8. 9. U.S. v. Muntain, 610 F.2d 964, (D.C. Cir. 1979). Charles Muntain, Assistant to the Secretary for Labor Relations for HUD, was convicted in District Court on eight counts of a 13count indictment. He was charged with various counts of improper conduct as a public official. While employed by the Government, Muntain was brought into contact with various contractor associations, trade associations and unions regarding labor relations and policies. He used these contacts to assist his partners with their sale of automobile insurance. The Court of Appeals found that there was sufficient evidence to support Muntain's conviction that he knowingly concealed his involvement in a group automobile insurance venture when he completed annual HUD confidential statements made by employees of their financial interests. The remaining convictions were remanded with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal. U.S. v. Nasser; U.S. v. Hauff, 476 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1973). Former I.R.S. employee Nasser was convicted of violating the federal conflict of interest statute in the United States District Court. In addition, both Nasser and Hauff, Nasser's client, were convicted of conspiring to violate the conflict of interest statute. On appeal, Nasser and Hauff argue that $207 (a) of the federal conflict of interest statute violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment based on vagueness. The defendants state that government employee Nasser had to decide (1) whether he participated "substantially" in a matter while he was employed; and (2) whether his mode of participation was encompassed by the words "or otherwise." Nasser claims that he could not fairly assess these questions because of the vagueness of the statute. The court found that the statute was sufficiently definite to permit a fact finder to decide whether the defendant's participation fell within the proscribed conduct. Nasser and Hauff also argued that $207 (a) was a bill of attainder that violated Article I, $9 of the Constitution because it is a legislative act that imposes "punishment" on a group without a judicial trial. In other words, Nasser was forced to suffer as a result of his former employment by the Government. The court again disagreed. The statute accomplishes a legitimate legislative purpose; to protect the government from the use of governmental information by former government employees. Nasser and Hauff argued that $207(a) as applied to Nasser was an ex post facto law that violated Article I, $9 of the Constitution because the new law more closely restricted post-employment activity than the law in effect during most of Nasser's employment with the government. The court found that where there is a sufficiently rational relationship between the past activity and the public interest in excluding unworthy people, the disqualification is not a punishment and a law newly imposing it is not an ex post facto law. The remaining findings did not address the conflict of interest statute. The case was reversed and remanded to the U.S. District Court. 10. Woods v. Covington County Bank et al.; Hoglund v. Covington County These actions seek damages from a number of defendants alleged to have been aiders and abettors of a fraudulent scheme concocted by Alexander & Allen, Inc. The prior litigation was prompted by an SEC injunction proceeding against Alexander & Allen, Inc. for violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the securities acts. The SEC alleged that Alexander & Allen began a solicitation to obtain money from Vietnam POWs who had accumulated sums in back pay during their years of imprisonment that amounted to approximately $316,260. The company was found to be perpetrating a "horrible fraud" on the former POWs and civilian investors. Several of the former POWs, including Commander Woods, met and decided to institute a private suit to recover their investments. The Navy decided to explore methods to aid the servicemen in their recovery of lost investments. Naval Captain Fink sought the advise of Roger Nichols, an attorney who was completing his tour of duty as reserve officer with the Judge Advocate General's Corp. Nichols supervised the suit until his duty was completed and then he returned to private practice. The Navy did not have the resources to further assist the servicemen, so Captain Fink referred the POWs to Nichols. Nichols agreed to return to active duty for five days to conduct an investigation and evaluate the chance of recovery. Nichols conducted his investigation and was released from active services. He returned, once again, to his private practice. Nichols was then contacted by Woods and the POWs to serve in the capacity of their personal counsel. Nichols accepted the case on a contingency basis. The U.S. Court of Appeals found that Nichols' participation in the class actions did not impugn his conduct while on active duty with the Navy or improperly disadvantage the appellees. The District Court's disqualification order cannot stand because it would inflict substantial harm on the military legal assistance programs and prejudice the appellants' cases below. Canon 9, which is frequently invoked because of the appearance that a public official's action may have been influenced by the prospect of private employment, cannot be manipulated in the case at bar for strategic advantages or on the impropriety which exists only in the minds of imaginative lawyers. The Court of Appeals reversed the disqualification of the U.S. District Court. X-7 1001. MEMORANDUM OPINION Defendant This matter is before the Court upon defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment in which he is charged with four counts of making false statements in documents within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S Defendant is alleged to have made false statements concerning his financial status on the financial disclosure reports he was required to file with the United States House of Representatives in 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981 pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (EIGA), 2 U.S.c. SS 701-09. is a United States Congressman representing the second district of the State of Idaho. Defendant makes three arguments in support of his motion to dismiss: (1) that the financial disclosure requirements of EIGA are not subject to criminal sanctions under 18 U.S.c. § 1001 because Congress intended that they be enforced only by civil measures, (2) that the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution protects him from any prosecution concerning his EIGA reports, and (3) that he is the victim of selective prosecution. Defendant also has filed a motion for leave to take discovery relevant to the selective prosecution XI-1 |