1861. CLARKE v. WRIGHT. but a binding one. It may be remarked, with respect to this judgment, that Lord Hardwicke does not say, expressly, that the limitation to the issue of the former marriage was upon a valuable consideration. He adverts, it is true, to the existence of reciprocal considerations, both on the part of the husband and wife, by the provision under the articles for the children of the second marriage; but this appears to me (with deference to what is said in the judgment of the Court in Doe v. Manning (a),) to be at least as much for the purposes of strengthening his observation, that such a limitation had never been held, nor ought to be held, fraudulent, as for asserting that it was supported by a valuable consideration. And it should be further observed that in the year 1737, when this decree was made, the law had not been yet settled, as it has since been, that every limitation without a valuable consideration was fraudulent under the statute as against a subsequent purchaser for value. Six years later, in White v. Sanson (b), Lord Hardwicke himself says:-"I have heard it said in this Court that there are reasonable voluntary settlements, which they will not interpose to disturb upon the construction of these statutes (13 & 27 Eliz.);" and in the same judgment he had previously said :—" I hardly know an instance where a voluntary conveyance has not been held fraudulent against a subsequent purchaser." And twenty years later, in Cadogan v. Kennet (c), we find Lord Mansfield saying:-"The statute 27 Eliz. c. 4, does not go to voluntary conveyances merely, as being voluntary, but to such as are fraudulent." And in Doe v. Routledge (d) the same Judge said that in the statute there was not a word that impeached voluntary (a) 9 East, 59. 64. (c) Cowp. 432. 434. settlements merely as being voluntary, but as fraudulent and covinous. It may likewise be observed, in order to prove how far from settled the law on this subject was at the time when Newstead v. Searles was decided, that Lord Hardwicke in that case relies on the fact that the mortgagees had notice of the marriage settlement, which, according to the doctrine since established, does not at all affect the right of the subsequent purchaser for value. And, further, that Lord Hardwicke speaks of the two statutes of the 13 & 27 Eliz. as if the one put voluntary conveyances exactly on the same footing, as to creditors, as the other puts them as to subsequent purchasers, which is a very different view from that taken of the two Acts at the present time. I will add that Lord St. Leonards, in his treatise on Vendors and Purchasers, does not cite the case of Newstead v. Searles while discussing the question whether the marriage consideration runs through the whole settlement, but as an authority for a previous passage in his treatise, viz. "On the ground of policy, it seems that a settlement by a widow previous to her second marriage, of her estate on the children of the first marriage, will not be deemed fraudulent.” And in Cruise's Digest, vol. 4, p. 72, 3rd ed., the case is stated as authorising the proposition that "there is one case in which a conveyance founded on a moral consideration only has been held good against a subsequent purchaser, viz. that of a widow making a settlement on her children by her first husband previous to her marrying a second." If either policy or moral duty were really the ground of that decision, it might become a question whether it could be properly applied to a limitation in favour of the illegitimate son of the settlor; but it is difficult to understand how policy or moral duty can be sufficient to uphold Lord Hardwicke's decision at this day, seeing that the limitation 1861. CLARKE V. WRIGHT. 1861. CLARKE บ. WRIGHT. to the issue of the former marriage must still remain unsupported by any valuable consideration. It is more reasonable, I think, to say that Lord Hardwicke decided the case before the principles of law which would have guided him to a different conclusion were well understood; and that his decision, being in conflict with the doctrines which have since been firmly established, cannot now be regarded as binding; but must be classed with the numerous other cases which have been decided on this head of law by eminent Judges in earlier times, and have since been disregarded by the Courts on a fuller consideration of all the authorities on the construction of the statute. Judgment affirmed. April 19. The 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 42, 8. 22, which empowers the Court or a Judge in any action, the venue in which is by law local, to order a suggestion to be entered, that the trial may be had JOHN GREENHOW and EDWARD BURTON v. PARKER (a). DECLARATION That, at all times in this declaration mentioned, there was a union of the township of Preston Patrick, and divers other parishes and places, formed for the purpose of the administration of the laws for the relief of the poor by the name of the Kendal Union, which union was so formed pursuant to and in accordance with the laws in force relating to the poor, and was called the Kendal Union: that, at all the times, &c., there was a workhouse which had been, and was duly constituted to county, applies be, and was, one of the common workhouses or places of to penal actions within reception and relief of the poor of such township, parishes in another the 31 Eliz. c. 5, s. 2. A guardian of the poor who has knowingly supplied, for his own profit, goods for the use of the poor in the workhouse contrary to the provisions of 55 Geo. 3, c. 137, s. 6, and 4 & 5 Wm. 4, c. 51, is liable to the penalty thereby imposed whether the master of the workhouse to whom he sold the goods was authorized to enter into such a contract or not. (a) Decided in Easter Term. and places, pursuant to and in accordance with the same laws that there was a board of guardians of the poor for such union duly constituted and chosen, and the defendant was one of the guardians of the poor of such union, and had been elected, chosen, appointed and constituted such guardian pursuant to (4 & 5 Wm. 4, c. 76), and the other laws in force in that behalf, in respect of the township of Preston Patrick: that the defendant was appointed to be a person in whose hands the collection of the rates for the relief of the poor of the said townships, &c., forming the said union, and the providing for, ordering, management, control and direction of the poor of the said townships, &c., was placed, as such guardian, pursuant to, and in accordance with, the laws relating to the relief of the poor: and the defendant, while he was such guardian, and while he retained such appointment as such guardian, and while he was, and while he so retained such appointment as a person in whose hands such collection and such providing for, ordering, management, control and direction was so placed, did, before the commencement of this suit, in his own name, furnish and supply, for his own profit, and was directly concerned in furnishing and supplying for his own profit, divers goods and materials for the use of the said workhouse, and otherwise for the support and maintenance of the poor in the said townships, &c., so forming the said Union, he the defendant not having at any time obtained any certificate from any justice of the peace, or of any other person, permitting and suffering him so to do, or permitting him or suffering him to contract or agree for the purchasing, or supplying of the same, or any article or thing whatsoever, contrary to the form of the statute, &c., whereby an action hath accrued to the plaintiffs to demand and have of and from the defendant the penalty or sum of 1007., &c. 1861. GREENHOW v. PARKER. 1861. GREENHOW v. PARKER. Plea: Not guilty.-(By statute 21 Jac. 1, c. 4, s. 4.) The venue was originally laid in Westmoreland; but, by a Judge's order, made under the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 42, s. 22, it was directed that the trial should be had in the Northern Division of Lancashire; and a suggestion for that purpose was entered on the record. At the trial, before Keating, J., at the Spring Assizes at Lancaster, it appeared that the action was brought by the plaintiffs, who were two of the guardians of the Kendal Union in Westmoreland, against the defendant, for a penalty alleged to have been incurred by him under the 4 & 5 Wm. 4, c. 76, s. 51, and the 55 Geo. 3, c. 137, s. 6. It was proved that the defendant had been duly appointed a guardian of the Kendal Union, and that, while holding that office, he had sold a quantity of chaff for 30s. to one Jackson, the master of the Kendal Union Workhouse. The amount so paid was entered in the accounts of the workhouse. The chaff was used for making beds for paupers. The price was much greater than had ever previously been paid. The defendant's counsel submitted, first, that the plaintiffs must be nonsuited, because the trial should have been had in the county of Westmoreland, and, secondly, that though the goods were supplied to the master of the workhouse, it must be taken that the supply was personally to him; that there was no evidence of the supply of goods to the workhouse, and no contract with the guardians, or supply to them; and on this point he referred to the following orders of the Poor Law Commissioners. Art. 44. All contracts to be entered into on behalf of the union relating to the maintenance, clothing, lodging employment or relief of the poor, or for any other purpose relating to or connected with the general management of the poor, shall be made and entered into by the guardians. Art. 85. The guardians shall examine, &c., every bill exceeding in amount |