text and slightly more in the German text. In the light of these production figures it will be apparent that, if the Nuernberg staff was large, nevertheless everybody had quite enough to do.

Foreign Delegations

The London Agreement provided (Art. 5) that any government of the United Nations might "adhere" to the Agreement by giving notice in proper form. Nineteen nations (in addition to the four signatories) took advantage of this provision, and thereby endorsed the principles of the Agreement. Many of these countries sent observers and representatives to Nuernberg to assist in the preparation of the prosecution's case before the IMT.

The interest which a number of these countries thus manifested in the Nuernberg proceedings continued after rendition of the IMT judgment. The representatives of France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Holland at once announced their desire to maintain delegations at Nuernberg during the trials under Law No. 10, and a British delegation was established a few months later. These five Nations alone 145 were represented at Nuernberg throughout the duration of the trials under Law No. 10. However, delegations from Norway, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Belgium were temporarily accredited to Nuernberg for the duration of one or more particular cases.

Both the permanent and the temporary foreign delegations were of great assistance to the prosecution in ascertaining the facts concerning crimes and atrocities alleged to have been committed in countries which they represented and in procuring documents and witnesses for the court proceedings. The permanent delegations had a reciprocal mission to fulfill on behalf of their own governments in obtaining evidence for use in war crimes trials conducted in their respective countries, and in following the proceedings and sending back to their governments such portions of the testimony and exhibits or other documents as might be useful for legal, historical, or other purposes.

Defense Counsel

Under the conditions which prevailed in Germany shortly after the end of the war, it was absolutely necessary that the IMT undertake the responsibility of insuring that the defendants were adequately represented by counsel. The manner in which this responsibility was discharged has already been sketched,146 together with some of the reasons why it was decided that, as a general rule, German attorneys could most effectively defend the accused.

One additional problem worthy of some mention which confronted

145 A representative of the Soviet Union was accredited to Nuernberg in October 1946, but he departed from Nuernberg in December 1946 and did not return.

146 Supra, pp. 29-30.

the IMT was whether German attorneys with active Nazi records should be allowed to act as defense counsel. Although no written rule governing this matter was ever promulgated, the IMT did settle on a fairly consistent practice in this regard. According to this practice, if a defendant requested representation by a lawyer with a definite or even conspicuous Nazi background, the IMT would not regard that circumstance as an obstacle to authorizing his appearance before the tribunal. However, the IMT did not include attorneys with such records in the lists of attorneys which were furnished to the defendants to assist them in making a selection.

The practice of the tribunals constituted under Law No. 10 was in general accord with the precedents established by the IMT. As stated above,147 the expectation that German attorneys would act in most cases was embodied in Ordinance No. 7. Like the IMT, the later tribunals freely approved former Nazis as defense counsel upon application by any defendant.

In view of the part played by the Nuernberg Military Tribunals in the selection of defense counsel, it seems to be desirable that the names and qualifications of the 200-odd attorneys who acted as such should be made a matter of permanent record. Accordingly, at my request the Secretary General recently furnished me with a list, based upon the records available to him, containing the names and other pertinent data concerning the defense counsel in all 12 of the trials under Law No. 10. I have attached this list hereto as Appendix Q. The Secretary General has advised me that the records upon which this list is based are incomplete, but that probably only a few names are missing; however, the accompanying data with respect to a large number of the listed attorneys is complete.

The defense bar was at its peak size in March 1948, at which time it numbered 194, of whom 83 were main counsel and 111 assistant counsel. In the 12 trials, slightly over 200 persons acted as counsel or assistant counsel for the 177 defendants. With a handful of exceptions,148 all of these were attorneys qualified to practice before the German courts, and all but three were Germans. The three nonGerman attorneys-Messrs. Warren E. Magee of the Bar of the District of Columbia, Joseph S. Robinson of the New York Bar, and Dr. Walter Vinassa of Switzerland-were approved by the tribunals on special applications to represent the defendants Ernst von Weizsaecker (Case No. 11), Friedrich von Buelow (Case No. 10), and Paul Haefliger (Case No. 6), respectively. These were the only applications by any of the defendants for permission to retain par

147 Supra, pp. 29-30.

148 All but one of the main counsel were qualified attorneys; Admiral Schniewind, a defendant in the "High Command case" (Case No. 12), was represented by a former German naval officer who was not a lawyer. Several of the assistant counsel were military men, engineers, or economists without legal training.

ticular non-German counsel, except for an application filed on behalf of Alfried Krupp (Case No. 10) which, in its original form, did not give the name of the attorney in question and was denied for that reason, but which later was resubmitted as an application to retain one Earl Carroll. This application was rejected (by Tribunal III) primarily on the ground that OMGUS had refused (for other reasons) to permit Carroll to remain in the American zone of occupation.

While applications to retain particular German attorneys were never disapproved on the ground that the attorney had been a Nazi, they were on occasion rejected if it appeared that the attorney had endeavored to conceal this fact or had made any other false statements in his application. In fact, such false statements were only rarely made or discovered, and the great majority of applications were approved. It should not be concluded, however, that the defense bar did not include a large number of Nazi Party members. Most German attorneys had belonged to the Nazi Bar Association (the National Socialist Rechtswahrerbund), and in fact 136 of the 206 individuals employed as principal or assistant counsel had been members of the National Socialist Party or one of its branches, such as the SA ("Storm Troopers" or "Brown Shirts") or SS (Himmler's "Black Shirts"). As Appendix Q shows more particularly, 10 defense counsel had been members of the SS and 22 of the SA,149 and 6 held some sort of office in the hierarchy of the Nazi Party. Of the remaining 99, 42 joined the Party between 1933 and 1937, and 57 between 1937 and the end of the war.

Apart from Party membership, a number of the defense counsel had a "personal interest" in at least certain phases of the proceedings. A number of the counsel and assistants in the "Farben case" (Case No. 6), for example, were or had been employed in the legal or technical departments of I. G. Farben. One of the most prominent defense counsel,150 who upon occasion acted as spokesman for the defense bar, had been president of the German Bar Association at the time Hitler came to power. In this capacity he had, on 25 April 1933, circulated a notice to all members of the association, written by one Dr. Voss, the "National Socialist Confidential Agent" with the German Bar Association, urging "all Aryan members" to join the Nazi Party with the least possible delay.151 This attorney no doubt spoke from the heart when he urged, on behalf of his clients (leading industrialists such as Schacht and Flick) that the pressure and dangers of the Nazi dictatorship had forced them, out of prudent regard for the preservation of their businesses, to take many steps in self-pro

149 Including 1 person who was in both, so that 31 individuals in all are involved.

150 Dr. Rudolf Dix, who was main counsel for Schacht before the IMT and represented Friedrich Flick (Case No. 5) and Hermann Schmitz (Case No. 6) in the subsequent trials. 181 See Anwaltsblatt Nachrichten fuer die Mitglieder des Deutschens Anwaltsvereins, Booklet 4, April 1933, pp. 129-130.

tection which they would not have taken in less tense circumstances. Another attorney 152 had served as Legation Counsellor at the German Embassy in Paris under Ambassador Abetz,153 and in this capacity had had ample opportunity to observe the diplomatic steps taken in connection with the deportation of French Jews, the shooting of hostages, and the forced recruitment of slave labor. Such a man might be expected to have a well-developed personal attitude toward some of the matters charged against von Weizsaecker and other defendants in the "Foreign Office case" (Case No. 11).

In addition to assisting the defendants to obtain counsel, a great many services were rendered to defense counsel to facilitate their work. These services, as stated above,154 were performed by the Defense Information Center under the Secretary General, and will be fully described in the latter's final report. Defense counsel were paid 3,500 RM (Reichsmark) per defendant per month, but not more than 7,000 RM per month.155 Under the rules adopted by the tribunals, each defense attorney might represent two or more defendants in any one case, but could not represent defendants in more than two cases being tried concurrently before separate tribunals.

Defense counsel who did not live in Nuernberg were provided with billets through arrangements made by the Defense Center. They were also entitled to three meals per day at a cost of only 50 pfennigs per meal,156 and were issued gratis a carton of cigarettes each per week. They were also provided with office space, furniture, and office supplies in the Palace of Justice. Witnesses requested by defense counsel were procured and were housed, fed, and paid (mileage and per diem) without cost to the defense.157 When defense counsel found it necessary to travel to interview witnesses or for other reasons connected with the trial, railway transportation or the necessary amount of gasoline for privately owned automobiles was furnished free of charge. Extensive clerical and translation assistance, together with a great variety of other services, was also rendered.

152 Dr. Ernst Achenbach, who was counsel for Gajewski (Case No. 6) and Bohle (Case No. 11) up to the end of January 1948, when he ceased to act.

153 Convicted of war crimes by a French tribunal at Paris on 22 July 1949, and sentenced to 20 years at hard labor.

154 Supra, p. 37.

155 Out of these fees, main defense counsel paid their assistants and secretaries. 156 The food question was at times a difficult one. The IMT had made special arrangements to feed defense counsel from American Army rations. This was severely criticized in some quarters on the ground that defense counsel should not be favored over other elements of the German population to such a great extent. As Chief of Counsel, I joined with the judges of Military Tribunals I and II in January 1947 in recommending that the policy initiated by the IMT be continued. For the reason indicated above, however, OMGUS thought that it would be unwise to continue to furnish American food to defense counsel. They were, however, thereafter furnished sufficient food out of the Germany economy to equal the caloric content of Army rations, and were also given American coffee. This compromise may have lacked something in logic, but was accepted as reasonably satisfactory by defense counsel and all others concerned.

157 For example, in the 4-month period ending 25 March 1948, 313 witnesses were requested, of whom 275 were located and produced at Nuernberg.

WAR CRIMES SUSPECTS AND WITNESSES

The problem of how to deal with the enormous number of suspected war criminals who were at large in Germany and Austria as the occupying Allied forces moved in was one of the most difficult which confronted the occupation authorities. For many months the United Nations War Crimes Commission had been compiling lists of suspects on the basis of information furnished from the countries occupied by Germany, and by the end of the war these lists were very lengthy. The Allied forces overran and liberated concentration camps and prisoner-of-war camps under conditions and circumstances which revealed that the most atrocious and extensive criminality had been involved in their operation. Examination of the tons of captured German documents revealed that responsibility for many of these crimes could be traced to the highest levels of the Reich government. Several large branches of the Nazi Party, such as the SS-with membership of hundreds of thousands or even millions of individualshad been dedicated to the pursuit of criminal objectives, under precise written directives circulated very widely through these organizations.

While Nuernberg had a direct and profound interest in the solution of this problem, it was by no means the only agency involved. The occupational administration as a whole was deeply concerned from the angle of security. Those branches of OMGUS whose mission was to supervise the reestablishment of German governmental and political agencies and public or semipublic institutions were endeavoring to insure that former Nazis would not participate in or wield influence over these agencies and institutions. In addition to OCCPAC and OCCWC, the Judge Advocate's department of the Army was responsible for the apprehension and trial of certain categories of war criminals. The Intelligence services of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as numerous other research, scientific, and cultural organizations, were intent on building up, piece by piece, the complicated and terrible picture of what had gone on in Germany under the Third Reich, and for this purpose wanted extensive access to thousands of Germans, many of whom were suspected war criminals, for interrogation purposes. The other occupying powers, as well as all the countries formerly occupied by Germany, were anxious to locate and apprehend thousands of suspected criminals who were or might be in the American zone of occupation.