SPECIAL MESSAGE.-JANUARY 13, 1806.

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

I lay before Congress the application of Hamet Caramalli, elder brother of the reigning bashaw of Tripoli, soliciting from the United States attention to his services and sufferings in the late war against that State. And in order to possess them of the ground on which that application stands, the facts shall be stated according to the views and information of the executive.

During the war with Tripoli, it was suggested that Hamet Caramalli, elder brother of the reigning bashaw, and driven by him from his throne, meditated the recovery of his inheritance, and that a concert in action with us was desirable to him. We considered that concerted operations by those who have a common enemy were entirely justifiable, and might produce effects favorable to both, without binding either to guaranty the objects of the other. But the distance of the scene, the difficulties of communication, and the uncertainty of our information, inducing the less confidence in the measures, it was committed to our agents as one which might be resorted to if it promised to pro

mote our success.

Mr. Eaton, however (our late consul,) on his return from the Mediterranean, possessing a personal knowledge of the scene, and having confidence in the effect of a joint operation, we authorized Commodore Barron, then proceeding with his squadron, to enter into an understanding with Hamet if he should deem it useful; and as it was represented that he would need some aids of arms, and ammunition, and even of money, he was authorized to furnish them to a moderate extent, according to the prospect of utility to be expected from it. In order to avail him of the advantages of Mr. Eaton's knowledge of circumstances, an occasional employment was provided for the latter as an agent for the navy in that sea. Our expectation was, that an intercourse should be kept up between the ex-bashaw and the commodore, that while the former moved on by land,

our squadron should proceed with equal pace so as to arrive at their destination together, and to attack the common enemy by land and sea at the same time. The instructions of June 6th, to Commodore Barron, show that a co-operation only was intended, and by no means a union of our object with the fortune of the ex-bashaw, and the commodore's letters of March 22d and May 19th proved that he had the most correct idea of our intentions. His verbal instructions indeed to Mr. Eaton and Captain Hull, if the expressions are accurately committed to writing by those gentlemen, do not limit the extent of his cooperation as rigorously as he probably intended; but it is certain, from the ex-bashaw's letter of January 3d, written when he was proceeding to join Mr. Eaton, and in which he says, "Your operations should be carried on by sea, mine by land," that he left the position in which he was with a proper idea of the nature of the co-operation. If Mr. Eaton's subsequent convention should appear to bring forward other objects, his letter of April 29th and May 1st views this convention but as provisional, the second article, as he expressly states, guarding it against any ill effect; and his letter of June 30th confirms this construction.

In the event it was found that after placing the ex-bashaw in possession of Derne, one of the most important cities and provinces of the country, where he had resided himself as governor, he was totally unable to command any resources, or to bear any part in the co-operation with us. This hope was then at an end, and we certainly had never contemplated, nor were we prepared to land an army of our own, or to raise, pay, or subsist, an army of Arabs, to march from Derne to Tripoli and to carry on a land war at such a distance from our resources. Our means and our authority was merely naval, and that such were the expectations of Hamet, his letter of June 29th is an unexpected acknowledgment. While, therefore, an impression from the capture of Derne might still operate at Tripoli, and an attack on that place from our squadron was daily expected, Colonel Lear thought it the best moment to listen to overtures of peace then made by the bashaw. He did so, and while urging provisions for the

United States, he paid attention also to the interests of Hamet; but was able to effect nothing more than to engage the restitution of his family, and even the persevering in this demand suspended for some time the conclusion of the treaty.

In operations at such a distance, it becomes necessary to leave much to the discretion of the agents employed, but events may still turn up beyond the limits of that discretion. Unable in such case to consult his government, a zealous citizen will act as he believes that would direct him were it apprized of the circumstances, and will take on himself the responsibility. In all these cases the purity and patriotism of the motives should shield the agent from blame, and even secure the sanction where the error is not too injurious. Should it be thought by any that the verbal instructions said to have beeu given by Commodore Barron to Mr. Eaton amount to a stipulation that the United States should place Hamet Caramalli on the throne of Tripoli, a stipulation so entirely unauthorized, so far beyond our views, and so onerous, could not be sanctioned by our government; or should Hamet Camaralli, contrary to the evidence of his letters of January 3d and June 29th, be thought to have left the position which he now seems to regret, under a mistaken expectation that we were at all events to place him on his throne, on an appeal to the liberality of the nation something equivalent to the replacing him in his former situation, might be worthy its consideration.

A nation, by establishing a character of liberality and magnanimity, gains in the friendship and respect of others more than the worth of mere money. This appeal is now made by Hamet Caramalli to the United States. The ground he has taken being different not only from our views but from those expressed by himself on former occasions, Mr. Eaton was desired to state whether any verbal communications passed from him to Hamet, which had varied what we saw in writing. His answer of December 5th is herewith transmitted, and has rendered it still more necessary, that in presenting to the legislature the application of Hamet, I should present them at the same time an exact statement of the views and proceedings of the executive through this

whole business, that they may clearly understand the ground on which we are placed. It is accompanied by all the papers which bear any relation to the principles of the co-operation, and which can inform their judgment in deciding on the application of Hamet Caramalli.

SPECIAL MESSAGE-JANUARY 17, 1806.

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

In my message to both houses of Congress at the opening of their present session, I submitted to their attention, among other subjects, the oppression of our commerce and navigation by the irregular practices of armed vessels, public and private, and by the introduction of new principles, derogatory of the rights of neutrals, and unacknowledged by the usage of nations.

The memorials of several bodies of merchants of the United States are now communicated, and will develop these principles and practices which are producing the most ruinous effects on our lawful commerce and navigation.

The rights of a neutral to carry on a commercial intercourse with every part of the dominions of a belligerent, permitted by the laws of the country (with the exception of blockaded ports and contraband of war), was believed to have been decided between Great Britain and the United States by the sentence of the commissioners mutually appointed to decide on that and other questions of difference between the two nations, and by the actual payment of damages awarded by them against Great Britain for the infractions of that right. When, therefore, it was perceived that the same principle was revived with others more novel, and extending the injury, instructions were given to the minister plenipotentiary of the United States at the court of London, and remonstrances duly made by him on this subject, as will appear by documents transmitted herewith. These were

followed by a partial and temporary suspension only, without any disavowal of the principle. He has therefore been instructed to urge this subject anew, to bring it more fully to the bar of reason, and to insist on the rights too evident and too important to be surrendered. In the meantime, the evil is proceeding under adjudications founded on the principle which is denied. Under these circumstances the subject presents itself for the consideration of Congress.

On the impressment of our seamen our remonstrances have never been intermitted. A hope existed at one moment of an arrangement which might have been submitted to, but it soon passed away, and the practice, though relaxed at times in the distant seas, has been constantly pursued in those in our neighborhood. The grounds on which the reclamations on this subject have been urged, will appear in an extract from instructions. to our minister at London now communicated.

SPECIAL MESSAGE.-FEBRUARY 3, 1806.

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

A letter has been received from the Governor of South Carolina, covering an act of the legislature of that state, ceding to the United States various forts and fortifications, and sites for the erection of forts in that state, on the conditions therein expressed. This letter and the act it covered are now communicated to Congress.

I am not informed whether the positions ceded are the best which can be taken for securing their respective objects. No doubt is entertained that the legislature deemed them such. The river of Beaufort particularly, said to be accessible to ships of very large size, and capable of yielding them a protection which they cannot find elsewhere, but very far to the north, is, from these circumstances, so interesting to the Union in general, as to merit particular attention and inquiry, as to the positions on it best calculated for health as well as safety.