has been unable to find any other decision directly in point unless it is that in the case of Theobold v. Louisville, etc. Ry. Co., 66 Miss. 279; s. c., 14 Am. St. Rep. 564. The statement of facts in that case shows that it was an action of trespass brought by an abutter against a street railway company for constructing and operating its road in the street in front of his property without his consent and without any condemnation proceedings, but the court in its opinion seems to treat the railway as an ordinary steam railroad. The Tennessee case is, however, supported, in principle at least, by the decisions holding that the erection of telegraph and telephone wires is the imposition of an additional burden for which the abutting owner is entitled to compensation. Western U. Tel. Co. v. Williams, 86 Va. 696; s. C., 11 S. E. Rep. 106; Board of Trade Tel. Co. v. Barnett, 107 Ill. 507; 8. C., 47 Am. Rep. 453; Dusenbury v. Mut. Tel. Co., 11 Abb. N. Cas. 440; Smith v. Cent. Tel. Co., 2 Ohio Circ. Ct. 259; Am. Tel. Co. v. Smith (Md.), 18 Atl. Rep. 910; Broome v. N. Y., etc. Tel. Co. (N. J.), Atl. Rep. 851. See also Gay v. Mut. Un. Tel. Co., 12 Mo. App. 485; Forsyth v. B. & O. Tel. Co., 12 Mo. App. 494. And there are weighty reasons in favor of this view. There has certainly been a wide departure in modern times from the old doctrine that "the owner of the soil has a right to all above and under ground, except only the right of passage for the king and his people." Even an ordinary horse railway company must have a sort of private right in the street, which, is in its very nature exclusive to a certain extent; otherwise it could not successfully carry on its business. When electric poles and wires come to be added, constituting a permanent obstruction, or when the cars are run by steam, causing additional noise and calculated to frighten horses and make the ordinary use of the street more dangerous, there is much reason for holding that an additional burden has been imposed and a new use made of the highway never contemplated when it was dedicated or condemned, especially when we come to consider that most of our streets were laid out when such a use was unheard of. And, as a matter of fact, a street railway with cars operated by steam or electricity may cause

the abutter as much annoyance and interfere with his right of access almost as seriously as an ordinary commercial steam railroad.

It is well settled, in accordance with the decision in the principal case, that the mere fact that an obstruction in a street is unauthorized and constitutes a public nuisance, will not give the abutting land owner a right to maintain injunction unless he is specially injured thereby. An Abutter's Right in a Street, 24 Cent. Law Jour. 51, 54; Elliott on Roads and Streets, 496. But an injunction will lie to prevent the deprivation of his right of access. Carter v. City of Chicago, 57 Ill. 283; Earll v. City of Chicago (Ill.), 26 N. E. Rep. 370; Ross v. Thompson, 78 Ind. 90. And it may be stated as a general rule that whenever abutting land owners are entitled to compensation for the construction of a railway of a kind constituting an additional servitude and amounting therefore to a "taking," an injunction will be granted to prevent such appropriation until compensation is made. People v. Law, 34 Barb. 494; Kavanagh v. Mobile, etc. R. R. Co. (Ga.), 4 S. E. Rep. 113; Colstrume v. Minneapolis, etc. R. R. Co., 33 Minn. 516; Scioto Valley R. R. Co. v. Laurence, 38 Ohio St. 41; Broome v. Tel. Co., 42 N. J. Eq. 143; s. c., 7 Atl. Rep. 851; Story v. N. Y. El. R. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 122; High on Inj. sec. 399. But it was held in a recent Kentucky case that an elevated railway was not per se an encroachment upon the abutter's rights and that, as it could not be told until after it had begun to run its trains, whether the abutter would be injured, its construction would not be enjoined in advance. Fulton v. Short Route Ry. Co., 85 Ky. 640; s. c., 4 S. W. Rep. 332. The correct. ness of this decision seems doubtful. See, however, Building Ass'n v. Bell Tel. Co., 13 Mo. App. 477; Tilton v. N. O., etc R. R. Co., 35 La Ann. 1062. For a further consideration of the rights and remedies of abutters, see An abutter's Rights in a Street, 24 Cent. Law Jour. 51. W. F. ELLIOTT. Indianapolis.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

SUNDAY LAWS-WORKS OF NECESSITY.-The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has racked its great brain upon the question what is a work of necessity within the meaning of a Sunday law, and has come to the conclusion that the employment of a barber on that day is not such a work. A man must shave on Saturday night, thereby violating the real Mosaic command-for Saturday is the Jewish Sabbath, and not the Christian Sunday. He must, therefore, elect to violate the law of God by shaving on Saturday, or else violate the law of man by shaving or getting shaved on Sunday, or else go to church unshaved. The St. Louis Court of Appeals, in a recent unreported opinion delivered by Biggs, J., has taken a more liberal view of the question, holding that where a young gentleman took a railway train to see his lady love on Sunday in a distant city, and missed the tr..in while in a restaurant getting his breakfast, the aet of sending a telegram to her, explaining the cause of his delay, was a work of necessity. The court proceeded upon the idea that there is such a thing as a moral or social necessity, and took a just view that what ordinary men of correct moral impulses would regard to be necessary under the circumstances is a necessity within the meaning of such a statute. Think of the suffering which the failure to send such a telegram

might entail upon the young lady. They might be engaged, and she might feel even more solicitous than a wife would feel under the same circumstances. She might imagine him chewed up in a railway accident, or charred to a crisp by the inevitable coal stove.American Law Review.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

BEACH ON PRIVATE CORPORATIONS.

It would require more space than we can conveniently give, to point out the many features of excellence in these two bulky volumes, the latest and apparently the most complete work on corporations now to be had. One cannot but be impressed with the energy and diligence of the author, who in the midst of an active practice and while engaged in other work, has been enabled to turn out a thorough and exhaustive treatise of this character. Throughout the book, the evidence of careful work and conscientious attention to details is at hand, and without entering into particulars, the difficulty of which, within the limits of this notice, will be understood, we feel justified in the statement that within the compass of these two volumes will be found the modern law as applicable to companies and corporations. No corporation attorney can afford to be without them, and the library of every practitioner should contain them. Mr. Beach is not only a book writer but he is in this instance at least something of an authority on the subject, about which he writes, and therefore it has an additional value. The book is first class in every respect, including the printing, binding and the well prepared index.

THE QUESTION OF COPYRIGHT.

In view of the passage of the recent international -copyright bill, this book will be found of special interest as it presents in convenient form for reference a summary of the more important of the copyright laws, and international conveyances now in force in the chief countries in the world. It discusses the nature and origin of copyright, literary property, international copyright; contains the text of the act of March, 1891, and an analysis of its provisions, the copyright law of Great Britain, and bills now pending in England. There is also an essay on cheap books and good boods, and one on the contest for international copyright.

THE RELATION OF LABOR TO THE LAW OF TO-DAY. This book is perhaps more of a treatise on political economy than on law, though it is of undoubted interest to students of the latter. It discusses the labor questions and labor struggles, and goes at length into the development of labor combinations and trades union, with special reference to the features of the law governing such. It contains also a review of the economic principles of the labor question, and closes with what is put forward as a solution of that question.

AMERICAN STATE REPORTS, VOL. 18.

The Missouri case of Craig v. Van Bebber, reported in this volume has a note of one hundred and fifty pages, exhaustively reviewing the authorities on the

subject of disaffirmance of deed of infant. There are also to be found many other cases of value and interest.

LAWYERS' REPORTS ANNOTATED, Books IX and X. We confess to a great weakness, if it may properly be called such, for this set of reports. It is a pleasure to turn from volumes containing dry reports of cases, to these, where the eye and the brain will find relief in diversified type, and readable notes and comments upon the cases reported, to say nothing of the briefs of attorneys, which is a prominent and valuable feature of these reports. The selection of cases reported is first class, and as we are firm believers in the sifting of cases, the separating of the grainy decisions from the loads of judicial chaff, and the throwing away of the latter, we find much satisfaction in these volumes.

AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA (F LAW, Vol. XV.

This volume, the latest of the series, contains many articles of special interest. The subject of "Mechanic's Liens" finds more extended treatment here than in any text-book on the subject-over two hundred pages being devoted to it. Medical jurisprudence, mercantile agency and merger are intelligently reviewed. Mines and mining claims, containing the modern law on that important subject, is a paper of decided merit and quite exhaustive. The subject of mortgages and municipal corporations, of course, take a great many pages, ard are exhaustively discussed, though there are special papers on municipal courts and municipal securities. The article on municipal corporations is particularly. well prepared, and fills nearly three hundred pages, a large part of which is notes. We have heretofore taken occasion to speak of the general excellence and value of this series, and content ourselves here with saying that as the series progresses it grows in strength aud value.

VESTED RIGHTS.

This book consists of well selected cases with very copious and able annotations on those fundamental and constitutional principles, which have for their object the protection of vested rights of property. The author says that the large number of cases found in the reports, in which the validity of legislation is challenged under these principles, led him to believe that a work of the kind offered would be acceptable to the profession. A study of the cases reported in the light of the notes, will show that his belief is well founded. It is not only a work of good practical value but is a storehouse of information and learning for the student of constitutional law. It is divided into chapters on the subjects of retrospective laws generally, and laws affecting the remedy, due process of law generally and therein of notice and opportunity to be heard, summary proceedings and police power. Other chapters treat of the obligations of contracts generally and as applied to municipal and also to private corporations. The chapter on private corporations is especially valuable. The cases reported are leading ones, and the notes full of authorities. The book is well put together, the typographical appearance being particularly good.

DANIEL ON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

It seems unnecessary to say anything to our readers by way of review of this already well known work. The present is the fourth edition. The first edition