fixed from the moment the facts of marriage and seisin concur, and becomes a title paramount to that of any person claiming under the husband by subsequent act." Grady v. McCorkle, 57 Mo. 172. This, then, is the character of the estate that is to be divested by this new construction of the statute. It is conceded that our statute requires "the owner" to be made a party before his or her interest in the lands can be affected by a tax proceeding under our act of 1877, and this section has been uniformly construed so that cestuis que trustent, mortgagees, remaindermen, and incumbrancers, who are not made parties, are not affected by these suits. Stafford v. Fizer, 82 Mo. 393; Corrigan v. Bell, 73 Mo. 53; Graves v. Ewart, 99 Mo. 13, 11 S. W. Rep. 971. No lawyer will question that inchoate dower is an incumbrance. But it is sought to sustain this new doctrine on the ground that our tax proceeding, beginning with the assessment, is a proceeding strictly in rem, and we may remark here that only by sustaining this position can this new rule be maintained. Beginning with Abbott v. Lindenbower, 42 Mo. 162, under a statute requiring the lands in all cases to be assessed to the person appearing to be the owner at the time of assessment, this court said: "It is unnecessary for us to say further here what might be the effect of this last clause in any cases; but we may go so far as to declare now that an assessment in the name of a person who neither was, nor ever had been, the owner of the property, would be an utterly void assessment." Our present statute requires the land to be listed and assessed in the name of the owner, if known. Under this statute in Gitchell v. Kreidler, 84 Mo. 472, Judge Black, speaking for the whole court, says: "While the judgment is against the property, and not personal, still the tax is assessed against the owner, if known. The law looks to him for payment of the tax. Such a proceeding cannot be said to be strictly in rem." Blackw. Tax titles, 630.

It will serve no good purpose to cite authorities to the same effect. This has been the accepted construction of our tax-laws for many years. Were it a proceeding strictly in rem, there would be no such thing as collecting the tax on real estate out of personal property, which it is conceded may be done. Indeed, the whole sytem is based on the idea that it is the duty of the husband to pay the taxes on his land; and a failure to pay the taxes is a default on his part. The wife is under no obligation to pay the tax. She does not own the fee; she does not reap the usufruct. Certainly no system, based upon justice, would exact of her tribute on property she might never enjoy, and rob her of her dower for failure to pay a tax she did not owe. If, then, taxes become delinquent, whose default is it? Not the wife's, certainly.

But it is said that, because there can be no personal judgment for taxes, therefore section 2197, Rev. St. 1879 (section 4525, Rev. St. 1889), cannot be invoked. It would be difficult to conceive of a statute that would protect a wife's dower, if this is not sufficient. But we think this construction of this section too narrow. The injury is not confined to "judgment." The statute says, in addition to "judgments or decrees confessed or suffered," "no laches, default covin, or crime of the husband shall prejudice the rights of the wife." Is it not laches in a citizen to neglect or refuse to pay his taxes? Is not the word "delinquent," used throughout the statute, a synonym for "laches" and "default?" And could there be a sale of the land, and a divestiture of the wife's dower, but for this delinquency on his part? The proposition is too clear for argument.

But if it is held that this section does not protect the

wife's dower against the laches and default of the husband, we will have an anomalous state of affairs. A husband cannot, by deed or mortgage, the most solemn and praiseworthy, for the most valuable consideration, alien or destroy her dower right. No judgment against him, willing or unwilling, can affect her dower,-no fraud, covin, or crime; and yet he can suffer this new "fine and recovery," and successfully bar her dower, by simply refusing to pay his taxes, and let the land sell; and thus a result is reached, by this simple device, that could not be compassed by the most skillful conveyancer. We cannot believe the legislature intended such result. On the contrary, the whole scope of the tax-act clearly shows that the taxlaw of 1877 (Rev. St. 1879, ch. 145, art. 6), was designed to furnish a method for collecting taxes, in which notice was given to the delinquent of the amount of his taxes, and a day in court, if erroneous, to show the error. When the judgment is entered, an execution issues just as on other judgments, and it is intended to convey the right, title, and interest of the defendant who owned the land, and whose duty it was to pay the taxes. Says Judge Black: "We have repeatedly held that the purchaser at these sales acquires, and acquires only, the title and interest of the parties who are made defendants." Graves v. Ewart, 99 Mo. 13, 11 S. W. Rep. 971; Powell v. Greenstreet, 93 Mo. 14, 8 S. W. Rep. 176. An ordinary execution sale conveys to the purchaser all the right, title, and interest of the defendant in execution, but it has no effect upon the inchoate dower of the wife. It was clearly the intention of the legislature to give the same effect to a tax-deed, under the regular and valid proceedings, that a deed under a general judgment would have,-"no more, no less." "A tax-title is a derivative title." Gitchell v. Kreidler, 84 Mo. 472. Says Judge Black again: "It must be taken as settled law that purchasers at these sheriff's sales made on executions in tax-suits acquire only the right, title, and interest of the defendant in the tax-suits." Powell v. Greenstreet, 95 Mo. 13, 8 S. W. Rep. 176; Evans v. Robberson, 92 Mo. 192, 4 S. W. Rep. 941. No inconvenience has been felt in Missouri, because, in ordinary execution sales, the wife's inchoate dower was not conveyed. Creditors and purchasers know her interest is fixed, and all business transactions are based upon that understanding. The State has adopted a most stringent policy in passing the fee-simple estate to the tax purchasers for the insignificant sum of the tax; a bagatelle, usually, compared to the value of the lands sold. While the State has a right to its revenue, no reason appears why it should take the dower of the unoffending wife, and vest it in the tax speculator, thus giving him a vantage over all creditors and purchasers at all other execution sales. We do not so read the statute. We regard the dower right as of inestimable value to the homes of this State. The trend of public opinion is rather to enlarge, as our homestead laws clearly indicate, than to cut off, this sustenance of the widow. Instead of being a "shadow," it has proved a "pearl of great price," in thousands of ruined homes. Between the tax speculator and the defenseless widow, section 4525 of our statutes of 1889 stands as a monument to the wisdom and humanity of our commonwealth.

CORPORATIONS-ILLEGAL COMBINATIONS OF STOCKHOLDERS-CANCELLATION OF PROXY.In Cone's Executors v. Russell, 21 Atl. Rep. 847, decided by the Court of Chancery of

New Jersey, complainants, as executors and trustees, held certain shares of stock in an incorporated company. Defendants held certain other shares therein, which added to those held by complainants constituted a majority of all the shares. Complainants on the one part, and defendants on the other, entered into a contract by which complainants agreed to execute, and in pursuance thereof did execute, a proxy, irrevocable for five years, to defendants, to vote at all stockholders' meetings upon the complainants' shares; and defendants, in consideration thereof, agreed to so vote said shares as that one of the complainants should be continuously employed as manager of the corporation, at a salary of $2,500 a year. It was held (1) The agreement is void-First, because against public policy; and, second, because a breach of trust by complainants. (2) That complainants are entitled to relief against the defendants, and an injunction against the use of the proxy, notwithstanding their position in pari delicto with defendants. The court

says:

The theory upon which the capital of numerous persons is associated in various proportions, in the shape of a trading corporation, to be managed by a committee of the stockholders, is that such committee shall truly represent and be subject to the will of the majority in interest of the stockholders. The security of the small stockholders is found in the natural disposition of each stockholder to promote the best interests of all, in order to promote his individual interests. A member of an ordinary partnership has an additional security in the personal character of each of his partners, and may decline to be associated with any whom he does not know and approve. But a stockholder in a corporation cannot control the personnel of his associates, and must rely upon their self-interest alone. Upon the foundation of the natural disposition of persons to promote their own interests rests the rule established in this State in the famous case of Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N. J. Law, 222, that a trading corporation could not, without special legislative authority, make a by-law authorizing a stockholder to vote by the proxy. The principle established by that case is "that the obligation and duty of corporators to attend in person, and execute the trust or franchise reposed in or granted to them, is implied in and forms a part of the fundamental constitution of every charter in which the contrary is not expressed:" and the reason given by Chief Justice Hornblower, at page 227, and again by Justice Ford, at page 250, is that the good of the stockholders, as well as of the public, requires that each stockholder should exercise his individual judgment as to all matters presented. In Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pick. 472, at p. 484, Chief Justice Shaw says: "Mr. Fuller was one of the original proprietors of the Worcester Railroad. His associates had a right to believe that in all his acts as such stockholder, in choosing directors, in framing by-laws, and doing other acts, pursuant to the powers of the corporation, he had a common, and, in proportion to his shares, an

equal, interest, and they had a right to rely on his judgment, his recommendations to directors, and other acts, with all the confidence inspired by such a belief." Our legislature has, since the decision in Taylor v Griswold, authorized the use of proxies, limiting them, however, to three years. But the principle still remains that the proxy is supposed to vote for the principal, and in his interest. If a majority of the stock is owned by one person, he has no right to use his power as such owner to advance his private interests at the expense of the minority. And in like manner he has no right to depute to another, who has little or no interest in the corporation, a power to use his stock for that purpose. Such deputation is the more dangerous because the person intrusted with the power has no such inducement to promote the interests of the corporation as the stock-owner has. Where the majority of the stock is owned by one man, or set of men acting in concert, the minority are, to some extent, protected by the natural interest of the majority to promote the real interest of the corporation; but where a person who has little or no actual own-nership has the unrestricted voting power of a majority of the stock, the minority loses this protection, and what may be properly termed the underlying and fundamental understanding and contract upon which the association is founded is abandoned and broken. The motive which may induce the owner of a controlling interest in the corporation to deprive himself of and depute to another the power to use it as he may see fit, during a fixed period, may be of little conse-sequence to his associates, but is usually found in some consideration of personal gain. In the case in hand it is the employment of complainant L. H. Cone as manager for a fixed term, and at a fixed salary, and irrespective of the actual value of his services. The avowed object and purpose of the defendants was to secure to themselves like employment and salaries. The mere statement of the affair seems to me to condemn it. The motive was in itself improper and unlawful. Servants of a corporation should be employed and paid upon their merits; and buying votes for an office in a corporation is of the same objectionable character as buying them for a public office. The same may be said of buying the right to control the business policy and management of the affairs of a corporation. So in Guernsey v. Cook, 117 Mass. 548, 120 Mass. 501; Woodruff v. Wentworth, 133 Mass. 309; Fall's App. 91 Pa. St. 434.

WRITS

SERVICE

STATUTE "MONTHS" BY PUBLICATION.-The Supreme Court of Florida, in Guaranty Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v. Buddington, 9 South. Rep. 246, say: that the term "months,' where used in a statute of that State, means calendar months and not lunar months, unless there is som e-thing in the statute which indicates that a contrary meaning was intended. From the very learned opinion of Raney, C. J., we extract the following:

Blackstone, after stating that a year is a determinate and well-known period, consisting commonly of 365 days, and in leap-years of 366, says that a "month" ismore ambiguous, there being in common use two.. ways of calculating months, either as lunar, consisting of 28 days, the supposed revolution of the moon, 13, of which make a year; or as calendar months of unequal

length, according to the Julian division in our common almanacs, commencing at the calends of each month, whereof in a year there are only 12. A "month," he says, is a lunar month or 28 days, unless otherwise expressed; not only because it is one of uniform period, but because it falls naturally into a quarterly division by weeks. Therefore a lease is only for 48 weeks, but if it be for "a twelvemonth" in the singular number, it is good for the whole year. For herein the law recedes from its usual calculation, because the ambiguity between the two methods of computation ceases; it being generally understood that by the space of time called thus, in the singular number, "a twelvemonth," is meant the whole year, consisting of the solar revolution. 2 Bl. Comm. pp. 140-142. A "month," in temporal matters, except in quare impedit, and, at least, some commercial matters, meant, unless a different meaning was shown to be intended, a lunar month; but in ecclesiastic matters it meant a solar month. Talbot v. Linfield, 1 W. Bl. 450; Lang v. Gale, 1 Maule & S. 111; Titus v. Preston, 1 Strange, 652; Cockell v. Gray, 3 Brod. & B. 186; Bayley, Bills, 238. In Barksdale v. Morgan, 4 Mod. 185 (A. D. 1694), where, on a contract to pay "within one month next following," the decision was that the time should be reckoned a lunar month, the court said: "In common parlance, the month is taken to be 28 days in all cases except in a quare impedit, and therefore it must be so many days, according to the com. mon and known acceptation of the work." In Lacon v. Hooper, 6 Term R. 224 (decided in 1795), where it was held that the word "month," infused in a statute without the addition of the word "calendar," or anything to show that the legislature meant a calendar month, meant a lunar month, Lord Kenyon said that the rule had been so long established that it should not be shaken, but confessed that he wished that the rule as first established by the decisions had been otherwise.

That the rule in England was as stated above, until changed by act of parliament during the present reign, cannot be denied; and it is true that in New York the same rule of construction was followed. Leffingwell v. White, 1 Johns. Cas. 99 (decided in 1791), held that calendar months were meant in matter of bills of exchange (Stackhouse v. Halsey, 3 Johns. Ch. 73); that a statute as to the advertisement of mortgaged property for sale "once a week, for six successive months," meant lunar months, (Jackson v. Clark, 7 Johns. 217; Loring v. Halling, 15 Johns. 119.) In People v. Mayor, etc., 10 Wend. 395, where a statute allowed the owners of land two years from the time of the sale for taxes within which to redeem, and required the municipal authorities to give public notice at least six months before the expiration of that period, for four weeks, it was held that "months" meant calender months. "Now," says the opinion, "as calendar time is used by the legislature in fixing the period for redemption, it is a just and reasonable inference that they intended to use it in fixing upon the division or point of time, specifying the no ice to be given to the owners to redeem. As the one period, in express terms, is calendar time, and the six months immediately succeed it, and were intended to include a part of it, it should be construed to mean the same; otherwise we must believe the legislature intended to fix the different periods by differrent calculation of time, in the same breath, and on the same subject, and without any conceivable purpose." See, also, Synder v. Warren, 2 Cow. 518; Parsons v. Chamberlin, 4 Wend. 512. In the last case a statute authorized any justice of the peace, who should be removed from office before the collection of the money

due on any judgment rendered by him, to issue execution at any time within six months after such removal." No calendar time was mentioned in the statute, "but" it was said, "the days mentioned in the execu tion correspond merely to calendar time. Executions are to be issued within thirty or ninety days, and they are returnable within similar periods. There is reason, therefore, to believe that calendar time was intended."

The Supreme Courts of North Carolina and Delaware have, we find, adopted the English view, (Rives v. Guthrie, 1 Jones, [N. C.] 84; State v. Jacobs, 2 Har. [Del.] 548); and there is in Georgia a superior court decision to the same effect, (Redmond v. Glover, Dud. [Ga.] 107.)

If the supreme court of any other of the States have adopted or approved the English view, neither our own investigation, nor those of counsel, have discov the fact. It has on the contrary, been repudiated by many of the courts for reasons that must commend themselves.

The court then calls attention to and reviews Bartal v. Calvert, 21 Ala. 42; Gross v. Fowler, 21 Cal. 393; Strong v. Birchard, 5 Conn. 357; Avery v. Pixley, 4 Mass. 459; Com. v. Chambre, 4 Dall. 143; Shapley v. Gary, 6 Serg. & R. 539; Alston v. Alston, 3 Brev. 469; Brewer v. Harris, 5 Gratt. 285; Brudenell v. Vaux, 2 Dall. 302; Sheets v. Selden, 2 Wall. 177.

INNKEEPERS LIABILITY Loss OF BAGGAGE.—The liability of an innkeeper for loss of baggage is well illustrated by the case of Glenn v. Jackson, 9 South. Rep. 259, decided by the Supreme Court of Alabama. It was there held that where a transient guest of an hotel delivers his baggage to a porter to be checked for safe-keeping, the porter having no authority to check it without directions from the clerk, but doing it nevertheless, and the guest then pays his bill and leaves the hotel, the relation of innkeeper and guest is thereby terminated, and, if the baggage is stolen during the guest's absence, the innkeeper is not liable therefor. Coleman, J., says:

The strict common law liability of innkeepers is for the protection of the goods of their guests, and while the relation of innkeeper and guest exist. The words of the common law were, eorum bona et catalla infra hospitia Calye's Case, 8 Coke, 32a; Wilkins v. Earle, 44 N. Y. 172. The evidence in the present case shows that, on each several visit of the plaintiff to the hotel, he was a guest, and was entitled to all the protection of the common law. It is equally clear that this relation terminated after each stoppage. He was charged and paid the usual day rates without reduction, and no agreement was made as to future visits. When the plaintiff paid his bill and left, the relation of innkeeper and guest ceased to exist. O'Brien v. Vaill, 22 Fla. 627, 1 South. Rep. 137. If, when he paid his bill he

had called for his valise, and it then had been stolen or lost, there could be no doubt of the liability of the defendant, or if he had requested the defendant or his authorized clerk to take charge of his baggage until his return, agreeing to return within a short time, and the defendant or clerk had consented to do so, a lia. bility would have been assumed by such agreement. Story, Bailm. § 477, and note. Or if the plaintiff had not paid his bill, and the defendant had undertaken to retain the baggage to secure the plaintiff's debt to him, the defendant would be liable. Haas v. Taylor, 80 Ala. 465, 2 South. Rep. 633. And there may be cases, according to the particular circumstances, where an innkeeper may be liable for the goods of a guest, for a reasonable time, after the departure of the guest from the inn. Adams v. Clem, 41 Ga 65. See criticism on this case in 22 Fla., and 1 South. Rep. supra. If a traveler, intending to become a guest at an hotel, meets a porter of the hotel at the depot or other usual stopping places for travelers, and intrusts his baggage with the porter, sent out for the purpose of soliciting patronage and caring for the baggage of such guest the relation of innkeeper and guest for the protection of the baggage is thereby created; or if a guest, intending to leave the hotel, intrusts his baggage to a porter of the hotel whose duty it is to deliver the baggage at depot, the relation is continued until the delivery at the designated place. But these principles of law afford no protection to one who intrusts his baggage to a mere a servant of the hotel not authorized to receive baggage, with directions to him to check it, for safe-keeping until he returns, then pays his bill to the clerk, and terminates his relation as guest, and gives no notice to the innkeeper or clerk that he expects to return, and that he has left his baggage to be taken care of until his return. "When a person came to an inn with a hamper of hats, and went away, and left them there for two days, and in his absence they were stolen it was held that he was not to be deemed a guest, and that the innkeeper was not liable for the loss thereof." Story, Bailm. § 477. It is not in the power of a bailor to force upon another the custody of his goods. It must be a duty voluntarily assumed or one imposed by law. A deposit received by a servant not in the line of his duty, and without the express or implied consert of his principal and against positive instructions cannot impose a liability upon the principal.

-In Belcher v. Farren, 26 Pac. Rep. 791, the Supreme Court of California decide that a widow born in Ireland, whose parents never came to this country and who was herself never naturalized, in order to prove her citizenship by marriage to a naturalized citizen must produce record evidence of her husband's naturalization. The court says:

We are constrained to hold under the decisions that the evidence was incompetent. Miller v. Prentice, 82 Cal. 104, 23 Pac. Rep. 8; Bode v. Trimmer, 82 Cal., 513, 23 Pac. Rep. 187; Prentice v. Miller, 82 Cal. 575, 23 Pac. Rep. 189. In the last case it is said: "And like any other judicial record must be proved by the record itself, or as properly exemplified copy thereof, or by proof of its loss of destruction. Charles Green's Son's v. Salas, 31 Fed. Rep. 107. There are, however, certain limitations to this rule, for after proper

proof of the naturalization of the parents of alien children, who were under 21 years of age and residents of the United States at the time their parents were naturalized, parol evidence may be received to prove the minority and residence of the children in order to show that they are citizens, (Rev. St. U. S. § 2172); and proof of naturalization may also be by the parol evidence of the party, in the form of an affidavit, in proceedings concerning mining claims, by virtue of section 2321 of the Revised Statutes of the United States; but the appellant does not come within either of these limitations." This quotation is made because it intimates that in case of the children they must also prove the naturalization of their parents by the record—a case parallel to the present. The other facts which it is said they may prove by parol constitute no exception to the rule, which is simply that an ordinary naturalization is effected by a judgment, and it must be proven as other judgments are. So the cases cited by the respondent, if they are properly called "naturalizations," are not by judgment and the practice in such cases throws no light upon the point involved here.

18. Waiver and Estoppel-Agent.-The receipt of premiums or assessments by an agent outside of the rules of the company or society, is ultra vires and not binding.50 But an agent may, while acting within the scope of his authority, waive the performance of certain conditions, but outside of this he cannot bind a principal who never acquiesced in the act. Where the receipts for premiums are intrusted to an agent who had been accustomed to receive premiums overdue, either by giving credit until a particular time, or by merely giving receipts, this may bind the company and prevent it from declaring a forfeiture.52 But it has been held that a

50 Life Ins. Co. v. McMillan, 24 Ohio St. 81; Painter v. Industrial Life Ass'n, 14 Ins. L. J. 556; Insurance Co. v. Norton, 96 U. S. 239; Insurance Co. v. Eggleston, 96 U. S. 577; Insurance Co. v. Doster, 106 U. S. 32; Baldwin v. Ben. Ass'n Soc., 86 Ill. 479; Marston v. Life Ins. Co., 59 N. H. 92; Thompson v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 259.

51 Co-operative Life Ass'n v. McConnico, 53 Miss. 233; Lenard v. Lebanon Mut. Ins. Co., 3 W. N. C. 327. 52 Mound City Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Twining, 19 Kan. 349; Insurance Co. v. Wolff, 95 U. S. 326; Insurance Co. v. Norton, 96 U. S. 234; Piedmont & Arlington L. Ins. Co. v. McLean, 31 Gratt. 517; Am. L. Ins. Co.

And

mere office clerk cannot, by receipts of overdue premiums, waive a forfeiture.53 where the agent's authority is limited, as for instance, by express conditions in the policy which is brought to the knowledge of the assured, expressly preventing him from waiving a forfeiture, of course, he cannot.54 In a benefit society where all arrearages are to be paid to the secretary, receipts of delinquent assessments issued by such officer and duly entered upon the minutes, constitute a waiver, where there are no other conditions than payment of arrearages.55 But the act of the financial reporter of a local lodge in receiving assessments after maturity, which act is expressly forbidden by the laws of the order, will not bind the lodge unless express or implied authority was given him, but to establish a waiver as to such act knowledge and acquiescence on the part of the managing officers in the control of the society must be -shown.56 Of course the act of the agent in extending the time of payment, or in accepting overdue assessments, may be ratified by the company or society. This, as well as the authority of the agent in this respect, is sometimes a question of fact for the jury.57

19. Payment. When premiums or assessments are due they must be paid in full to avoid a forfeiture of the policy. Hence, in the absence of any agreement to that effect, part payment of an annual premium will not keep a policy alive for such proportional part of a year as the sum paid bears to the whole premium.58 Ordinarily the place of payment is designated by the contract of insurance.

v. Green, 57 Ga. 469; Unsell v. Hartford L. A. Ins. Co, 32 Fed. Rep. 443; Knuant v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 31 Fed. Rep. 322; Lebanon Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hoover, 18 W. N. C. 223.

53 Koelgers v. Guardians' L. Ins. Co., 2 Lans. 480. 54 Merwin v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 85 N. Y. 278; Insurance Co. v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall. 222; Insurance Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U. S. 519.

55 McDonald v. Order of Chosen Friends (Cal.), 20 Pac. Rep. 41.

56 Eaton v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor (U. S. C. C.), 22 Cent. L. J. 560.

57 Dial v. Valley Mut. Life Ass'n (S. C.), 8 S. E. Rep. 27; Cleaver v. Insurance Co. (Mich.), 39 N. W. Rep. 571; Smith v. Insurance Co. (Vt.), 15 Atl. Rep. 353; Hankins v. Insurance Co. (Wis.), 35 N. W. Rep. 34; Key v. Des Moines Ins. Co. (Iowa), 41 N. W. Rep. 615; Bartlett v. Ins. Co. (Iowa), 41 N. W. Rep. 601; Sheldon v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 25 Conn. 207; Church v. Lafavette Ins. Co., 66 N. Y. 222; Miller v. Life Ins. Co., 12 Wall. 285.

58 Hutson v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 28 N. J. Eq. 167.

Generally the company's domicile is the place named. Where the legal effect of the policy is that payment is to be made at the home office, an endorsement on the margin of the policy that "all receipts for premiums paid at agencies are to be signed by the president or actuary" is not agreement on the part of the company to make any particular agency the legal place of payment.59 The party to receive payment on behalf of the company is usually specified. Sometimes this party is the company's local agent, and where it appears that the company's local agent was in the habit of receiving the premiums which were accepted by the company without objections, a tender of the premium to such agent on the day it falls due is sufficient to prevent forfeiture, although the policy provided for payment at the company's principal office.60 In benefit societies the local or subordinate lodges, or councils, are generally the agents of the supreme or superior bodies for the purpose of collecting and transmitting assessments and contributions. Hence, a member who has paid the assessment to the lower lodge will be protected, although the money never reaches the supreme or higher body. In one case the subordinate council had a collector whose duty it was to collect all assessments which were to be turned over to the treasurer whose duty it was to transmit the assessments to the supreme council. The deceased had been treasurer of his council. He remitted to the supreme body the aggregate of assessments due from his council, including his own. This was held to be a good payment." The time within which payment is to be made is nearly always specified and the policy is not void before such time;68 but not infrequently the language used necessitates interpretation. Thirty days after notice is the usual limit, but this, of course, varies in different associations. In one case where the assessment was required to be paid within thirty days from the "date of notice" it was construed to mean the day the notice was delivered or

62

59 Insurance Co. v. Davis, 95 U. S. 425.

60 Morey v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 2 Wood C. C. 663. 61 Schenck v. Gegenseitger Witwes und Waisen Fond, 44 Wis. 369; Eidman v. Mut. Ins. Co., etc., 44 Wis. 376.

62 Farrie v. Supreme Council Catholic B. Legion, 15 N. Y. State Rep. 155.

63 Ruse v. Mut. B. Life Ins. Co., 26 Barb. 556.